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ABSTRACT 
 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON THE PRICE OF INSURANCE 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. PROPERTY-LIABILITY 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
By 
 
JEUNG BO SHIM 
 
August 7, 2007 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Richard D. Phillips 
 
Major Department: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
Although the economic motivation and efficiency effects of mergers and 
acquisitions (M & As) in the insurance industry have been discussed, none of the prior 
studies have addressed the relationship between M & A activity and insurance price 
change. In addition, little is known about the effect of diversification on the differences in 
insurance price across lines. The main objective of the dissertation is to provide evidence 
on these issues. A secondary objective is to investigate the relationship between M & A 
activity and insurer’s efficiency and financial performance. We also examine various firm 
characteristics that affect insurance price differences across lines and that influence 
insurer’s efficiency and performance. We conduct fixed effects model regressions to test 
our hypotheses using unbalanced panel data over the sample period 1989-2004.  
The empirical tests indicate that the price of insurance for newly formed insurers 
decreases following the M & As and diversified insurers charge lower prices than less 
diversified firms. Our result is consistent with one possible explanation that acquiring 
insurers reduce overall underwriting risks and more efficiently manage the frictional 
costs of capital through geographic and/or product line diversification by engaging in the 
M & As and therefore gain a competitive advantage in pricing. Our analysis also reveals 
 10
a number of other interesting results. We find that insurance price is positively related to 
marginal capital allocation and inversely related to firm insolvency put value, suggesting 
the importance of incorporating insolvency risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines 
of insurance business. We also find that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost 
efficiency, consistent with the efficiency structure hypothesis. However, the market share 
variable is not significant, implying that market power that can arise from M & A activity 
may not be a big concern for insurance regulators. In the analysis of efficiency and 
financial performance, we provide evidence that acquirers’ overall cost and revenue 
efficiency and financial performances decrease following M & As. We also find that 
more focused insurers outperform the diversified insurers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. property-liability insurance industry has 
experienced significant changes of market structure owing to rapidly changing 
technologies, particularly advances in computing and communications, the increasing 
convergence of the financial marketplace, coupled with intense competition, and the 
increased catastrophic risk. The intensification of competition brought on by 
technological progress and increased exposure to catastrophic risk have constricted profit 
margins and put pressure on insurers to seek ways to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
Moreover, in response to periods of dynamic structural changes, insurance firms have 
attempted to enhance their performance and attract new customers by increasing their 
geographical access and the range of products they offer through M & A activity.  
The U.S. insurance industry has witnessed an increasing wave of merger and 
acquisition (M & A) activity in the 1990s, which draw widespread attention for 
commentators to investigate economic justifications and consequences of M & A activity.  
Among them, BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) find that mergers serve as an alternative form 
of market exit for insurers that are financially distressed. Chamberlain and Tennyson 
(1998) suggest M & A activity may be a reaction by the industry to fundamental shocks 
such as industry-wide depletions of capital due to large catastrophes, unanticipated 
inflation or even adverse asset returns. Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) suggest 
technological advances and increasing financial sophistication provide insurance firms 
with incentives to seek improvements in X-efficiency and economies of scale through M 
& As. They also find that M & As improve the efficiency of target insurers in the US life 
insurance industry. 
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Although the economic motivation and efficiency effects of M & As in the 
insurance industry have been discussed, none of the studies have addressed the impact 
that M & As activity will have on the changes in the price of insurance across lines of 
business. In addition, little is known about the effect of diversification on the differences 
in insurance price across lines. This is the first study that analyzes the direct relationship 
between insurer’s M & A activity and the price of insurance in the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry. Since U.S. antitrust policy is primarily concerned with the potential 
for collusive behavior (e.g., significantly increased market power due to M & As) within 
the industry, the findings of the relationship between M & As and insurance price 
changes are critical for anti-trust regulators in determining whether to strengthen or 
weaken existing anti-trust laws. 
Our analysis is guided by the theoretical propositions set forth in Froot and Stein 
(1998) and in the capital allocation literature (Myers and Read, 2001) which predicts the 
prices of illiquid and intermediated risks depend upon the firm’s capital structure and also 
on the covariance of an individual line of insurance relative to the riskiness of firm’s 
entire portfolio. As Froot and Stein point out in their capital budgeting model, given the 
capital market frictions that make raising external funds costly, financial institutions will 
behave in a risk-averse fashion and care about risk management. More specifically, Froot 
and Stein suggest that a business segment’s contribution to the overall variability of the 
cash flows of the bank is an important factor in assessing the risk of a specific segment 
and in the capital budgeting decision. This implies that firm capital structure, risk 
management, and capital budgeting are related.  
Myers and Read (2001) argue the costs of holding equity capital should be 
allocated to the individual lines of insurance such that the marginal contribution to firm’s 
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overall default risk is equal across all lines of insurance.1 Using this assumption, they 
develop a capital allocation rule where the capital allocated to the individual lines of 
business “adds up” to the overall capital of the insurer where prices then reflect these 
marginal allocations.   
In addition to the adding up property, a second important implication of the Myers 
and Read formulation relates to the portfolio of businesses supported by the capital of the 
insurer. For example, Myers and Read demonstrate theoretically that diversification by 
adding more lines of business with low covariability with the insurer’s current loss 
portfolio (or high covariability of loss portfolio with asset portfolio) can decrease the 
overall capital requirements of the insurer. 2 This implies that firms that engage in M & A 
activity in an attempt to acquire a portfolio of businesses utilize the capital of the firm 
more efficiently and thus, the price of insurance across lines in the newly formed insurer 
reflect not only the lower overall capital costs but also new capital allocation by lines of 
business.  
The capital allocation theory argues that competitive insurance price should 
reflect total capital requirements and their line-by-line allocations (Myers and Read, 
2001). The recent empirical study by Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006) provides evidence 
that insurance prices are directly related to the marginal capital allocations suggested by 
the Myers and Read (2001) model and also related to the covariability of losses across 
lines of insurance predicted by Froot and Stein (1998).  
The economic literature suggests other hypotheses in observing the setting of 
prices. For example, the market power (MP) hypothesis states that merging firms can 
increase prices by acquiring varying degrees of market power, earning higher profits (e.g., 
                                                 
1 Capital is defined as the net of total assets over liabilities. Capital is also called surplus in the insurance 
industry. 
2 Capital requirement is measured by capital-to-liability ratio (Myers and Read, 2001). 
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Berger and Hannan, 1989). The efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis posits that cost-
efficiency and scale efficiency are driving forces for price and profit. Berger (1995),  and 
Goldberg and Rai (1996) argue that prices may be relatively favorable for consumers of 
firms in concentrated markets or with large shares under the ES hypothesis because 
efficient firms with lower costs can set lower prices than other firms to attract more 
customers from competitors.  
Such tests that exclude efficiency and market power variables in observing the 
determinants of insurance price differences across lines of business may be problematic if 
insurance price, efficiency and market power variables are jointly determined and omitted 
variables affect significantly the differences in insurance prices across lines. Thus, we 
attempt to identify a number of possible determinants of insurance price differences 
across lines of business by incorporating efficiency, and market power variables into the 
existing empirical literature of insurance price. In this dissertation, we focus on testing 
three specific hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power 
hypothesis) to indicate whether these hypotheses are valid in determining insurance price 
differences across lines of business.  
The economic premium ratio is used to proxy for the price of insurance. The 
economic premium ratio for a line of insurance is defined as premiums written net of 
dividends to policyholders and underwriting expenses scaled by the estimated present 
value of losses. To examine whether the marginal capital allocated across lines are 
reflected in the differences of line-by-line insurance price, we employ Myers-Read 
methodology to implement marginal capital allocation by line of business. Myers and 
Read (2001) use the Black-Scholes option pricing model to estimate insurer’s insolvency 
put value and then allocate capital marginally by taking partial derivatives of firm’s 
insolvency put value with respect to the present value of loss liabilities for each line. We 
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incorporate cost efficiency into the regression model to examine whether ES hypothesis 
is valid. The market share variable is also included to control for the market power 
hypothesis. We also include geographical and/or product line diversification measured by 
Herfindahl index as explanatory variables to provide further evidence on the related 
hypothesis that diversified insurers charge lower prices.  
Another important objective of the dissertation is to investigate the relationship 
between M & A activity and insurer’s performance change. Although M & A activity 
impacts significantly the economic performance of insurance companies and their 
efficiency, limited evidence exists on the relationship between M & A activity and 
insurers’ efficiency and financial performance in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry in the current changing environmental context. In particular, there have been no 
significant studies of direct relationship between M & A activity and differences in 
performance across lines of insurance. Hence, this dissertation seeks to provide further 
information on whether the efficiency and performance of acquiring insurers are 
consistently enhancing or reducing following M & As using more recent and much larger 
sample data. In addition, we examine the relationship between M & A activity and line 
by line performance change by considering underwriting performance (measured by 
combined ratio and expense ratio) in each line.  
 Prior studies investigate the performance effects of diversification based on two 
alternative hypotheses- the strategic focus hypothesis and the conglomeration hypothesis. 
Pro-focus arguments state that firms can maximize value by focusing on core businesses 
and core competencies where the firm has a comparative advantage. It is also argued that 
conglomeration may aggravate agency problems by allowing cross-subsidization to poor 
subsidiaries (Jensen, 1986; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein, 
1998). In contrast, pro-conglomeration hypothesis asserts that operating multiple lines of 
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business can add value from taking advantage of cost scope economies that can arise 
from the shared use of resources such as information technology, customer database, and 
marketing distribution systems (e.g., Teece, 1980), or from revenue scope economies in 
offering “one-stop shopping” to customers who are willing to pay more (e.g., Gallo, 
Apilado, and Kolari, 1996). Conglomeration may also improve financial efficiency by 
creating internal capital markets which is less affected by capital market frictions 
(Gertner, et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). 
Despite substantial empirical research on the validity of the strategic focus and 
conglomeration hypotheses, there is little consensus on which hypothesis dominates in 
the insurance industry. Cummins and Nini (2002) find a positive relation between returns 
on equity and product line Herfindahl index in the property-liability insurance industry, 
consistent with the strategic focus hypothesis. Meador, Ryan, and Schellhorn (2000) 
conducted efficiency analysis to investigate the effects of product diversification for U.S. 
life insurers. Their results suggest that diversified life insurers are more X-efficient than 
their more focused counterparts. Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss (1999) suggest 
technological advances and increasing financial sophistication provide insurance firms 
with incentives to seek improvements in X-efficiency and economies of scale through M 
& As. They find that M & As improve the efficiency of target insurers in the US life 
insurance industry. Berger, et al.(2000) provide evidence that conglomeration hypothesis 
holds more for large personal lines insurers, while strategic focus hypothesis may apply 
more to small insurers that emphasize commercial lines. Their results suggest that the 
strategic focus hypothesis dominates for some types of insurers and the conglomeration 
hypothesis dominates for other types. Cummins, et al.(2003) examine whether it is 
advantageous for insurers to offer both property-liability and life-health insurance or to 
focus on one or a few specialized area by estimating efficiency scores using data 
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envelopment analysis. Their results provide evidence that strategic focus is a better 
strategy than conglomeration, consistent with the findings of most of the recent literature 
on diversification. 
The recent study by Cummins and Xie (2005b) investigates scale economies in 
the US property-liability insurance industry. They find that most small insurers operate 
with increasing returns to scale, thus gaining scale economies, while most large firms 
operate with decreasing returns to scale, indicating scale diseconomies. Their results 
imply that large insurers with decreasing returns to scale are already too large to be scale 
efficient. Cummins and Xie (2005a) provide evidence that larger insurers are more likely 
to be acquirers. They also argue that scale economies were not a predominant motive for 
M & As since non-decreasing returns to scale is unrelated to being an acquirer. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the efficiency of acquiring insurers is likely to decrease 
following M & A perhaps due to scale diseconomies and increased frictional costs 
associated with managerial conflict and agency costs.  
It has been argued that there is no single dominating hypothesis or theory that 
justifies M & A activity (e.g., Trautwein, 1990). In any given case, more than one motive 
may underlie the decision to merge. For example, the agency theory states that M & A 
activity is driven by the manager’s incentive to grow firm beyond its optimal size and the 
motive for M & A transaction may not be stockholder wealth maximization, but 
managerial self-interests that pursue manager’s private benefits (Jensen, 1986). The 
managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M & As may not create value or even destroy 
value because they may be the result of poor decisions by overconfident managers (Roll, 
1986). Bidding firm managers motivated by managerial hubris are likely to overestimate 
their own ability to manage an acquisition and overvalue the target, leading to 
overbidding. As a result, the hubris hypothesis predicts a negative gain for bidders. Other 
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things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency and skill of its 
management. Thus, we hypothesize that the financial performance of acquiring insurers 
is also likely to decrease following an M & A if the agency theory and the managerial 
hubris hypothesis are predominant motives for M & As. 
To examine the relationship between M & A activity and efficiency change, we 
estimate the cost, revenue, pure technical, scale and allocative efficiency of firms using 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is a mathematical programming (non-
parametric) approach that compares each firm to a “best-practice” cost and production 
frontiers formed by convex combination of the most efficient firms in the sample (Cooper, 
Seiford, and Tone, 2006). 3  The frontier efficiency method summarizes the overall 
performance of a firm into one score by taking account of the multi-dimensional 
production process of the firm. A firm is considered fully efficient if it operates on the 
frontiers, while any departure from the frontiers is measured as inefficiency. An 
advantage of DEA is that it is expected to yield more accurate results if the objective is to 
study the performance of specific units of observation, because the optimization is 
conducted separately for each decision making unit (DMU) (Cummins and Weiss, 1998). 
We also estimate the return on equity and on assets on the basis of balance sheet ratios as 
a measurement of firm performance.4
The primary data source for the study is from annual regulatory statements filed 
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The samples of M & 
A are identified through list of Best’s Insurance Reports-Property/Casualty. We also 
utilize the NAIC by-line quarterly data (1991-2004) to estimate underwriting returns 
                                                 
3 While the econometric frontier efficiency methodology requires the specification of functional form such 
as the translog to estimate the frontier and requires the distributional assumptions about error term, DEA 
method avoids this type of the specification error since it is not necessary to specify a functional form or 
distributional assumptions (Cummins and Weiss, 1998) 
4 A number of previous studies on M & As have been characterized by the use of stock price performance 
using event study methodology. We do not possess information on share price for the available data, since 
the majority of firms are not listed on the stock exchange. 
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which are used to obtain estimates of industry-wide volatilities and correlation matrix 
between the asset and liability portfolios. Data for the input prices used to estimate 
efficiency are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The quarterly time 
series of returns of asset classes are obtained from the standard rate of return series. Our 
analysis is based on merging or acquiring groups and unaffiliated insurers over the 
sample period 1989-2004 in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry because 
corporate strategies such as M & A decisions and investment strategies are likely 
performed at the group level (Berger, et al. 2000; Cummins and Xie, 2005). 
By way of preview, the results of empirical tests provide support for the 
hypothesis that the price of insurance for newly formed insurers decreases following the 
M & As and diversified insurers charge lower prices then less diversified firms. We find 
that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency, consistent with the 
efficiency structure hypothesis. However, the negative and/or insignificant signs for the 
market share variable indicate that market power hypothesis is not valid with our sample 
data. We also find that the price of insurance across lines are inversely related to the firm 
insolvency risk and are positively related to the marginal capital allocation. These 
findings have some implications that show the importance of incorporating insolvency 
risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines of insurance business.  
The analysis on insurer’s performance generally supports for the hypotheses that 
acquirers’ overall cost and revenue efficiency and financial performances decrease 
following M & As. This implies that the benefits of risk diversification through M & As 
tend to be offset by the additional costs associated with management governance and 
integration, allocation of resources, and administrative and regulatory issues. These 
results are consistent with the findings of recent empirical studies for the relationship 
between diversification and firm performance (e.g., Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). 
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The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior literature on the 
determinants of the insurance price. Chapter 3 provides an overview of various theories 
that explains M & As. Chapter 4 specifies hypotheses about the relationship between M 
& A activity and the price of insurance and insurers’ efficiency and financial 
performance. Chapter 5 discusses the rationale of capital allocation, and capital allocation 
methodology. Chapter 6 reviews DEA efficiency methodology. Chapter 7 describes the 
data and sample selection criteria. Summary statistics are also described in chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 explains the regression methodology for examining the relationship between M 
& A activity and price of insurance and presents the results of that analysis. Chapter 9 
discusses efficiency regression methodology and analyzes those results. Chapter 10 
discusses the regression methodology to investigate the relationship between M & As and 
insurers’ financial performance. Chapter 11 concludes the dissertation by summarizing 
the results and by discussing future extensions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
-DETERMINANTS OF INSURANCE PRICES 
 
How should insurance companies determine premium rates for insurance 
policies? Traditional actuarial approaches to pricing property-liability insurance contracts 
reflect a supply (insurer)-side perspective, relying on retrospective data to estimate the 
timing and level of future cash flows. Insurance prices are determined by a complex set 
of supply and demand relationships. Although more modern actuarial models (e.g., Borch, 
1974; Buhlmann, 1984) recognize the role of supply and demand in determining 
insurance price by modeling a market where buyers and sellers of insurance contracts are 
risk-averse utility maximizers, they have valued insurance apart from any financial 
market considerations.  
The insurance pricing models have developed continually in conformity with 
changes in tax laws, price regulation, and financial theories. Financial economists use 
financial theory to address the deficiencies of actuarial pricing models, incorporating the 
time value of money, investment income and surplus commitments. Financial theory 
views insurance policies as financial instruments that are traded in markets where prices 
also take into account the forces of supply and demand (Cummins, 1990b). The financial 
pricing approaches reflect equilibrium relationships between return and risk and 
competitive market constraints.  
The earliest financial insurance models are based on the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) (Cooper, 1974; Biger and Kahane, 1978; Fairley, 1979). The CAPM 
indicates that the invested assets earn the risk free rate of interest plus a risk premium; 
this implies that investors are rewarded for bearing systematic (beta) risk but not for 
taking unsystematic risk, i.e., risk that is uncorrelated with the market return. Because the 
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CAPM assumes that investors hold efficient asset portfolios, the market does not reward 
investors for risk that can be diversified away by holding a properly structured asset 
portfolio. The CAPM is used to derive the equilibrium rate of underwriting return called 
the insurance CAPM (Biger and Kahane ,1978; Fairley, 1979; Hill, 1979). Later, the 
arbitrage pricing model has been applied to insurance pricing (Kraus and Ross, 1982). 
Myers and Cohn (1987) develop the discounted cash flow model. A significant drawback 
of these models mentioned above is the lack of recognition of firm default risk. This issue 
is addressed through option pricing models. Several authors, including Smith (1977), 
Brennan and Schwartz (1979), Doherty and Garven (1986), Cummins (1988), Cummins 
and Danzon (1997), and Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998), have applied option 
pricing technology to insurance pricing. Both Cummins (1988) and Doherty and Garven 
(1986) use a more general form of the options relationship where both assets and the 
exercise price are random. Doherty and Garven (1986) use discrete-time risk-neutral 
valuation methods while Cummins (1988) employs the continuous time method 
underlying the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. Cummins and Danzon (1997) and 
Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) extend the insurance option model to the multiple-
line business. Descriptions and analyses of financial pricing models are presented in 
Cummins and Phillips (2001).  
This section first describes the insurance pricing characteristics and insurance 
risks that should be taken into account in pricing models. We then outline financial 
pricing models such as insurance CAPM, discounted cash flow model (DCF), option 
pricing model. We also discuss the issue of pricing of the intermediated risks under 
imperfect capital market.  
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2.1 INSURANCE PRICING CHARATERISTICS AND INSURANCE RISKS 
Financial theory views insurance companies as liability-driven financial 
intermediaries with equity capital and debt. As corporations issue bonds to raise debt 
capital, insurers issue debt capital (premiums) in the form of insurance policies. Insurance 
contracts are roughly analogous to the non-financial corporate bonds. This view suggests 
that financial theory often used to value traditional corporate debt can be applied to 
insurance pricing (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988). 
However, there are some unique characteristics of insurance debt that differ from 
conventional corporate bonds. For example, when most corporate bonds are issued, the 
maturity date and coupon payments are known in advance. In contrast, both the payment 
time and amount on a given contract for property-liability insurance are uncertain and 
stochastic due to contingent events such as the occurrence of fire and hurricane 
(Cummins, 1990b). Furthermore, although insurance pricing models often assume that 
premium is collected at the inception of the policy, it is possible in practice to spread 
premium payments over the policy period. For example, large commercial insurance lines 
may pay monthly premiums or may spread premium payments over the first three 
quarters of the policy year (Feldblum, 1992). In long-tail lines of business like product 
liability or workers’ compensation, losses are not paid until long after the accident has 
occurred due to several factors such as loss adjustment procedures and litigated claims.5 
Thus, insurance pricing that should incorporate both premium collection and loss 
payment patterns confronts some different problems that are not present in conventional 
financial instruments. 
The owners of the insurance company provide equity capital to support their 
insurance writings. When an insurer writes a policy, part of premium is used to pay 
                                                 
5 Industry-wide loss payment patterns are available from Schedule P of the Annual Statement, but industry-
wide premium payment patterns are not available. 
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acquisition, underwriting and administrative expenses. The remaining premiums along 
with equity capital committed to the firm by shareholders are invested in financial 
securities such as stocks and bonds to support the unearned premium reserve and the loss 
reserve. During the time lag between premium payment and loss settlement dates, 
insurers earn investment income. The shareholders’ investment is subject to a layer of 
taxes. The insurance company has to recover these tax costs when pricing. Investment 
income is one stimulus for insurance pricing models that account for time value of money. 
Because insurance cash flows exchanged at different times have different time value of 
money and investment income is considered in the price-setting process, the risks of 
economic inflation and fluctuating interest rates should be taken into account in pricing 
insurance contracts (Cummins and Phillips, 2001).  
Timing differences between premium payments and loss settlements and the 
resulting investment income were not considered in the earliest accounting pricing 
methods (Cummins, 1990). The most serious deficiencies of accounting models are that 
they use retrospective method rather than prospective to estimate cash flows. They 
typically measure policyholder funds (insurance premium) in proportion to loss reserves 
and unearned premiums. Reserves are not a perfect proxy for the amount and timing of 
future cash flow since reserves may be considered sunk costs which are irrelevant in 
pricing future policies.6 In addition, accounting models use embedded yields to obtain the 
rate of return on policyholder funds. The embedded yield is also unrelated to pricing 
insurance contracts since policyholder funds (net of expenses) will be invested at current 
market rates, not at the embedded yield. Most of the pricing errors of accounting models, 
which reflect the insurer’s retrospective data, can easily be corrected by following the 
basic principles of capital budgeting set forth in finance texts (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 
                                                 
6 See Cummins and Chang (1983) for detailed discussion. 
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2000). The recognition of these defects of the earliest pricing methods has led to 
development of more appropriate insurance financial pricing models.  
2.2 INSURANCE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM) 
The insurance CAPM was developed in Biger and Kahane (1978), Fairley (1979), 
and Hill (1979) to calculate a fair premium rate. The derivation begins with following 
formula:7
                                       
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
u uI r A r P= +Π = +                           aY                               (1) 
Where = net income and investment income, respectively 
Π  income less expenses and losses 
~ ~
,Y I
           u   = underwriting profit = premium
~
           A     = invested asset of the firm 
               = premiums collected from policyholders 
r    = rate of investment return on assets 
 equity (G), since invested assets (A) of the firm consists of liability (R) plus equity 
(G).  
P
~
a
~
ur    = rate of return on underwriting  
Tildes indicate stochastic variables. We obtain return on equity by dividing both sides of 
(1) by
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
1 ( 1)e a u a u
R Pr r r r ks r s⎛ ⎞= + + = + +                                       (2) 
            
 
expected underwriting p  underwriting profit margin is:  
                                                
G G⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Where = the premium-to-equity (or premiums-to-surplus) ratio /s P G=
/k R P= = the liabilities-to-premiums ratio (funds generating factor) 
The insurance CAPM can be determined by equating the CAPM rate of return on 
the insurer’s equity with the expected return given by equation (2) and solving for the
rofit. The resultant formula of the
 
7 Notations are taken from Cummins and Phillips (2001). 
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~ ~
( ) [ ( ) ]mu f u fr E r rβ+ −                                                 (3) 
Where 
~ ~ ~
= the beta of underwriting profits. The first component 
E r k= −
of equation (3), 
( , ) / ( )u m mu Cov r r Var rβ =
fkr− represents an implicit interest payment to the policyholders for the 
interest payment will reduce required profits on underwriting depending on the size,
use of their funds during the period between premium payment and loss settlement. The 
of the policyholder funds and the risk-free interest rate, 
 k , 
fr . The second term is to 
atic risks of underwriting. One of the 
limitati
e of its cash flows. Because insurance 
cash fl
                                                
compensate the insurance company for the system
ons for this model is that they did not take into account default risk. 
2.3 DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW MODEL 
The most prominent discounted cash flow (DCF) models developed by Myers and 
Cohn (1987) and by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) are based 
on concepts of capital budgeting. In capital budgeting, decision rules such as the net 
present value (NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR) method are utilized to accept or 
reject projects (Brealey and Myers, 2000). A fundamental principle of finance is that the 
value of any asset is equivalent to the present valu
ows on a given contract occur at different times, the DCF models provide an 
accepted approach to pricing insurance contracts.  
Under DCF models,8 all of the cash flows that include premiums, expenses, taxes 
and loss payments are projected, period by period and are then discounted to the 
beginning of the policy period by the appropriate discount rate. Myers and Cohn (1987) 
use a risk-adjusted discount rate, whereas the NCCI model uses an internal rate of return 
 
8 Cummins (1990) documents that accounting numbers are irrelevant in a DCF analysis except as they 
directly impact cash flows, implying that loss reserves and loss development factors are not related to DCF 
models.  
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to obtain a fair and competitive premium.9 Both Myers and Cohn and NCCI models are 
widely used. The former are discussed in this section.  Myers and Cohn (1987) determine 
the fair premium (P) as the present value of (1) loss and expen es 
), taxes on the 
investment balance (IBT), and taxes on underwriting profits (UPT) are paid at the end of 
plified premium formula in a two-period model is:11
se payments (L), (2) tax
on the investment balance (IBT), and (3) taxes on underwriting profits (UPT):10
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )PV P PV L PV IBT PV UPT= + +                                 (4) 
Premium flows are discounted at the risk-free rate since they are assumed to be riskless. 
However, loss flows are uncertain and risky, and thus are discounted at the risk-adjusted 
discount rate. An important feature of Myers and Cohn model is the concept of the 
surplus flow. Surplus is committed when the policy is written and it is released when the 
losses are paid. The insurance contract is a promise that compensates policyholders if 
contingent events occur. The worth of the promise depends on the financial strength of 
the insurer. The surplus committed by the shareholders supports its promise. The surplus 
committed to written policies and premiums paid in advance (investment balance) are 
invested and a tax on the investment income is paid at the end of the time. It is assumed 
that the funds (surplus plus premium) are invested at the risk-free rate, and therefore the 
tax on investment income is discounted at that rate. Tax shields that generated from 
underwriting losses are used to offset taxes on investment income or taxes on insurer’s 
underwriting profits. Assuming that loss and expense payments (L
the time period, sim
( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1L f L fr r r r
fP E rL P LP
ττ τ += + − +     
   
+ + + +
                                              
9 See Cummins (1990) for detailed comparison between Myers and Cohn and NCCI models 
10 The premium is defined as fair if insurer is indifferent between selling the policy and not selling it in 
terms of the market value of the insurer’s equity. 
11  The model generalizes directly to multiple periods with assumption that claims payouts are 
proportionally separated each period (Myers and Cohn, 1987) 
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(1 ) (1 )(1 )
f                             
Lr rf
SrL τ
τ= ++ − +                                                                 (5) 
Where S  = surplus committed by shareholders at the beginning of the time period 
Lr = risk-adjusted discounted rate 
fr = risk-free rate 
τ = corporate income tax rate 
The Myers and Cohn model is consistent with financial theory. However, how to 
estimat
ed to insurance pricing by several 
authors
ies have multiple cash flows, basic option 
models
e the risk-adjusted discount rate by line of business and the possibility of firm’s 
default are not considered. In addition, the question of the appropriate level of surplus 
commitment remains unanswered.   
2.4 OPTION PRICING MODEL 
The option pricing models have been appli
 (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988; Cummins and Danzon, 1992; 
Cummins, Phillips, and Allen, 1998). These option pricing models not only incorporate 
insurer’s default risk but also estimate key parameters more accurately than the previous 
pricing models like Myers and Cohn (1987) model.  
The basic insurance option pricing models view insurance pricing as analogous to 
the pricing of risky corporate debt (e.g., Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988). 
The value of an insurer’s promise to policyholders can be considered equivalent to the 
value of the riskless bond minus a put option written on the value of the firm. Although 
these option models (single period) studied by Doherty and Garven (1986) and Cummins 
(1988) provide important insights into insurance pricing, they have some limitations. For 
example, although most property-liability polic
 assume a single payoff. These models also assume that insurers produce only one 
type of insurance, whereas most real-world insurers write multiple types of coverage such 
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as homeowner’s insurance, auto insurance, medical malpractice insurance, and workers’ 
compensation (Cummins and Phillips, 2001).  
To remedy these defects, Cummins and Danzon (1997) and Phillips, Cummins 
and Allen (1998) extend the basic insurance option model to the case of multiple lines of 
business. The model developed by Phillips, Cummins and Allen (PCA) is discussed in 
this section.12 PCA assume that financial markets are competitive and perfect, and there 
are two groups of potential in that premium, equity, and 
s follo
surance buyers. It is also assumed 
liabilitie w geometric Brownian motion process: 
i P i P i pi i i
dP Pdt Pdzµ σ= +  
G G GdG Gdt Gdzµ σ= +  
i L i L i Li i i
dL L dt L dzµ σ= +                                                 (6) 
ues of liabilities for i=1, 2 Where , ,i iP G L = premium, equity, market val
            , ,P G Li iµ µ µ = drift parameters for premium, equity and liabilities for i=1, 2 
            , ,P G Li iσ σ σ =diffusion parameters for premium, equity and liabilities for i=1, 2 
            dz dz dz = increments of the Brownian motion processes 
d liabilities for i=1, 2 
The Brownian processes of liabilities  each other as follows:  
j
, ,P G Li i
 for premium, equity an
 and assets are correlated
1 2 1 2
,  ,  L L L L L G L G P L P Li i i j idz dz dt dz dz dt dz dz dtρ ρ ρ= = =  for i=1, 2 and j=1, 2. The premium, 
surplus and liabilities are pre mporal capital 
ri
relationship: 
sumed to be priced according to the interte
asset p cing model (ICAPM), implying the following expected rates of return 
P f Pi i
rµ π= + , for premium i=1, 2 
                                                 
12 Notations are taken from PCA (1998) 
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G fr Gµ π= +  
L L Li i i
rµ π= + , for liability class i=1,2                           (7) 
Where fr = ris free rate, r = inflation rate for liability class i, i=1, 2 and k Li jπ = the 
market risk premium for process , ,  and i ij P L G= , i=1, 2. 
If ICAPM is applied to the pricing of assets and liabilities, the risk premium is: 
( / )( )j jm j m m frπ ρ σ σ µ= −                                            (8) 
Where ,m mµ σ = drift and diffusion parameters for the Brownian motion process for the 
market portfolio and jmρ = the correlation coefficient between the Brownian motion 
process for the market portfolio and asset class j, where , ,  and i ij P L G= , and i=1, 2.  
 Given these premises of the pricing model and assuming that shareholders of the 
insurer have limited liability, the insurer has an option at the end of period when the 
payments of liability are due. The insurer can pay off the liabilities (L) if the premium 
account (or assets, A) exceeds the losses payable to policyholders; shareholders will then 
receive the residual value. The value of the shareholders’ claim on the insurer at the end 
of period is Max [A-L, 0]. The shareholders’ claim can be viewed as a call option on the 
surer
clare bankruptcy and turn its 
asset over to the policyholders. The policyholders’ claim tly 
rm, i.e., Min [L, A] = L-Max [L-
hu to the value of liabilities less the value of a 
put option known as the insolvency put.  
 Assuming that there are no frictional costs in the insurance markets, PCA derive 
the market value of line i’s claim on the insurer as follows: 
in ’s assets (A) with exercise price (L). If the insurer’s assets are not sufficient to 
cover the liabilities, the insurer with limited liability can de
 at the end of period is direc
analogous of the claim of the bondholders in a levered fi
A, 0]. T s, the policyholders’ claim is equal 
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( )r rf Li
i iP L e w
τ ( , , )Li I A L τ− −= −                                         (9) 
            = the nominal losses owed to line i 
Where = the market value of line i’s claim on the firm 
i
            ,
iP
L
f Li
r r = the risk-free rate and the liability inflation rate of line i 
            τ  = time of expiration of the option  
            Liw = /iL L  
            ( , , )I A L τ = the insurer’s overall insolvency put 
Equation (9) means that the market value of the policyholder’ claim for line i is equal to 
the nominal expected value of loss liabilities at the expiration period, discounted at the 
risk-free rate, minus the line i’s share of the insurer’s overall insolvency put option. PCA 
state that insolvency risk in line i’s claim depends on the firm’s overall insolvency risk, 
not just on the line-specific levels of risk since an insurer’ entire equity capital is 
available to any line of business where the losses are larger than expected. Thus, the 
market value of the line-specif aiic cl ms on the insurer are not expected to vary after 
control
t vary after adjusting for line-
with the results of Sommer (1996), and 
Cummi
ling for different liability growth rates by line and controlling for insurer’s overall 
default risk. PCA investigate empirically their theoretical model by using data on the 
publicly traded property-liability insurance companies. They find that the price measure 
for the short and long-tail lines within a given firm does no
specific liability growth rates. PCA also provide evidence that the price of insurance is 
inversely related to firm default risk, consistent 
ns and Danzon (1997).   
Cummins and Phillips (2001) document that option pricing models often depend 
on the assumptions of no-arbitrage and market completeness which are difficult to justify 
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for some insurance products. Additional research is needed to develop more realistic 
pricing models in imperfect capital markets with frictions.  
2.5 CAPITAL ALLOCAITON AND PRICNG OF THE INTERMEDIATED RISKS 
UNDER IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET 
Froot and Stein (1998) model the interaction between the capital budgeting and 
risk management functions of financial intermediaries under imperfect capital market 
situations where it is costly for financial intermediaries to raise new external funds on 
short notice and it is also costly to hold sufficient capital as a cushion for uncertain events. 
In their model, it is assumed that firms invest in liquid assets that can be frictionlessly 
hedged
 the firm to care about 
risk ma
                                                
 in the capital market as well as illiquid assets that can not be easily hedged. The 
costs associated with raising new external capital are also assumed to be a convex 
function of the size of the equity capital. The firm has an initial portfolio and chooses its 
capital structure at time 0. At time 1, the firm can invest in new risky products and makes 
hedging decisions for both initial portfolio and new risky products. The investment can 
be financed out of external sources.  Uncertain payoffs at time 2 not only affect firm’s 
need to raise costly external funds, but also give an incentive for
nagement. 
Based on their capital budgeting model, Froot and Stein (1998) demonstrate that 
the hurdle rate for illiquid, intermediated risks depends on the covariance of business 
segment with the market portfolio (systematic risk) as well as on the covariance with the 
firm’s pre-existing portfolio of non-tradable risks (unsystematic risk).13 Intuitively, the 
price of illiquid assets such as insurance policies reflects the covariance of an individual 
line of business with the riskiness of an insurer’s entire portfolio and an insurer’s capital 
structure, implying that prices across lines of business may vary.  
 
13 Froot (2003) recently extends their valuation function model incorporating asymmetrically distributed 
risks in formal corporate pricing and allocation metrics 
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The capital allocation literature (e.g., Merton and Perold; 1993, Myers and Read; 
2001, Perold; 2001, and Zanjani, 2002) is also related to the pricing of intermediated 
risks (The details of capital allocation are discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3). Capital 
allocation literatures posit that customers of financial intermediaries are strongly risk-
averse to firm default risk and thus financial intermediaries have an incentive to reduce 
insolvency risk by holding more capital, investing in safer assets, obtaining high quality 
reinsurance, diminishing interest rate risk and diversifying across lines of insurance. 
Assuming that insolvency risk mostly depends on the amount of capital retained by 
financi
costly due to financial market imperfections such as corporate taxation 
and agency costs. Thus, because of these costly risk management methods, safer 
insurance companies may require high price for their products (e.g., Cummins, 
Harrington and Niehaus, 1994).  
 summary, the implication from the brief review of risk management and capital 
allocation literatures is that the pr  of business reflects firm capital 
ructu
and the covariability among lines of insuranc
al firms, additional capital may benefit financial intermediaries such as banks and 
insurance companies by increasing the demand for firm’s products by consumers who are 
averse to insolvency risk (Cummins and Danzon, 1997) and by reducing the likelihood 
that firms lose franchise value(Cagle and Harrington,1995). However, maintaining 
financial capital is 
In
ice of given line
st re, costly surplus requirements and their allocation to individual lines of business, 
e and between firm’s overall assets and 
liability portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
 34
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW-THEORIES OF M & A MOTIVES 
 
The literature identifies several economic and financial theories that justify M & 
A activity. In this chapter, we provide an overview of the literature that we use to guide 
our empirical work.  
3.1 EFFICIENCY THEORY 
Efficiency theory suggests that M & As can be motivated to achieve synergies. 
Synergy is the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating 
opportunities that would not have been available to the firms operating independently. A 
synergy exists if the combined firm is able to operate better or more efficiently than 
before, even if the separate firms were efficiently managed.  
any dimensions of a firm’s 
activities. According to narrow technical 
 the firm is raised, outputs can increase 
proportionately. Other things equal, this reduces the unit costs of production. A change to 
Efficiency is a broad concept that can be applied to m
definitions of the most commonly used 
indicators of efficiency, a firm is cost efficient if it minimizes costs for a given quantity 
of output and profit efficient if it maximizes profits for a given combination of inputs and 
outputs. These definitions focus on how production factors are combined by comparing 
actual costs or profits of a firm with the costs or profits of the best performed firm. A 
broader concept of efficiency considers synergies, scale and scope economies. We 
categorize the potential sources of synergy into two types which are operating synergies 
and financial synergies. 
Operating Synergies: Economies of Scale and Scope 
M & As might be explained by the existence of operational synergies. Operational 
synergies stem from factors such as economies of scale or scope. In some cases, 
economies of scale are obtained through advanced production technologies which are 
subject to increasing returns to scale. If scale of
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such a
ield higher profits, leading to higher market concentration. The ES 
hypoth
 
brandin
ial capital. Another source of scale efficiency is earnings 
diversif
 technology in an industry provides motivation for firms to build additional 
capacity, resulting in higher outputs, greater profits where lower prices are economically 
feasible. The efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis suggested by Demsetz (1973, 1974) and 
Peltzman (1977) states that efficient firms increase in size and market share owing to 
their ability to y
esis predicts that firm profitability is positively related to concentration, and 
efficient firms charge lower price than competitors because either superior management 
or production processes can achieve lower costs. 
 In the case that market demand in the industry may not large enough to support a 
large number of the higher scale firms, even at lower unit output prices, the advantages of 
scale economy can still be achieved through M & As. Firms operating at below-optimal 
scale may also be able to achieve scale gains more quickly through M & As than through 
organic growth.  
Economies of scale may arise from the development of distribution networks,
g, and IT systems. Large scale also provides insurers with more resources and 
flexibility to adjust to changing market conditions. Scale economies might be present in 
the insurance industry because fixed costs are spread over a lager base and thus average 
costs are reduced as the size of firm increases. Fixed costs are present since insurance 
firms need for relatively fixed factors of production such as computer systems, 
managerial expertise and financ
ication (Cummins, Tennyson and Weiss, 1999). Operating at larger scale can lead 
to decrease in firm’s cost of capital if earnings volatility is inversely related to firm size.  
Studies for US insurance industry have found some evidence in favor of 
exploiting scale economies. Cummins and Weiss (1993) and Hanweck and Hogan (1996) 
provide evidence of scale economies for small and intermediate-size firms in the 
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property-liability insurance industry, suggesting that consolidation reduces average costs. 
Scale economies are also found in the life insurance industry (e.g., Grace and Timme, 
1992; Cummins and Zi, 1998). 
On the other hand, the argument for economies of scale as a major driver of 
insurance M & As may be criticized if frictional costs arising from post-merger 
integration problems outweigh any potential scale efficiency gains due to the 
organizational diseconomies of operating larger institutions. Larger organizations may be 
more complex to manage and may not be able to react quickly to changing market 
conditions, creating the possibility of inefficiency. Studies of US banks find that mergers 
produce no improvement in cost efficiency, especially for the transactions that involve 
 Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2000). 
 reduce consumer search costs and 
improv
very large banks (e.g.,
Economies of scope provide another important production theory rationale for M 
& As. Scope economies can be present for costs or revenues (Berger, et al. 2000). Cost 
scope economies can arise from the shared use of resources such as information 
technology, customer databases, managerial expertise, marketing distribution systems, 
and brand names (e.g., Teece, 1980). Revenue economies of scope are often said to arise 
from the opportunities of “one-stop shopping” that can
e service quality (e.g., Gallo, Apilado, and Kolari, 1996). 
Financial Synergies 
Takeovers occur in order to reap the benefits of financial synergies. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) assume that management knows more about the firm's value than potential 
investors. Asymmetric information between firms and capital markets can raise the cost 
of external funds relative to that of internally generated funds. The assumptions of 
information asymmetry make the form of financing important, predicting a disadvantage 
to equity financing and a value to internal financing.   
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The financial synergy theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that value may 
be created in mergers when firms rich in financial slack acquire slack-poor firms. Such 
gains can be realized if the information asymmetry between potential acquirers and slack-
poor firms is lower than that between outside investors and slack-poor firms. More 
specifically, a combination of a firm with excess cash and limited investment 
opportunities with a firm that has limited cash and high-return investment opportunities 
can yield higher value for both slack-rich firms and slack-poor firms. The slack-poor firm 
could g
rkets provide senior managers with the residual right of control of the 
ain from the merger by implementing positive net present value projects that 
might otherwise have been passed up due to costly external financing. The slack-rich firm 
can also create value by the investment opportunities brought about by the merger. Since 
takeovers can increase the values of both acquirers and targets by financing positive net 
present value projects that cannot be financed as stand-alone entities, M & As can be 
efficient way to achieve financial synergies. Hubbard and Pahlia (1999) find strong 
support for the financial synergy hypothesis, where diversifying acquisitions involve 
target firms that are financially constrained. 
Financial synergy is likely to show up by establishing an internal capital market 
through M & A activity. Weston (1970) states that resource allocation is more efficient in 
internal than in external capital markets, and thus merging firms lead to a more efficient 
resource allocation by creating a lager internal capital market. This work was extended by 
Gertner et al., (1994) and Stein (1997), emphasizing the potential efficiency-enhancing 
role of internal capital markets. Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) argue that 
takeovers may be value enhancing. In their study of external versus internal capital 
markets, the authors suggest that takeovers have an advantage in the efficient 
redeployment of the assets that are performing poorly under existing management. 
Because internal ma
 38
firm’s 
s 
positio
evidence that capital is allocated to subsidiaries with best expected performance, 
                                                
assets, these control rights offer increased monitoring incentives for the firm’s 
senior management as they receive more gains from monitoring. Stein (1997) also 
documents that firm takeover activities may improve financial efficiency by creating 
internal capital markets that is less affected by capital market frictions. Houston et al. 
(1997) state that bank holding companies create internal capital markets to allocate 
insufficient capital among subsidiaries. They find that the benefits of internal capital 
markets exceed the additional agency costs involved in coordinating actions within the 
holding company.  
Because insurance companies are required to report transactions with affiliates in 
mandatory filings to state insurance regulators, the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry provides a particularly interesting environment where to analyze internal capital 
markets. It is very common for insurers to be affiliates of an insurance group and capital 
transfers are active among affiliated insurers.14  Powell and Sommer (2004) provide 
evidence that internal capital markets are more active and play a larger role within groups 
of insurance companies than in non-financial firms. For example, affiliated insurers can 
exchange capital by assuming and ceding reinsurance. Because reinsurer pays for some 
portion of assumed liability shifted from ceding company, reinsurance can be used to 
increase a ceding insurer’s underwriting capacity and thus, increase the insurer’s surplu
n. 15  Therefore, the ceding company is basically using the reinsurer’s capital 
(surplus) to guarantee unexpected larger payments for such catastrophic losses due to 
natural disasters and industrial explosions. Eckles et al. (2005) explore the efficiency of 
internal capital market in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. They provide 
 
14 Insurers report capital transfers among affiliates in Schedule Y (Part 2: Summary of the Insurer’s 
Transactions with any Affiliates) of the annual statement. 
15 Insurer can also increase its surplus by selling its assets to affiliates for a price above book value or at the 
current market value (Eckles et al., 2005). 
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consistent with efficient internal capital markets. They also find that reinsurance among 
affiliates is the most common form of internal capital market transfer and dividend 
payment to affiliates and capital contributions are second most common transactions.16  
On the other hand, other authors suggest some deficiencies associated with 
internal capital markets (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and Stulz, 1998; and 
Scharfstein, 1998). These studies suggest that M & A activity may lead to inefficient 
cross-subsidization across segments that allow poor segments to drain resources from 
better-performing segments. 17  Shin and Stulz (1998) find some evidence of cross-
subsidization in diversified conglomerates. They argue that this diversification may be 
inefficient because it does not appear to depend on the investment opportunities of the 
subsidized segment. Scharfstein (1998) argues that M & A activities destroy value 
because management in merging firms does a poor job allocating capital-underinvesting 
in divisions with relatively good investment opportunities and overinvesting in divisions 
with relatively poor investment opportunities. Rajan et al., (2000), and Scharfstein and 
Stein (2000) argue that internal capital markets established by M & A activity can hinder 
investment efficiency because of agency problem that may generate inefficient 
mpello (2002) examines the function of 
interna
                                                
subsidization across business segments. Ca
l capital markets in the investment allocation process of financial conglomerates, 
using data from bank holding companies and produces some of mixed results. He finds 
that internal capital market result in inefficient cross-subsidization within small bank 
holding companies, but internal capital markets tend to play an efficiency-enhancing role 
 
16 Shareholder dividends are dividends paid to affiliates if they own a portion of the reporting insurer’s 
shares. Capital contributions are capital transfers from one affiliate to another in the form of cash, securities, 
real estate and surplus notes.  
17 Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995) document that merging firms trade at 
an average discount in U.S. stock markets relative to stand-alone firms. 
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in large bank holding companies. Despite substantial studies, there is no consensus on 
whether or not internal capital market is efficient. 
3.2 MA
concentration. Empirical studies examining bank 
perform
RKET POWER THEORY 
In economic theory, market power is defined as the capability of a firm to raise 
the price of a good or service without losing all consumers to its competitors. The market 
power theory suggests that merging firms can increase prices by acquiring varying 
degrees of market power, allowing firms to increase profits. This rationale is particularly 
true when the merging firms are direct competitors and their combination results in a 
substantial increase in market concentration within specified geographical or product 
markets (e.g., Shepherd, 1982).  
The market power theory is associated with the traditional structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) hypothesis. The SCP hypothesis suggests a positive relationship 
between profitability (or price) and 
ance and market concentration argue that banks are able to extract monopolistic 
rents in concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower deposit rates and to charge 
higher loan rates (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989; Berger, 1995). This reflects the setting 
of prices that are less favorable to customers in more concentrated markets. This 
hypothesis derived from the model of the oligopolistic behavior of firms implies that 
higher market concentration may facilitate collusion arrangements among firms (Stigler, 
1964). Collusive synergies represent no efficiency gains but wealth transfers from the 
firm’s customers (Trautwein, 1990).  
When direct competitors merge, especially when they already operate in a fairly 
concentrated market environment, increased market power is likely to be one of the 
factors motivating the consolidation. M & As that aims at achieving market power may 
be beneficial from the firm’s point of view, but are less favorable to customers due to 
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decreased pricing competition. This is often viewed as socially undesirable; as a result, 
antitrust policy is introduced with the aim of limiting the ability of firms to accrue market 
power. A primary goal of US antitrust legislation is to prevent a significant increase in 
market power by regulating M & A activity.   
A few studies have examined the effects of financial sector M & As on prices. 
The findings of these studies are inconsistent. In a study that examines the market power 
effects of bank megamergers, Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) find no evidence 
of significant price effects attributable to these bank mergers. Their measures of prices 
ts from balance sheets. Prager and Hannan 
(1998) 
industry, including the number and size of firms, is a function of fundamental factors 
                                                
are the aggregate of bank loans and deposi
examined the pricing effects of horizontal mergers in the local banking industry. 
Using deposit interest rates that banks offer their customers as a price measure, they find 
that banks operating in markets where substantial horizontal mergers took place exhibited 
greater declines in deposit interest rates than did banks operating only in markets where 
no such mergers took place. This finding is consistent with market power theory that 
bank mergers which substantially increase concentration lead to increased market power, 
resulting in price changes that are not beneficial to customers. 
3.3 INDUSTRY SHOCK HYPOTHESIS  
Industry shock hypothesis suggests that the extensive M & A and restructuring 
activity within an industry can occur as the result of industry shocks. Examples of 
industry shocks include changes in regulation, input price volatility, increased 
competition, and technological innovations (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). To support 
the proposition that industry shocks play an important role in a firm takeover and in 
restructuring activity,18 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) assume that the structure of an 
 
18 The term “Takeover” is used to refer to all types of mergers and acquisitions. 
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such as technology, government policy, and demand and supply conditions. Thus, major 
changes in any of these factors cause alterations in industry structure. For example, a 
shock-d
d competition. In addition, 
Coase 
cts of business, but also have changed the 
lationships between firms. 
riven reduction in demand can induce firms to abandon unprofitable lines of 
business, but it can also force firms to merge other business lines in order to react to the 
post-shock optimal size. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) assert that M & As can be the 
least-cost method for industry restructuring in response to economic shocks. Andrade and 
Stafford (2004) find a strong positive relation between industry shocks and own-industry 
mergers in the 1990s, consistent with recent findings by Mulherin and Boone (2000) and 
Andrade et al. (2001).  
Jensen (1993) documents that most M & As since the mid-1970s has been 
triggered by technological and supply shocks that improve productivity and create 
overcapacity. Jensen argues that firm takeover activities are efficient way of eliminating 
excess capacity since the solution of removing overcapacity by product market forces 
generates large, unnecessary costs. Andrade and Stafford (2004) provide evidence that 
excess capacity drives industry consolidation through mergers. The evidence of Andrade 
and Stafford (2004) suggests that industries restructured and consolidated by M & As as 
the economy adjusted to a variety of shocks to capacity an
(1937) identified technological change as a major determinant of firm size. Coase 
predicted, “Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of 
organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm.” An implication of Coase’s 
prediction is that M & A activity is related to technological change. Technological 
change has occurred at an explosive pace. Computer software applications and internet 
development have not only impacted all aspe
forms and nature of competitive re
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Golbe and White (1988) document that M & A movements have occurred when 
the economy experienced high rates of growth and coincided with particular 
developments in business environments. They argue that M & As are characterized by 
resource allocation and reallocation processes in the economy, with firms responding to 
new investment and profit opportunities arising out of changes in economic conditions 
and technological innovations. 
3.4. THE AGENCY THEORY  
The agency theory of M & As, proposed by Jensen (1986), suggests that value-
destroy
 of the firm. Given these circumstances, 
the mo
ight blind 
kholders. 
ing M & A activity is driven by the manager’s incentive to grow firm beyond its 
optimal size. Some managers’ interests seem to lie in making their firms the largest and 
most dominant firms in their industry or even in the entire market. In most acquisition, it 
is the managers of the acquiring firm who decide whether to carry out the acquisition and 
how much to pay for it, rather than stockholders
tive for acquisitions may not be stockholder wealth maximization, but managerial 
self-interests that pursue manager’s private benefits.  
In some cases, M & As can result in the rewriting of management compensation 
contracts. Managers may be motivated to increase their compensation by increasing the 
size of the firm through non-value maximizing mergers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). If 
the potential private gains to the managers from the transaction are large, it m
them to the costs created for their stoc
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that takeovers can be viewed as managerial 
strategies to achieve entrenchment. Managers choose manager-specific acquisitions so as 
to make themselves indispensable to their firm at the expense of shareholders. Managers 
benefit from value-destroying takeovers because of power and prestige associated with 
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managing a larger firm (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990) and because takeovers may reduce the 
risk of the mangers’ undiversified personal portfolio (Amihud and Lev, 1981) 
3.5 MA
 theory assumes that the stock market valuation for potential 
acquire
 argue that managers 
underst
RKET TIMING THEORY 
The market timing theory demonstrates that firm takeover activity can occur 
because of stock market valuation issues (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). The market timing theory does not imply that M & As could not be 
triggered by technological innovations, changes in regulation, or corporate governance 
issues, etc. Rather, the market timing theory suggests that stock market misvaluation 
impacts merger waves regardless of the underlying motivations for the mergers. 
The market timing
rs and potential targets can deviate from true values. The merging firm employs 
its relatively overvalued stock as currency to purchase the target firm’s stock. Such stock 
market driven M & As may have poor long-run stock performance due to the correction 
of misvaluation. Market timing theory predicts that stock deal acquirers underperform 
cash deal acquirers in the long run and that firms with overvalued equity might be able to 
make acquisitions while firms with undervalued or relatively less overvalued equity 
become takeover targets.  
A few recent papers model M & A activity as a result of stock market valuation. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theoretically model the impact of market valuations on the 
decision to acquire and the occurrence of merger waves. They
and stock market inefficiencies and take advantage of them by engaging in 
takeover activity. Stock is used to pay for acquisitions by overvalued acquirers who 
expect to see negative long-run returns on their shares, but are attempting to make these 
returns less negative. The model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also predicts that merger 
waves where managers will make stock-based acquisitions occur in high market 
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valuation periods. An implication of this prediction is that M & A activity will be higher 
in industries and markets with a large variation in stock valuation. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) develop a theoretical model where market 
values for acquirers and targets may deviate from true value. They argue that firm-
e merger waves in the absence of any 
underly
aluating target firms but 
underta
rs should be inversely related. 
specific and market-wide misvaluation can caus
ing reasons for the acquisition, such as synergy. Their model suggests the 
possibility of mergers increases with market overvaluation. Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson and Teoh (2003) find that market misvaluation impacts the volume of 
takeovers and overvaluation for both acquirers and targets influences virtually every 
aspect of the acquisitions including method of payment and bidder and target 
announcement period return.  
3.6 MANAGERIAL HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS 
The managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M & As may not create value or 
even destroy value because they may be the result of poor decisions by overconfident 
managers (Roll, 1986). Roll (1986) argues that acquisitions are motivated by managerial 
hubris. Managers are more likely to overestimate their own ability to manage an 
acquisition. Bidding firm managers make mistakes in ev
ke acquisitions presuming that their valuations are correct. They may overvalue 
the target firm, leading to overbidding, i.e., they will be infected by hubris. Out of over 
optimism, the bidder pays too much for the target causing a positive gain for target 
shareholders, but a negative gain for bidders. Each dollar paid to the target shareholders 
represents a dollar lost to the acquirers’ shareholders. The shareholder wealth of 
acquiring firm declines, while the wealth of target firm rises. Thus, the gains to the 
target’s and bidder’s shareholde
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Consistent with managerial hubris hypothesis, Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2003) 
find that during periods of high stock market valuation, managers are more likely to 
suffer from hubris and make poor acquisition decisions. Although the market initially 
welcomes acquisition announcements during stock market booms, the hubris-driven 
acquisitions undertaken during high market valuation periods earn negative abnormal 
returns in the long run. This suggests that the market learns over time as the true quality 
of the acquisition is revealed.  
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) investigate the relationship between firm-level 
valuation and the long-run firm performance of acquiring shareholders. It is hypothesized 
that the market overextrapolates the past performance of the bidder when it assesses the 
y that in “glamour firm” with low book to 
market
tive means to replace 
ineffici
value of an acquisition. They find empiricall
 ratios, managers are more likely to overestimate their abilities to deal with an 
acquisition, i.e., they are more likely to be infected by hubris. Such hubris-driven 
acquisitions destroy shareholder value, and bidders underperform during the three years 
following the acquisition. On the other hand, in firms with high book to market ratios, 
managers are more prudent in their acquisition plans. Because these acquisitions are not 
motivated by hubris, they tend to create shareholder value rather than destroy it.  
3.7 CORPORATE CONTROL THEORY 
Corporate control theory argues that M & As can be an effec
ent managers of the target firm and thereby improve the performance of the assets 
under its control (e.g., Jensen, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). In the absence of any 
internal method of control, or where such methods are not successfully implemented, the 
market for corporate control facilitates the dismissal of non-value-maximizing managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). In these takeover contracts, the bidder deals directly with the 
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target’s shareholders, rather than with its management. A bidder who gains the required 
votes assumes control and then gets rid of the incumbent managers. 
Other things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency 
and skill of its management. If the present and expected future earnings are below their 
potential amount due to relatively inefficient or lackadaisical management, the market 
will underestimate the firm value below the level that the firm’s asset would have under a 
more efficient management. An opportunity then exists for more competent and skillful 
firm to purchase this underperformed firm at a price below its potential value and make a 
profit by removing incompetent target management and operating the firm efficiently. 
Such takeover attempts represent what Manne (1965) termed the “market for corporate 
control,” If the market operates in this fashion, it is socially beneficial because it tends to 
shift control of corporate assets from less to more efficient management.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HYPOTHESES 
 
4.1 THE IMPACT OF M & A ON INSURANCE PRICES  
 
One primary implication of the option pricing model for insurance is that the price 
of insurance is inversely related to firm default risk (e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997; 
Phillips, Cummins and Allen, 1998). As capital allocation literatures (e.g., Merton and 
Perold; 1993, Myers and Read; 2001, Perold; 2001, and Zanjani, 2002) point out, 
custom
 the firm by pooling uncorrelated risks. Most property-liability companies write 
multipl
ers of financial intermediaries are strongly risk-averse to firm default risk and thus 
customers are willing to pay higher premium for safer firms. Given that the firm default 
risk generally depends on the amount of capital retained by insurers relative to liabilities, 
financial intermediaries have an incentive to reduce insolvency risk by holding more 
capital. As the amount of capital held increases, the frictional costs of holding capital 
increase due to capital market imperfections. Thus, insurers that properly manage the 
frictional costs of capital will have a competitive advantage in pricing. Insurers have a 
motivation to manage capital costs through M & A activity by engaging in a portfolio of 
businesses that more efficiently utilizes the capital of the firm.  
A frequently stated motive for mergers and acquisition activity is a desire to 
diversify
e lines of insurance. The multi-line insurer may reduce insolvency risk by 
diversifying its exposures across lines of business or geographic locations since the 
businesses in the portfolio coinsure one another. For instance, risk characteristics and loss 
variability of property insurance are likely to differ from those of liability insurance. Both 
property and liability insurance may have a function of offsetting underwriting risks. 
Therefore, diversification enables firms to reduce its overall underwriting risk and thus 
can lower the amount of capital that insurer should hold to support insurance risks if the 
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lines of businesses are not perfectly correlated with one another (Merton and Perold, 
1993).  
An important implication of diversification effect is that the risk of the portfolio 
of businesses will be less than the sum of the stand-alone risks of the businesses; firms, 
then, would be required to hold less capital to support uncertain events since a particular 
line that may have high capital requirement on a stand-alone basis but has offsetting risks 
with other lines of business in the context of portfolio of businesses (Merton and Perold, 
1993). Myers and Read (2001) show that if each line of business is assumed to be 
organized as a stand-alone firm, total surplus requirements for those lines increase 
because of loss of diversification. If we do not consider the effect of diversification when 
allocating capital by lines of business, we may overestimate the cost of capital for that 
specific line, leading to overpricing of that risk. Perold (2001) argues that diversification 
across business segments diminishes the firm’s deadweight cost of risk capital. The 
marginal capital allocation formula proposed by Myers and Read (2001) illustrate that 
diversification by adding more lines of business with low covariability with the insurer’s 
current loss portfolio (or high covariability of loss portfolio with asset portfolio) can 
decrease the overall capital requirements of the insurer. This implies that firms that 
engage in M & A activity in an attempt to acquire a portfolio of businesses utilize the 
capital of the firm more efficiently. Thus we hypothesize that the price of insurance for 
newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As since the price of insurance 
across lines in the newly formed insurer reflects the lower capital costs. Diversified firms 
across lines of business or geographic locations can reduce its overall underwriting risk 
and, thus, can lower the amount of capital that the insurer is required to hold to support 
insurance risks if the businesses in the portfolio coinsure one another. Accordingly, we 
predict that diversified firms will charge lower prices than less diversified insurers.  
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In the classical theoretical paradigm of the perfect capital market with perfect 
information and without taxes, transaction costs and bankruptcy costs, the pricing of 
specific risks should be constant across all financial institutions and should not depend on 
the characteristics of an individual financial firm’s portfolio. In reality, financial markets 
do not operate without frictions such as taxation, regulatory environment and asymmetric 
information between managers and outside investors. Because holding capital is costly 
due to these market frictions, financial institutions may not hold sufficient capital to 
eliminate all insolvency risk. When financial intermediaries have to raise capital 
externa
                                                
lly, imperfect capital markets impose deadweight costs that must be covered by 
the cash flows of a business line. Therefore, in order for insurers to survive in imperfect 
capital markets with frictions, insurance price by line of business should reflect firm 
capital structure, the covariance among lines of business and between asset and liability 
portfolios as well as the amount of marginal capital allocated to each line of business. 
The recent empirical study by Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006) provides evidence that 
insurance prices are directly related to the marginal capital allocations suggested by the 
Myers and Read (2001) model and also related to the covariability of losses across lines 
of insurance predicted by Froot and Stein (1998).  
The economic literature suggests other hypotheses in observing the setting of 
prices. For example, the market power (MP) hypothesis states that mergers may be 
motivated by the firm’s desire to set prices that are less favorable to consumers, earning 
higher profits.19 Berger and Hannan (1989), and Hannan (1991) provide evidence that 
support the market power hypothesis by examining the relationship between price and 
 
19 A related hypothesis is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. The SCP hypothesis asserts 
that consumers are treated less favorably in more concentrated markets as a result of anti-competitive price 
settings in these markets (Berger, 1995). In many of these studies, profitability is regressed against 
concentration and/or market share. Some argue that the finding of a positive, dominating coefficient 
estimate for market share and an insignificant coefficient for concentration explains the market power (MP) 
hypothesis, which relates market share to market power (Shepherd, 1982; Kurtz and Rhoades, 1991). 
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concentration or market share. They find that retail deposit rates are set less favorably for 
consumers in more concentrated markets or with larger market shares. Sapienza (2002) 
examines the effects of banking mergers on individual business borrowers. He finds that 
if the merger is between banks previously operating in the same geographical area (in-
market
mergers), then the decrease in interest rates is not as significant. His findings 
support
 mergers) and such mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market 
shares, interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease substantially, which are 
beneficial to borrowers. This result is consistent with the view that horizontal mergers 
generate efficiency gains. However, as the local market share of the target bank increases, 
the efficiency effect is offset by market power. He also provides evidence that if the 
merger is between banks previously operating in different geographical areas (out-of-
market 
 the view that in-market mergers achieve higher efficiency gains than do out-of-
market mergers. 
The efficiency-structure hypothesis argues that more efficient firms charge lower 
prices than competitors, gaining large market shares that may result in high levels of 
concentration since these firms with superior management or production technologies 
have lower costs (Demsetz, 1973, 1974; Peltzman, 1977). The efficient-structure (ES) 
hypothesis posits that cost efficiency and scale efficiency are driving forces for price and 
profit after controlling for the impact of other variables (Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 
1996). 
Tests that exclude efficiency and market power variables in observing the 
determinants of insurance price differences across lines of business may be problematic if 
insurance price, efficiency and market power variables are jointly determined; and 
omitted variables significantly affect the differences in insurance prices across lines. Thus, 
we hypothesize that insurance price differences by line of business may reflect the joint 
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effects of marginal capital allocation, efficiency, and market power. We attempt to 
identify a number of possible determinants of insurance price changes across different 
lines by incorporating efficiency, and market power variables into the existing empirical 
literature on insurance price. In this dissertation, we focus on testing three specific 
hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power hypothesis) to 
indicate whether these hypotheses are valid in determining insurance price differences 
across lines of business. Specifically, we hypothesize that variations in prices by lines of 
 if 
capital 
4.2 TH
business are directly related to corresponding variations of marginal capital allocation
allocation theory holds. This hypothesis is related to the proposition of Myers and 
Read (2001) and Zanjani (2002) that differences in marginal capital allocation by lines of 
business generate price differences across lines of insurance. In addition, we test whether 
both efficiency structure and market power hypothesis is valid. If the efficiency structure 
hypothesis holds, we expect negative relationship between insurance price and cost 
efficiency, while positive relationship between price of insurance and market share is 
predicted under the market power hypothesis.  
 
E EFFECT OF M & A ON EFFICIENCY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. property-liability insurance industry has 
experienced significant changes of market structure. In response to rapid changes in new 
computer and communications technologies and regulatory framework, insurance firms 
have attempted to improve their efficiency and attract new customers by increasing their 
geographical access and the range of products they offer through M & A activity. 
Furthermore, the intensification of competition brought on by technological change and 
increased exposure to catastrophic risk have constricted profit margins and have put 
pressure on insurers to seek ways to reduce costs and improve efficiency.  
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It is documented that M & As are value-increasing events (e.g., Shepherd, 1982; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hubbard and Pahlia, 1999; Berger, DeYoung, and Udell, 2001).  
Value increasing may arise from economies of scope or scale, increases in managerial 
efficiency, creation of market power, improvements in production techniques, lower 
income
adjust to changing market conditions, but also makes it easier to change 
produc
 volatitlity, or financial synergies. Economies of scope provide an important 
production rationale for M & As. Scope economies can be present for costs and revenues. 
Joint production of outputs can lead to lower costs and higher revenues than production 
by separate firms. Cost scope economies can arise from the shared use of resources such 
as information technology, customer database, managerial expertise, marketing and 
distribution systems, and brand names across several businesses within the firm (Teece, 
1980). Revenue economies of scope may arise from the opportunities of “one-stop 
shopping” that can reduce consumer search costs and improve service quality (Berger, et 
al. 2000). 
Firms operating at a below-optimal scale can achieve scale gains through M & A. 
Insurers that expand their size by merging with others to obtain optimal operating scale 
are able to allocate fixed costs such as the cost of information and technology systems 
and advertising expenses over a larger volume of output, thus reducing average costs and 
improving profitability. Large scale not only provides insurers with more resources and 
flexibility to 
t focus and exit or sell unprofitable lines of business. Studies for US insurance 
industry have found some evidence in favor of exploiting scale economies. Cummins and 
Weiss (1993) and Hanweck and Hogan (1996) provide evidence of scale economies for 
small and intermediate-size firms in the property-liability insurance industry, suggesting 
that consolidation reduces average costs. Scale economies are also found in the life 
insurance industry (e.g., Grace and Timme, 1992; Cummins and Zi, 1998). Cummins and 
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Santomero (1999) also find that economies of scale exist in the life insurance industry. 
They find that the majority of small insurers operate at a level where increasing returns to 
scale apply.  
The source of scale efficiency may be particularly applicable to insurers, because 
the essence of insurance is risk diversification through pooling. By increasing the 
magnit
ummins, 
Tennys
ies of US banks find that mergers 
produc
ude of the insurance pool through geographical or product diversification, 
expected losses become more predictable and earnings volatility can be reduced. There is 
no question that, as long as the prospective earnings of the combining insurers are not 
perfectly correlated, the newly formed insurer will yield an income stream for its owners 
having a lesser degree of dispersion than was attainable only from one of its predecessors 
(Lewellen, 1971). The less volatile earnings that reduce the expected costs of financial 
distress or bankruptcy may permit insurers to hold less equity capital for risks 
underwritten, providing a potentially significant source of cost reduction (C
on and Weiss, 1999). 
On the other hand, the argument for economies of scale and scope as a major 
driver of insurance M & As may be criticized if frictional costs arising from post-merger 
integration problems outweigh any potential scale efficiency gains due to the 
organizational diseconomies of operating larger institutions. Larger organizations may be 
more complex to manage and may not be able to react quickly to a changing market 
conditions, creating the possibility of inefficiency. Stud
e no improvement in cost efficiency, especially for the transactions that involve 
very large banks (e.g., Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger, 2000).  
M & A activity can also lead to increase in costs due to the aggravated agency 
problems and inefficiencies of internal capital market. As firms become larger and more 
complex, managerial monitoring becomes more difficult and thus the costs of governance 
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will increase. In addition, managers are more likely to engage in activities that maximize 
their private benefits and to subsidize poor business segments since larger internal capital 
market enables managers to avoid the market discipline that comes with external 
financing (Easterbrook, 1984; Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
ustry. They provide evidence that the majority of small 
to med
to scale 
diseconomies and increased frictional costs associated with post-merger managerial 
integration and agency problems.  
The agency theory states that M & A activity is driven by the manager’s incentive 
to grow firm beyond its optimal size and the motive of M & As may not be stockholder 
wealth maximization, but managerial self-interests that may increase manager’s 
perquisite consumption (Jensen, 1986). The managerial hubris hypothesis suggests that M 
& As may not create value or even destroy value because they may be the result of poor 
decisions by overconfident managers (Roll, 1986). Bidding firm managers motivated by 
managerial hubris are likely to overestimate their own ability to manage an acquisition 
and overvalue the target, leading to overbidding. As a result, the hubris hypothesis 
predicts a negative gain for bidders. 
The recent study by Cummins and Xie (2005b) investigate scale economies in the 
US property-liability insurance ind
ium-size firms operate with increasing returns to scale and most large insurers 
show scale diseconomies, implying that large insurers with decreasing returns to scale are 
already too large to be scale efficient. Cummins and Xie (2005a) provide evidence that 
larger insurers are more likely to be acquirers. They also argue that scale economies were 
not a predominant motive for M & A since non-decreasing returns to scale is unrelated to 
being an acquirer. This provides a rationale for the hypothesis that the efficiency of 
acquiring insurers is likely to decrease following M & A perhaps due 
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Other things being equal, the level of a firm’s earnings depends on the efficiency 
and skill of its management. Thus, we hypothesize that the performance of acquiring 
insurers (measured by ROA or ROE) is also likely to decrease following an M & A if the 
agency theory and the managerial hubris hypothesis are predominant motives for M & As. 
On the other hand, the performance of acquiring insurers is likely to improve following 
an M & A if M & A activity is driven by value maximizing motivations such as 
economies of scale and scope, financial efficiency and earnings diversification. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPITAL ALLOCATION RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We discuss the rationale of capital allocation and Myers-Read capital allocation 
methodology in this chapter. 
5.1 THE RATIONALE OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
Because most policyholders purchase insurance policies to protect against adverse 
financial contingencies and they are strongly risk-averse with respect to insurer default on 
contractually-promised payoffs, insurers need to hold capital in order to secure 
policyholders’ unexpected claims (Merton and Perold, 1993). The principal role of 
holding cap
20
21 gulatory restrictions that may 
require in
                                                
ital in the insurance company is to keep the probability of bankruptcy low by 
increasing ability to pay insurance claims even under adverse circumstances. However, 
holding capital is costly because of frictional costs that include double taxation, 
regulatory and agency costs.  More precisely, when shareholders provide capital to 
insurance companies, the investment return is first taxed at the corporate level as 
insurer’s taxable income and then again as part of shareholder’s taxable income when 
distributed as dividends.  Regulatory costs occur due to re
surers to hold minimum levels of capital or in the form of conservative 
reserving standards. Shareholders may demand an additional return on their investment 
due to these frictional costs and thus in order to be profitable, insurers need to issue 
insurance policies with more than their production costs including frictional capital costs 
(Hancock, et al., 2001; Myers and Read; 2001).  
Given that holding capital is costly and insurers should keep a specified level of 
capital to meet regulation requirements, managing the cost of capital is of particular 
importance in providing insurance policies, especially catastrophe insurance that needs 
 
20 Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and others illustrate that the costly external finance and frictional 
costs of holding capital are the driving force behind the firm’s motivation to manage risk. 
21 Smith and Stulz (1985) note how nonlinear (or convex) tax schedules give rise to a rationale for hedging. 
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large amounts of supporting capital. As the amount of capital held increases, the 
frictional costs of holding capital may consist of large portions of the insurance premium 
(Zanjani, 2002). Thus, insurers that properly manage frictional costs will have a 
competitive advantage in pricing.  
promised payments, they prefer insurer’s strong financial 
and thus, are willing to pay more for 
that. 
hat is needed to obtain an insurer’s desired 
default
summed up over insurer’s all lines of business yields the total amount of equity capital of 
                                                
Insurers have an incentive to manage capital costs through risk management. 
Effective risk management not only promotes stability, but also provides a protection 
against unexpected losses. This protection is obtained primarily through the maintenance 
of an appropriate level of economic capital by financial institution. The risk management 
process involves estimating how much risk each business segment contributes to the total 
risk of the firm and thus to overall capital requirements. Capital held by the firm is then 
allocated across lines of business reflecting the varying risk level of individual lines of 
business. All else equal, more (less) risky lines may require more (less) capital and thus 
demand higher (lower) prices. Because policyholders are concerned about counterparty 
default risk on contractual 
strength that guarantees to pay unexpected losses 
Myers and Read (2001) argue that the essential rationale of the capital allocation 
is to allocate the frictional costs of holding capital to the individual lines of business 
depending on the marginal contribution of individual lines of business to firm’s overall 
default value. Specifically, if a new line of business through M & A activity is added to 
the existing portfolio, additional capital t
 value will be determined. Once this additional capital amount is known, the cost 
of surplus due to adding a new line of business can be calculated.22 The additional capital 
 
22 Cummins and Phillips (2005) develop the estimation model of cost of capital by lines of business in the 
property-liability insurance industry using full information industry beta approach.  
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the insurer. Thus, capital allocation can be considered a way to represent the allocation of 
the costs of holding capital.  
5.2 METHODS OF CAPITAL ALLOCATION 
It is well documented in the financial pricing of insurance literatures that option 
pricing model is utilized in analyzing firm default risk and surplus requirements (e.g., 
Doherty and Garven, 1986; Cummins, 1988, and Phillips et al,1998). The option pricing 
model is also adopted to calculate marginal capital allocation (Merton and Perold, 1993; 
Myers and Read, 2001). Both Merton-Perold and Myers-Read provide a capital allocation 
rule based on a default insurance concept.  
Merton-Perold capital allocation is conducted using incremental method. For 
example, assume there are firms with three lines of business; the first step is to calculate 
the risk capital required by firms that combine two of business lines.23 The second step is 
to calcu
                                                
late the risk capital required for the full portfolio of businesses of the firms, i.e., 
adding the excluded business to the two-business firms. Marginal capital allocation by 
line of business is then the difference between the risk capital of two-business firms 
obtained from the first step and the required risk capital for all three businesses. Merton 
and Perold show that the risk capital of a multi-line business firm is less than the 
aggregate risk capital of the business on a stand-alone basis when the businesses are not 
perfectly correlated with one another. Merton-Perold method is appropriate when 
considering entering new businesses or getting out of existing businesses since their 
methodology allows for discrete changes in the portfolio of businesses of the insurer. 
However, the key deficiency of their model is that 100 percent allocation is not feasible 
across the lines of business. 
 
23 Merton-Perold(1993) define risk capital as the smallest amount that can be invested to insure the value of 
the firm’s net assets against a loss in value relative to the risk-free investment of those net assets.  
 60
Unlike Merton-Perold method, Myers-Read method (2001) uniquely allocates 100 
percent of total capital of the firm. Relying on the assumption that insurer’s future losses 
and ass
e policy and the premium a policyholder is willing to 
pay for
                                                
et values are lognormally or normally distributed, 24 Myers and Read use the 
Black-Scholes option pricing model to estimate insurer’s insolvency put value. Assuming 
an entity with limited liability, an insurance company does not pay losses if loss liabilities 
exceed insurer’s assets. The insurer defaults and the payoff to the policyholder is loss 
minus max (L-V, 0) where L represents losses and V is assets.  Insolvency put value is 
measured as max (L-V, 0). It can be said that the insurer holds an option to put the default 
costs to the policyholders. As the insurer has the option to default on their liabilities in 
the event of insolvency, this insolvency put option can be an asset to the insurer, but 
lowers the present value of insuranc
 it. As mentioned earlier, maintaining solvency ability to a specified level causes 
frictional costs for an insurer. 
Myers-Read (2001) argue that marginal contribution of individual lines of 
business to firm’s overall default value does vary and surplus (equity capital) should be 
allocated by lines of business based on these marginal contributions such that the 
marginal contribution to firm’s overall default value is equal across all lines of insurance. 
They find a unique capital allocation method that leads to the “adding up” property; the 
equity capital allocated to the individual lines of business “add up” to the overall equity 
capital of the insurer. In their model, although the total capital requirement of the insurer 
is not explicitly specified, it could be taken to be the amount of capital to keep up the 
desired safety level of the insurer.  
Zanjani (2002) develops multi-line insurance pricing and capital allocation model. 
He demonstrates that capital costs have a significant impact on the prices of 
 
24 Myers and Read emphasize that their result is independent of the distribution assumptions for the 
insurer’s entire losses and assets portfolio(2001, p.573) 
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intermediated risks, based on three key assumptions that (1) insurers are exposed to 
default risk due to uncertain loss events, (2) it is costly for insurers to hold capital, (3) 
consum
is driven by high marginal capital requirements 
als 
capital requirements. Segments 
with ris
olvency put 
RIX
ORTFOLIO 
 
capital allocation are the volatility and the correlation matrix for both asset portfolio 
rtfolio returns. Other things equa  is 
 the certain amount of capital, 
the insolvency put value of the insurer depends on the respective volatility of asset return 
ers care about the insolvency risk of insurers. Capital market frictions provide an 
economic rational for risk management and capital allocation by lines of business 
depends on the contribution of an individual line of business to the overall firm 
insolvency risk. Consumer demand for product quality may lead firms to charge high 
prices for high-risk segments, which 
(Merton and Perold; 1993; Myers-Read, 2001). Zanjani proposes that “price differenti
across market are explained by differences in marginal 
k that threatens company solvency will have higher marginal capital requirements 
and higher prices due to implicit capital costs, even if that risk is unrelated to the broader 
securities markets.” which is consistent with the results of Froot-Stein (1998), and Myers-
Read (2001). 
We employ Myers-Read methodology to calculate marginal capital allocation by 
line of business in the present paper. We first describe the estimation of volatility and 
correlation matrix between asset and liability portfolio that are needed to implement 
capital allocation. We then discuss Myers-Read’s formula to estimate ins
value and marginal capital allocation. 
5.2.1. THE ESTIMATION OF VOLATILITY AND CORRELATION MAT  
BETWEEN ASSET AND LIABILITY P
The critical parameters that need to be estimated to implement Myers-Read
returns and liability po l, insurer’s insolvency risk
related to the amount of capital that insurer holds. Given
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and loss return series, the correlation between loss return series across lines of business, 
the correlation between asset portfolios return series, and correlation between asset 
portfolio return and liability portfolio return series (Myers and Read, 2001).  
  The respective volatility for asset portfolio returns ( Vσ ) and liability portfolio 
returns ( Lσ ) and covariance of the log losses returns and log asset returns ( VLσ ) are 
estimated by the following expressions: 25
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Where /i i
∑∑                                                (12) 
x L L=  is the proportion of losses from line i , /i iy V V= is the proportion of 
assets from asset type i , V Vi jρ  is the correlation between log asset type i  and log asset 
type j , L Li jρ is the correlation between log line i losses and log line j losses, V Li jρ is the 
Vicorre tween log and log line losses, lation be  asset type i j σ  is the volatility of asset type 
i , and L jσ is the volatility of log line j losses 
We aggregate each insurer’s lines of business into four categories such as 
persona
                                                
l property, personal liability, commercial property and commercial liability line. 
We use NAIC quarterly time series data available from 1991-2004 to calculate 
underwriting return series. The quarterly underwriting return series are adjusted for 
seasonality using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X11 procedure. The underwriting return 
series defined as the natural logarithm of the present value of incurred losses and loss 
 
25 As in Myers and Read (2001), we assume that the distribution of loss return series and asset return series 
is joint lognormal.  
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adjustment expenses divided by the earned premium for each quarter. We estimate the 
volatility and correlation matrix at the individual line of business with industry-wide 
underw
lation matrix. 
eserve 
l
ortfolio returns and liability portfolio returns and between asset 
portfol
U  VALUE 
framework. A key element of their model is the value of the default put option. The 
riting return series. Similar to Cummins, Lin, and Phillips (2006), individual 
insurer’s liability portfolio volatility and correlation matrix were then calculated as 
weighted averages of the elements of the overall by-line volatility and corre
The sum of present value of expected loss payments and the unearned premium r
are employed as weights.  
The asset portfolio is classified into seven categories: stocks, government bonds, 
corporate bonds, real estate, mortgages, cash and other invested assets, and non-invested 
assets. The quarterly estimates of the asset returns on the first six categories are obtained 
from the standard rate of return series. The return series for the other assets are calcu ated 
by the natural logarithm of the gross quarterly percentage change in the total market 
value of asset of the insurance industry net of the market value of the first six asset 
categories. 
Finally, we can calculate the respective volatility and the respective correlation 
matrix for both asset p
io and liability portfolio returns using industry-wide quarterly data.  
5.2.2. THE ESTIMATION OF MYERS-READ INSOLVENCY P T
AND MARGINAL CAPPITAL ALLOCATION 
Myers and Read propose a capital allocation model based on an options pricing 
underlying variables for the default option are the market value of assets (V ) and the 
present value of loss liabilities ( L ). The amount of capital ( S ) can be expressed as V - 
L . Assuming with the limited liability, shareholders hold an option to put the def  
costs to the policyholders if the assets are insufficient to cover the loss liabilities. The 
ault
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insurer can declare bankruptcy if L  > V at the end of period. The default amount is L -V . 
Let D  represent the market value of default amount, [( ( ,0)]D PV Max L V= − . The 
default value, D  is also ca ut value.  
The value of default option is a function of the market value of assets, the present 
value of loss liabilities and the volatility of the asset-to-liability ratio: ( , , )D f V L
lled the inso ncy p  lve
σ= . 
Myers and Read are modeling a multiple-line insurance company. If an insurer writes M 
lines of business, th
1
M
ie insurer’s total losses are the sum of loss of each line (
i
L L
=
= ∑ , 
where =present value of loss liabilities for line  and iL i M  represents the number of lines 
re jointly 
 measure of firm portfolio risk is the volatility of the 
tio (
of business). In this paper, assets are also classified into N categories, 
1
i
i
V V
=
= ∑ , where 
V =the amount of asset of type i  and N  represents the number of asset categories.  
As Myers and Read point o t, if the aggregate losses and asset values a
N
i
u
lognormal distributed, the relevant
σ ): 2 2 2asset to liability ra V L LVσ σ σ σ= + − , where =the volatility of insurer’s Vσ
assets, Lσ =the volatility of insurer’s loss liabilities, and VLσ =the covariance of the 
natural logarithms of assets and losses values. 
       To calculate the default-value-to liability ratio, Myers and Read applied the 
following formula: 
                                          { } (1 ) { }d N z s N z σ= − + −                                               (13) 
where 
2log(1 ) / 2s σ
σ
− + +
Myers-Read shows that marginal default values can be a marginal capital allocation base. 
Their marginal default values by line of business( id ) is obtained by taking partial 
z =                                                  
derivatives of insolvency put value,  with respect to loss liabilities for lin : D e i , iL
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According to their unique “add up” property, the insolvency put value for the company 
default values. 
i
− + − − −∂ ∂            (14) 
( D ) can be obtained by the sum of products of line-by-line liabilities and marginal 
                                                            i i
1
M
D L d
=
= ∑                                                   (15) 
Myers and Read (2001) propose to allocate insurer’s surplus to each lines of 
insurance business to equalize marginal default values since insurer’s entire surplus is 
available to pay the claims from any specific policy or line of business where it is needed 
and policyholders have a preference for protection against default on their claims based 
on the insurer’s total amount of surplus. Assuming the sam
 
e default value to liability ratio 
across all lines of insurance ( / di id D L= ∂ ∂ = ), Myers and Read marginal capital 
   
allocation by line of business ( ) is derived by: is
1
21 ( ) ( )i L L L L V LVi i
d ds s
s
σ σ σ σσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦
∂ ∂
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠= −
Where (= ) is the surplus allocated per dollar of loss liability in line ,  
) is the insurer’s aggregate surplus-to-liability ratio, )
− − −∂ ∂                          (16) 
is / iS L∂ ∂ i
( /s S L=  ( /d D L=  is the insurer’ 
insolvency put per dollar of total liabilities, σ  is the volatility of the asset to liability 
ratio, /d s∂ ∂  is the partial derivative of d  with respect to s  (the option delta), /d σ∂ ∂  is 
the partial derivative of d  with respect to volatility of the asset to liability ratio (the 
option vega), L Liσ is the covariance of log losses in line i  with log losses of liability 
portfolio values, L Viσ  is the covariance of log losses in line i  with log assets portfolio 
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values, LVσ  is the covariance of log losses of liability portfolio values with log assets 
portfolio values.  
 The important implication of Myers-Read’s marginal capital allocation formula is 
that geographic diversification or diversification by adding more lines of business that 
have low correlation with losses of other lines of business (or that have high correlation 
olio returns) may reduce insurer’s overall capital requirement. 
Diversification reduces required capital because it can offset risks if both newly added 
and existing lines are not perfectly correlated with one another. However, administrative, 
operating, and agency costs also increase due to diversification such as M & A activity. 
Myers and Read (2001) argue that the net financial gains from such diversification are 
high in beginning for an insur r a few highly correlated lines of 
business. As more new se net gains decrease 
when a
n matrix for both asset portfolio returns 
and liab
with asset portf
 the er starting one o
 lines and geographical areas are added, the
dministrative, operating, and agency costs outweigh the costs of reduced capital 
requirement. Thus, efficient composition of business proceeds until the marginal benefit 
from reducing required surplus is equivalent to the marginal cost (Myers and Read, 2001). 
26
Using estimated volatility and correlatio
ility portfolio returns, we estimate both the ratio of marginal capital allocation-to-
liability ( , ,i g tMCA ) and the ratio of insolvency put value-to-liability ( ,g tIPV ) that are 
used to test our hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Myers and Read (2001) also state that “Efficient diversification does not minimize required surplus. It 
minimizes the total cost of issuing, administering, and collateralizing policies. This establishes the efficient 
composition of business.” 
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 CAHPTER 6 
 
 
EFFICIENCY METHODOLOGY 
duction process 
among firms. A firm
a firm is considered fully efficient if its actual input usage equals optimal input usage 
while a firm is measured as inefficient if actual input usage exceeds optimal input usage. 
This chapter begins by discussing the concepts of frontier efficiency. We then 
present DEA estimation methodology used to create efficiency scores. We also describe 
the measurement of outputs, output prices, inputs and inputs prices utilized in our 
analysis. 
6.1 FRONTIER EFFICIENCY CONCEPTS 
Efficiency is often used as one of tools that measure firm performance. The basic 
idea of efficiency analysis is to split firms that perform well from those that perform 
unsuccessfully. This is related to a benchmarking method called frontier efficiency 
methodology (Lovell, 1993 and Grosskopf, 1993). The frontier methodology measure the 
performance of each firm relative to “best practice” frontiers derived from firms in the 
industry. The frontier efficiency method summarizes the overall performance of a firm 
into a single statistic that takes account of different multi-dimensional pro
 is considered fully efficient (with efficiency scores of 1.0) if it 
operates on the frontiers, while any departure from the frontiers is measured as 
inefficiency (with efficiency scores between 0 and 1.0). 
There are several types of efficiency measurement that convey different 
information about firm performance. Efficient production, and cost frontiers are 
estimated providing measures of cost, technical, and allocative efficiency for each firm. 
Cost efficiency for a given firm is defined as the ratio of the costs of a fully efficient firm 
(i.e., a firm operating on the efficient cost frontier) to the given firm’s actual costs 
employed to produce the same output quantities.  Given output quantities and input prices, 
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Cost efficiency includes both technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to 
reduce its input usage to produce a given set of outputs by adopting the best practice 
lects the ability of a firm to use the cost 
minimi
ier. 
Howev
onvex combination of the most 
the multi-dimensional production process of the firm. A firm is considered fully efficient 
                                                
technology, and allocative efficiency, which ref
zing combination of inputs to produce a given amount of output.  
Technical efficiency can be decomposed into two components, one due to pure 
technical efficiency and one due to scale efficiency. The fact that it is socially and 
economically optimal for firms to operate at constant returns to scale provides the 
rationale for separating pure technical and scale efficiency (Cummins and Weiss, 2001). 
Pure technical efficiency is measured relative to a variable returns to scale (VRS) 
production frontier. This is the proportion by which the firm could reduce its input usage 
by implementing the state of the art technology characterized by the VRS front
er, a firm operating on the VRS frontier, i.e., a frontier represented by increasing, 
and/or decreasing returns to scale is scale inefficient because it can improve its efficiency 
by moving to a constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier. Scale efficiency can be 
calculated by the ratio from the CRS to the VRS production frontier. 
6.2 DEA ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
We estimate efficiency of firms using data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is 
a mathematical programming (non-parametric) approach that compares each firm to a 
“best-practice” cost and production frontiers formed by c
efficient firms in the sample (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone, 2006).27 The frontier efficiency 
method summarizes the overall performance of a firm into one score by taking account of 
 
27 While the econometric frontier efficiency methodology requires the specification of functional form such 
as the translog to estimate the frontier and requires the distributional assumptions about error term, DEA 
method avoids this type of the specification error since it is not necessary to specify a functional form or 
distributional assumptions. Accordingly, the econometric approach may potentially confounds the 
efficiency estimates with specification error if it uses the wrong functional form or distributional 
assumptions for the error terms.  (Cummins and Weiss, 2001) 
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(with efficiency scores equal to 1) if it operates on the frontiers, while any departure from 
the frontiers is measured as inefficiency (with efficiency scores between zero and 1).  
DEA provides a convenient way for decomposing efficiency into its 
components.28 For example, cost efficiency can be easily decomposed into pure technical, 
scale, a y. DEA is expected to yield more accurate results if the 
objectiv  is to study the performance of specific units of observation, because the 
optimization is conducted separately for each decision making unit (DMU). Cummins 
and Zi (1998) find that DEA estimates of efficiency are more highly correlated with 
conventional performance measures such as return on assets than are the estimates of 
econometric approach in the 
nd allocative efficienc
e  
U.S. life insurance industry. 
Detailed descriptions of the DEA methodology are provided in Ali and Seiford (1993), 
Charnes, et al. (1994), Seiford (1996), Zhu (2003) and Cooper, Seiford, an
observed points lie on or below the production frontier. Suppose producers use input 
ector T k
d Tone (2006). 
DEA technical efficiency is measured by estimating “best practice” production frontiers, 
employing the input-oriented distance function (Shephard, 1970). The purpose of DEA is 
to construct a non-parametric envelopment frontier over the data points such that all 
v 1 2( , ,..., )kx x x x += ∈ℜ  to produce output vector 1 2( , ,..., )my y y y + T m= ∈ℜ , where 
k is the number of inputs, m is the number of outputs, and T denotes the vector transpose 
operator. A production technology that converts inputs into outputs can be modeled by an 
yinput correspondence y ( ) kV +→ ⊆ℜ . For any my +∈ℜ , denotes the subset of all 
d at least
( )V y
input vectors kx +∈ℜ , which yiel  y . The input-or
                                                
iented distance function for a 
specific decision making unit (DMU) is defined by 
 
28 An econometric model is more difficult to decompose efficiency into its components (see the Cummins 
and Weiss (2001) for more detailed discussion about advantages and disadvantages of the econometric and 
the mathematical programming approaches). 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }(( , ) sup : , inf : ,xD x y y V y y xθ θ θ⎧ ⎫ ) 1V yθ −⎛ ⎞= ∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ = ∈⎝ ⎠                 (17) ⎩ ⎭
The input-oriented distance function is the reciprocal of the minimum equi-proportional 
contraction of the input vector x , given outputs y , i.e., Farrell’s (1957) measure of input 
technical efficiency. Input technical efficiency is therefore defined as 
( , ) 1/ ( , )TE x y D x y= . 
 Technical efficiency for each year is estimated independently for each firm in the 
sample by solving linear programming problems. The following formulation is one of the 
standard forms for DEA linear programming of i-th DMU:
( , )TE x y
29
                            ( )( ) 1,i iD x y − ( , ) mini i iTE x y θ= =  
                                    subject to ,  ,  0i i i i i iY y X xλ λ θ λ≥ ≤ ≥                                         (18) 
where X is a K I× input matrix and Y an M I× output matrix for all DMUs in the sample, 
ix is a 1K × input vector and iy an 1M × output vector of firm i , and iλ is an 
1I × intensity vector for firm i , and I =the number of firms in the sample ( 1, 2,...,i I= ). 
The first constraint forces the i- produce at least many out
i-th DMU. The second constraint f  how much less input the i-th DMU would 
need. Hence, it is called input  scale back the inputs is 
th DMU to puts as the peers of 
inds out
-oriented. The factor used to θ  and 
the value of iθ  is the effi or the i-th DMU. It will satisfciency score f y 1θ ≤ , with a value 
of 1 indicating a point on the frontier and hence a technically efficient DMU. A DMU 
with θ  less than one is not operating on the “best practice” frontier and should be able to 
reduce the consumption of all inputs by 1- θ  without reducing output. The linear 
programming problem of this form must be solved I times, once for eac
sample. A value of 
h DMU in the 
θ  is then obtained for each DMU. 
                                                 
dual form (e.g., Coelli, 1998). 
29 There are other ways to formulate DEA technical efficiency problem such as the ratio approach or the 
 71
 The constraint 0iλ ≥ imposed on the equation (18) produces a constant returns to 
scale (CRS) production frontier. The CRS assumption is only appropriate when all 
DMU’s are operating at an optimal scale (i.e., equivalent to the flat part of the LRAC 
curve). However, firms may not be operating at optimal scale due to imperfect 
competition or capital market imperfection with frictions. Banker, Charnes and Cooper 
(1984) extended CRS DEA model to account for variable returns to scale (VRS) that 
firms operate with increasing returns to scale (IRS), constant returns to scale (CRS) or 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS). We estimate VRS production frontier by adding the 
convexity constraint 1 1N λ′ =  to the equation (18), where 1N is an 1N × vector of o es. n  A 
s operate either with 
CRS or DRS can be estim ting th
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) production frontier that firm
ated by substitu e 1 1N λ′ =  restriction with 1 1N λ′ ≤  .  
Technical efficiency (TE) can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and 
scale efficiency (SE), where TE=PTE*SE. PTE is measured relative to the VRS 
production frontier. If there is a difference in the two TE scores by conducting both a 
CRS and a VRS DEA for a particular DMU, then this indicates that the DMU has scale 
equal PTE and the NIRS score is equal to the VRS TE score, the DMU is operating with 
 output quantitie . The cost efficiency 
inefficiency, and that scale efficiency can be obtained from the ratio of the CRS TE score 
to the VRS TE score. If TE equals PTE, the DMU operates with CRS. If TE does not 
DRS. However, if TE does not equal PTE and the NIRS score is unequal to the VRS TE 
score, then IRS exist for that DMU (Aly, et al., 1990). 
The DEA cost efficiency is estimated by using input-oriented linear programming models. 
A firm’s objective is assumed to be the minimization of cost by choosing input quantities 
while holding constant the input prices w  and s y
(CE) is calculated by first solving the linear programming problem for each firm 
i ( 1, 2,...,i I= ): 
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,
 Ti ixi i
Min w x
λ
∗  
subject to Y yi ijλ ≥ , 1, 2,...,j M=                                                       (19) 
                                            X i irxλ ≤ , ,r K1 2,...,=  
                                             and 0iλ ≥                                                                              
The solution vector ix
∗  is the cost minimizing input vector for the input price vector 
and the output vector . The cost efficiency of the firm is then the ratio of frontier i ij
costs (minimum costs) to actual costs, CE = 
w y  i  
T
i i
T
w x
w xi i
∗
, whe 0 CE 1re ≤ ≤ and if CE score is 
equal to 1, the firm is considered fully efficient. Cost efficiency of a firm consists of both 
technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE), where allocative efficiency 
reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions given their respective 
prices and can be calculated as CE
TE
. A firm might not be cost efficient if it is not 
allocat
of firms is to maximize revenue efficiency by choosing 
ng as given input quantities and output prices. Revenue 
efficien
yi i j
ively efficient and/or if it is technically inefficient.   
Another important objective 
optimal output quantities, taki
cy is estimated based on an output-oriented approach. The linear programming 
problem for each firm in each year of the sample period is estimated as follows: 
ij ij, 1
M
Max p yλ
∗
=
subject to 
∑  
i ijY yλ ≥ , 1, 2,...,j M=                                               (20) 
i irX xλ ≤ , 1, 2,...,r K=  
and 0iλ ≥  
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The optimal solution for firm i  is the revenue maximizing output vector iy
∗ . Then the 
revenue efficiency is defined in ratio form, RE=
T
T
i i
i ip y
p y∗
 where p is the tr  of the 
ts and their prices 
used in
ches have been 
used to
t approach is not appropriate for the 
insuran
T
i
output price vector for firm i  and iy is the vector of actual output quantities for firm i . 
The revenue efficiency score can be interpreted as the ratio of actual revenue to 
maximum possible revenue given output prices and input levels. A score of one indicates 
that the firm is fully revenue efficient, while inefficient firms have RE between 0 and 1.   
6.3 MEASUREMENT OF OUTPUTS AND INPUTS 
In this section, we discuss the measurement of the outputs, inpu
anspose
 estimating efficiency. 
Outputs and Output Prices  
The definition or identification of the outputs produced by the financial institution 
is critical to the measurement of its performance. Three alternative approa
 define and measure outputs in financial firms: the asset approach, the user cost 
approach, and the value-added approach. The asset approach considers property-liability 
insurers as pure financial intermediaries that collect funds from policyholders and 
intermediate these funds into loans and other assets. However, the asset approach is not 
optimal to identify the output because property-liability insurers provide many other 
services in addition to financial intermediation (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Cummins 
and Weiss, 2000). The user cost approach involves classifying financial products into 
output and input categories based on their user costs or signs of their derivatives in a 
profit function (Hancock, 1985). The user cos
ce industry because specific data required on product revenues and opportunity 
costs are not available due to the fact that insurance policies bundle together many 
services which are implicitly priced. The value-added approach considers all liability and 
 74
asset categories to have some output characteristics rather than separating inputs from 
outputs in a mutually exclusive way. The value-added approach is regarded most suitable 
method to measure insurance outputs among the alternative methods.  
We employ a modified version of the value-added approach to define insurance 
outputs
• Real financial services relating to insured losses: Property-liability insurers 
provide a variety of real services for policyholders including risk surveys, coverage 
, consistent with most of recent financial institutions efficiency literature (e.g., 
Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Cummins and Weiss, 2000). Three main services provided 
by property-liability insurers are specified as a basis of defining outputs.  
• Risk-pooling and risk-bearing: Insurance provides a mechanism through which 
individuals and businesses exposed to losses can engage in risk reduction through pooling. 
The actuarial, underwriting, claim settlement and related expenses involved in risk 
pooling and risk bearing constitute a main element of value added in the insurance 
industry. While pooling reduces uncertainty, unexpected losses may still arise, potentially 
jeopardizing the insurer’s ability to meet its obligations. Thus, insurers recognize the 
need for holding equity capital that serves as a buffer against unexpected future losses on 
their portfolios. Holding capital can add value by providing financial security against 
unexpected underwriting and investment losses.  
• Financial Intermediation: Insurance companies are generally viewed as liability-
driven financial intermediaries. As corporations issue bonds to raise debt capital, insurers 
issue debt (premiums) in the form of insurance policies and some of the premiums 
received from policyholders are invested in financial markets to pay future claims if 
uncertain event occurs. The net interest margin between the rate of return earned on 
invested assets and the rate credited to policyholders represent the value added from the 
intermediation function.  
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design, and loss prevention and loss reduction services in addition to fundamental 
indemnification function. By contracting with insurers to provide these services, 
policyholders can benefit from insurers’ expertise in reducing the costs of managing risk.  
Because transactions flow data such as the number of policies issued and the number of 
claims 
dual can be 
minimi
that fund when los  i
risk pooling. Losses are also an appropriate proxy for the quantity of real services 
settled for each insurer and for each line of business are not publicly available, a 
number of recent studies proposed the present value of real losses incurred as the most 
common proxy for output quantity of risk pooling and real insurance services provided 
by property liability insurers (Berger, Cummins and Weiss, 1997; Cummins, Weiss and 
Zi, 1999, Cummins and Weiss, 2001, Cummins and Xie, 2005).30 Losses incurred are 
defined as the losses that are expected to be paid as insurer obligations for policy claims 
during a specific period of time. Losses incurred are composed of losses paid during the 
year, plus loss reserves existing at the end of the year, minus loss reserves existing at the 
beginning of the year. Insurance is created when individuals pool their resources to 
protect themselves from the effects of a loss. Pooling is the spreading of losses incurred 
by the few over the entire group, so the effects of the loss to any indivi
zed. Because the basic idea of risk pooling is that each policyholder in the group 
shares a part of the risk by making a payment into a fund and receives compensation from 
s occurs, it is argued that losses incurred prov de a good proxy for the 
provided, since the amount of claims settlement and risk management services are highly 
correlated with loss aggregates (Cummins and Nini, 2002).  
Since lines of coverage provided by property liability insurers have different risks 
and the payout patterns vary depending on the characteristics of lines of business and 
                                                 
30 Premiums were employed as the measure of output on the early insurance efficiency research. However, 
premiums represent revenues (i.e., price times quantity) rather than quantity. Because price differences 
across firms may result in distortions in performance measures, premiums are not a suitable proxy for 
output (Yuengert, 1993). 
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insurers’ claims handling procedures, lines of insurance with similar features are grouped 
together. Four insurance outputs are calculated: present value of real losses incurred in 
personal property (short-tail) lines, personal liability (long-tail) lines, commercial 
property (short-tail) lines, and commercial liability (long-tail) lines. The payout tail 
proportions for each line of business are estimated based on Schedule P of annual 
statement data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000). Using bootstrap method, 
U.S. Treasury spot rate (zero rate) curve from the constant maturity treasury yields 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis is estimated to calculate loss discounting factors.  
Consistent with recent efficiency studies (Cummins and Nini, 2002; Cummins 
and Xie, 2005), the price of insurance output is obtained based on following formula: 
( )i i
i
PE PV LP −= , where P  is the price of insurance output i , PE is the premiums 
earned for line i , and ( )iPV L is the present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses 
incurred of line i , 1,..., 4i = for personal short-tail, personal long-tail, commercial short-
tail, and commercial long-tail. The present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses 
incurred is employed to calculate the price of insurance output because premiums reflect 
implicit discounting to account for insurer’s investment of policyholder funds between 
the premium payment and the loss payment dates. Thus, consistency is preserved by 
taking into account the time value of money both in the premium and loss elements of the 
price. A potential problem may exist in using the losses incurred as outputs because 
losses are random and this random component may distort insurance output. Therefore it 
is necessary to consider methods to manage the potential “errors in variables” problem. 
The smoo
( )i PV L
thing procedure is adopted for both incurred losses and output prices. 
i i
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The average of the beginning and end of year invested assets are used to measure 
the quantity of the intermediation output. The values of losses incurred and invested 
assets are deflated to real 2000 values based on the consumer price index (CPI). The price 
of the intermediation output is obtained from the measure of the expected rate of return 
on the insurer’s invested assets. Interest-bearing assets (mostly bonds and short-term debt 
instruments) and equities are main components of invested assets for property-liability 
insurers. Accordingly, the price of the intermediation is the weighted average of expected 
investment returns, which are equal to the expected return on equities weighted by the 
proportion of invested assets in equities, plus the expected return on interest-bearing 
assets weighted by the proportion of the portfolio in this asset type. The expected return 
on equi
Inputs
ties is obtained from the average 30-day Treasury bill rate in year t plus the long-
term (1926 to the end of the preceding year) average market risk premium on large 
company stocks from Ibbotson Associates. The method assumes that insurers have equity 
portfolios with a market beta coefficient of 1.0. Because the expected return on interest-
bearing assets is generally close to the actual income return, we use their realized income 
return to represent the expected rate of return on the debt component of the portfolio. The 
realized return on interest-bearing assets equals the total net investment income of the 
insurer, minus dividends on equities, divided by the average amount of interest-bearing 
assets during the year. Therefore, the price of the intermediation output varies across 
insurers. 
 and Input Prices  
Insurance inputs will be represented by a combination of operating expenses and 
available measures of capital. Insurance inputs are classified into four principal 
categories: administrative labor (home office labor), agent labor, business services and 
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materials (including physical capital), and financial equity capital.31 Administration labor 
and agent labor are treated separately because the two types of labor have different prices 
and ea
 U.S. Department of 
ses incurred from the regulatory annual 
statement and the total labor expenses of the insurer. The price of business services and 
materials input is used by a national average price index for business services from U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
                                                
ch insurer use them in different proportions. Because insurers do not report 
publicly detailed information for the quantities of labor (such as the number of employees 
or hours worked) and materials used, they are imputed from the dollar value of related 
expenses. The quantity of an input is defined as the current dollar expenditures associated 
with the particular input divided by its current price.  
Current dollar expenditures for administrative labor are obtained from insurers’ 
regulatory annual statements as the sum of salaries, payroll taxes, and employee relations 
and welfare. The price of administrative labor is calculated from the
Labor data on average weekly wage rates for property-liability insurer Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC 6331). The quantity of administrative labor is acquired from the total 
expenditures divided by its price. Current dollar expenditures for agent labor are the sum 
of net commissions, brokerage fees and allowances to agents. The price of agent labor 
comes from the U.S. Labor Department’s weekly wage rate for insurance agent (SIC 
6411). We use national average weekly wage rate for both administrative and agent labor 
to reduce missing observations. 
The quantity of business services and materials input is imputed from total 
expenditures and prices. Current dollar expenditures for business services and materials 
are calculated as the difference of the total expen
 
31 Because physical capital such as buildings accounts for only a small fraction of total insurer expenses, we 
do not define physi  capital as a separate input. cal
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Financia equity capital is included as an important input, consistent with the 
theory of firm and financial institutions efficiency studies (McAllister and McManus, 
1993; Berger, Cummins and Weiss,  Mester, 1998; and Hughes, Mester 
nd Moon, 200
er to ensure payment against 
unexpe
in year
l 
1997; Hughes and
a 1). Because policyholders are strongly risk-averse with respect to insurer 
default risk, insurers need to hold equity capital in ord
cted losses. Financial equity in the insurance company plays a significant role in 
keeping the probability of bankruptcy low. As insurance prices reflect capital costs, 
capital levels ultimately affect the revenue and profit of an insurer.   
 Financial equity capital of a property-liability insurer is defined as the statutory 
policyholders surplus deflated to real 2000 values by the CPI. The quantity of this input is 
measured by the real value of the average of the beginning and end-of-year capital level. 
Although the ideal price of financial equity capital is the market return of equity capital, 
market equity returns are not observed for most firms in the sample because the majority 
of insurers are not publicly traded. Following Cummins and Nini (2002), we adopt an 
approach that assumes a constant cost of equity across all firms in the industry. The price 
of financial equity capital in the year t is set equal to the average 90-day Treasury bill rate 
 t, plus the long-term (1926 to the end of year t-1) average market risk premium on 
large company stocks from Ibbotson Associates.  
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CAHPTER 7 
DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
7.1 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The empirical analysis is conducted with pooled cross-sectional and time-series 
data of U.S. property-liability insurers over the sample period 1989-2004. Annual 
financial statement data are obtained from the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC). Our initial sample includes all firms in the NAIC database. 
Insurance companies may structure as an unaffiliated single insurer or as an affiliate of a 
large insurance group. Because corporate strategies such as M & A decisions and 
investment strategies are likely performed at the group level (Berger et al. 2000), 
affiliated insurance companies that belong to the same group are aggregated as one 
observa
Some sample selection criteria are imposed to ensure that insurance firms 
analyzed are actively engaged in the writing insurance contracts as ongoing concerns, and 
tion unit in our sample. In the case where multiple insurers are grouped as one 
unit, the values of indicator variable (i.e. organizational structure or distribution systems) 
on the groups are chosen from the largest insurer in the group based on the size of assets.  
This study focuses on mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry. The initial samples involved in M & As are identified through list of 
Best’s Insurance Reports-Property/Casualty. We investigate each of these M &A related 
insurers through NAIC demographic files to identify insurance company codes and then 
cross-check the list of M &A related insurers from Best’s Insurance Reports against 
NAIC demographic files. Those M &A related insurers which could not be verified in 
NAIC demographic files are excluded from the sample. Thus, our final list of M &A 
involved insurers should exist both in NAIC demographic files and in the Best’s 
Insurance Reports.  
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thus, reported financial data are meaningful measures of insurer price and capital 
structure. Accordingly, the insurers that report positive values for premiums written, 
surplus
rgers 
and ac
hose merging or 
NAIC demographic files. The 51 firms that exhibit 
negativ
eventually considered as insurers that pass our sample selection criteria.  
                                                
 and total admitted assets are included in our initial sample. Because we are 
unable to estimate values for some key variables such as economic premium ratio for 
those insurance companies that report non-positive values, they are excluded. Me
quisitions of shell, inactive, or run-off companies are excluded from the sample 
since the focus of the study is on the viable operating entities. We also omit insurers that 
were retired, or put into liquidation or receivership at merger and acquisition or within 
two years thereafter.  
We initially identified 538 firms that were involved in mergers and acquisitions 
during the period, 1990-2003 through a search of Best’s Insurance Reports. We first 
exclude any acquirer that merges with a shell company (44 firms) or with reinsurers (24 
firms). Also excluded from the sample were insurers that merge into inactive firms, or put 
into liquidation within one or two years after M & A (21 firms).32 Some insurers are 
involved in multiple M & A transactions within the same year or within two years before 
or after the transactions. We omit them (53 firms) to prevent double counting in the 
sample. The 66 firms are eliminated because the company codes of t
acquiring firms are not found in the 
e premiums, negative economic equity, or unusual financial ratios are also 
excluded because we are unable to estimate the economic premium ratio and calculate 
Myers-Read capital allocation. We also exclude 82 insurers that have negative outputs 
and inputs and negative prices in calculating efficiency scores. A total of 190 firms are 
 
32 For example, some insurers merge into inactive firms in other states even merged firms do not operate 
with no assets or premiums because acquiring firms may want to move their headquarters to other states. 
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To analyze insurance prices, we aggregate each insurer’s lines of business into 
four categories: personal property lines of business, personal liability lines of business, 
commercial property lines of business, and commercial liability lines of business.33  
 systems are 
obtaine
We also utilize the NAIC by-line quarterly data (1991-2004) to estimate 
underwriting returns, which are used to obtain estimates of industry-wide volatilities, and 
correlation matrix between the asset and liability portfolios. Data for the input prices used 
to estimate efficiency are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The 
quarterly time series of returns of asset classes are obtained from the standard rate of 
return series: Stocks- the total return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index; 
government bond-the Lehman Brothers intermediate term total return; corporate bond-
Moody’s corporate bond total return; real estate-the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) total return; mortgages-the Merrill Lynch mortgage backed 
securities total return; and cash and other invested assets-30 day U.S. Treasury bill rate. 
A.M. Best’s ratings and data on the variable measuring market distribution
d from Best’s Key Rating Guide for each year of sample period. 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The number of insurers and the economic value of assets of the U.S. property-
liability insurance industry for the sample period 1989-2004 are presented in the table1. 
The number of insurers has remained relatively unvarying even though the insurance 
industry has experienced a significant wave of merger and acquisition activity. The 
reason is due to the fact that the numbers of firms that withdraw from the market due to 
                                                 
33 Personal property lines of business include Homeowners, Farmowners, Earthquake, and Auto Physical 
Damage. Personal liability line includes Private Passenger Auto Liability. Commercial property lines 
include Fire, Allied Lines, Commercial Multiple Peril, Mortgage Guaranty, Inland Marine, Financial 
and Theft, Credit. Commercial liability lines include Medical Malpractice, Other Liability, Product 
Guaranty, Group Accident and Health, Credit and Other Accident and Health, Fidelity, Surety, Burglary 
Liability, Workers’ Compensation, Ocean Marine, Commercial Auto Liability, Aircraft, Boiler and 
Machinery, International, Reinsurance.  
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merger have been partially offset by the formation of new insurers (Cummins, Tennyson, 
and Weiss, 1999).  
The economic value of assets is defined as the book value of total assets minus 
the book value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds plus the market value 
of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds. Assets such as stocks, government 
bonds, and corporate bonds are adjusted to market values based on NAIC statutory 
accounting standards. However, other assets are reported at NAIC annual statement book 
values. Table1 shows yearly and average values of several asset classes. Government 
bonds in the industry averages 38.5 percent of total economic assets, whereas stocks and 
corporate bonds account for 21.3 and 14.6 percent, respectively. Cash and short-term 
investments tend to be around 7 percent. Other assets including reinsurance recoverable 
on loss and loss adjustment expense payments, receivable from subsidiaries and affiliates, 
and agent’s balances or uncollected premiums average around 17.2 percent. 
Table2 shows the economic value of liabilities and equity for the U.S. property-
liability insurance industry. The reserves for each line of business are adjusted to the 
present values by discounting the expected future loss cash flows with the estimated U.S. 
Treasur
of 
total unpaid loss reserves. The economic equity is 34.4 percent of total economic assets 
on average. Notably, the amount of equity capital in the industry has increased from 33.4 
y spot-rate curve. The payout tail proportions for each line of business and for 
each year of the sample period are estimated based on Schedule P of annual statement 
data using Taylor separation method (Taylor, 2000). Other liabilities are defined as total 
liabilities of the industry minus reserves for unpaid loss and loss adjustment expenses of 
commercial liability, commercial property, personal liability, and personal property after 
discounting. The commercial liability reserves account for a significant proportion 
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percent
writing returns data. Special property (includes earthquake insurance), 
fidelity
                          
 in 2002 to 36.4 percent in 2004 because insurers may increase holding capital to 
avoid insolvency risk following a large loss shock such as 9/11.  
The industry-wide volatility and correlation matrix that are determined by the 
quarterly time series of returns of seven asset classes and of the underwriting returns of 
twelve aggregated insurance lines are estimated as shown in Table3, 4, and 5.34 Table 3 
shows the estimated industry-wide volatility and correlation matrix based on the NAIC 
quarterly under
 and surety, and homeowners insurance lines exhibit the highest volatility. Of the 
pair-wise correlations between returns of twelve insurance lines, the pairs of medical 
malpractice and auto liability and the pairs of commercial multiple peril and special 
property show the highest positive correlations with 85.6 and 64.3 percent, respectively. 
High correlations between them may be justified since their businesses are similar in 
nature. The correlation between medical malpractice and special liability is negative 79.5 
percent. It can be argued that special liability lines that cover damage to ocean marine or 
boiler and machinery are less likely to be correlated with medical malpractice line that 
provides coverage for bodily injuries.  
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix for asset and liability portfolios. The 
returns of stocks have negative correlations with the returns of all loss liability lines, 
implying that investment in stocks does not provide a hedge against losses in liability 
lines. However, the returns of government bonds, corporate bonds, and real estate are 
positively correlated with several important lines of insurance, suggesting that investment 
in these types of assets provides effective hedges against some losses in liability lines. 
                       
 of lines of business into 12 is based on Schedule P of the NAIC regulatory annual 
statemen
burglary
group accident and health, credit accident and health, other accident and health, and credit insurance. 
 
34 Classification
t. For example, special property (SP) lines include fire, allied lines, inland marine, earthquake, 
 and theft. Accident, health, financial guaranty (AH) include mortgage and financial guaranty, 
Special liability (SP) includes ocean marine, aircraft, and boiler and machinery insurance. Miscellaneous 
liability includes international insurance.  
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In table 5, stocks among asset classes show the highest volatility, 15.8 percent, 
consistent with common perception. The correlations between asset classes are also 
presented in table 5. The returns of government bonds and mortgages are strongly 
positively related each other, 92.5 percent correlations. Insurers may have an incentive to 
reduce 
, the marginal increase in the present value of 
losses f
asset portfolio risk by investing both in stocks and government bonds since both 
stocks and government bonds returns are inversely related each other, with 28.3 percent 
correlations.    
Table6 provides an illustration of Myers-Read insolvency put value and capital 
allocations for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We measure insurer’s 
default risk by the Myers-Read insolvency put value. The default-to-liability ratio is 
calculated to obtain the insolvency put value. For instance, the average default value of 
industry during the period 1989-2004 is $28.83 million or 4.67E-05 percent of the present 
values of industry liabilities. We allocate the economic capital across the four aggregated 
insurance lines and other liabilities based on the economic values of the assets and 
liabilities in Table1 and 2, and the estimation of industry-wide volatility and correlations 
shown in Table3, 4, and 5. The capital-to-liability ratio indicates the marginal capital 
requirement for each line. In other words
or the line requires the marginal increase in capital requirement for that line. On 
average, the capital-to-liability ratio for commercial liability, commercial property, 
personal liability, and personal property line is 110 percent, 47 percent, 40 percent, and 
50 percent, respectively, compared to 19 percent of other liabilities. The right column of 
Table6 shows that the amount of total economic capital is 100 percent allocated by lines 
of business.  
We use five outputs and four inputs to estimate insurer’s efficiency scores.  Table 
7 shows the summary statistics of inputs, input prices, and expenses over the sample 
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period, 1989-2004 for the groups and unaffiliated companies. Among the insurance 
inputs, administrative labor represents about 12.1% of total expenses, agent labor 
represents 23.6%, materials and business services represents 40.4%, and financial equity 
capital represents approximately 23.9%. 
Summary statistics on outputs, output prices and revenues of insurance groups 
and unaffiliated companies for the period 1989-2004 are presented in Table 8. The 
quantity of insurance output in the personal lines outweighs the amount in commercial 
lines. The intermediation output accounts for a considerable proportion of total outputs. 
The prices of commercial lines are higher than those of personal lines, implying that 
commercial lines are likely to be more risky and complex than personal lines. Revenues 
are defined as the products of output quantities and prices. The last section of the table 
shows the percentage of total revenues attributable to the intermediation function and by 
line of business. Among them, intermediation output is the largest source of total 
revenue
l 
property and commercial property line for the entire sample of insurers is higher than 
ose for acquiring insurers, whereas the EPR of personal liability and commercial 
liability lines for all insurers is lower than those for acquirers. Acquirers have higher 
ROA (return on asset) than the entire sample of insurers (0.045 versus 0.034) while ROE 
s in the industry, representing about 24.4% of total insurance revenues. Personal 
short-tail and personal long-tail constitute 23.1% and 16.6% of the total revenues on 
average, while commercial short-tail and commercial long-tail represent approximately 
18.2% and 17.6% of insurance revenues.  
Table10 and 11 report summary statistics on the economic premium ratio, firm 
performance, marginal capital allocation by lines of business, efficiency scores and 
financial and operating characteristics for all the insurers in the sample and acquiring 
insurers, respectively. On average, the economic premium ratios (EPR) in the persona
th
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(return on equity) of all insurers are E of acquirers (0.066 versus0.054). 
Acquiring insurers have higher und rers across all lines 
except 
tal requirements (line 
tion for all insurers are higher 
than th
ly. 
cquiring firms is on average much l
with mean assets of $1.8 billion for acquirers versus $632 million for all insurers. 
d 11 a age measured by premium 
gher than acquirers 
al insurers, compared to 38.7% for all 
le firms, compared to 57.5% for all 
th
 
 
 
higher than the RO
erwriting performance than all insu
commercial property line, indicating that acquiring firms have higher loss ratio 
and underwriting expense ratio than all insurers.  
The average of overall firm capital-liability ratio for acquirers is lower than that 
of non-acquirers from 0.715 to 0.842. Notably, marginal capi
capital-to-liability ratio) and relative marginal capital alloca
ose of acquirers across all lines except the commercial liability line. Acquirers 
exhibit higher portfolio risk than all insurers on average (14.2% versus 12.9%). 
Acquiring insurers are more cost efficient than all insurers while all insurers are more 
revenue efficient than acquirers. Acquiring insurers are more diversified over product 
lines and geographical areas than all insurers, as measured by Herfindahl indices, based 
on premium written across all lines and 51 states, respective
The size of a arger than those of all insurers 
Table10 an lso demonstrates that underwriting lever
written relative to firm overall equity capital for all insurers is hi
(1.275 versus 1.228).  40.6% of acquirers are mutu
insurers. Only 22.6% of acquirers are unaffiliated sing
insurers and 69% of acquirers have independent marketing systems, compared to 61.2% 
for all insurers. On average, acquirers have higher A.M. Best’s ratings an all insurers.  
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CAHPTER 8 
INSURANCE PRICE ANALYSIS 
We begin by discussing the estimation of the price of insurance. Next, we specify 
regression methodology that enables us to test hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapter. We also define explanatory variables and discuss expected relationship between 
dependent and explanatory variables and then present the results.  
8.1. THE ESTIMATION OF PRICE OF INSURANCE 
We use the economic premium ratio as the price of insurance following the 
insurance literature (e.g., Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Phillips et al., 1998, and 
Cummins et al., 2005). The economic premium ratio for a line of insurance is defined as 
premiums written for the line net of dividends to policyholders and underwriting 
expenses divided by the present value of losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred. 
More precisely, the economic premium ratio is as follows: 
                                , , ,
, , ,
i t i t i t
i t i t i t
,  ( ) x  i t
NPW DIV EXP
EPR
NLI LAE PVF+
       where = the economic premium ratio for line i, in year t 
                  
− −=                                            (21) 
,i tEPR
,i tNPW = net premium written for line i, in year t 
                  ,i tDIV = dividends to policyholders incurred for line i, in year t 
                  ,i tEXP =underwriting expense incurred for line i, in year t 
,i tNLI                  =net loss incurred for line i, in year t  
                  ,i tLAE =net loss adjustment expense incurred for line i, in year t 
                  ,i tPVF  = present value factor for line i, in year t 
                  PVF = 
1
1
tT
t t
w
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  where w  represents the proportion of losses  
                             and loss adjustment paid at time t with assumption of 0 1, and  
                            1tw =
t1t r+
tw< ≤∑ . tr  is U.S Treasury spot rate at time t and T represents the  
                             number of periods in the payout tail. 
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We assume premiums are paid at the beginning of the year and the losses and loss 
adjustment expenses are paid at the end of the time period. Premiums are measured net of 
g expenses because the purpose is focusing on 
the par
 expense payment, and 
(2) the discount interest rate. The pattern of loss payment (payout tail) depends on the 
characteristics of lines of business that insurer writes and its claims handling procedures. 
 developed 
or ultimatel lities 
are fully devel and workers 
compensation m er. The payout tail proportions for each 
line of busin stimated based on Schedule P 
of annu on method (Taylor, 2000).  
We  constant 
maturit ent value factor for each year is 
calculated by summing up the estimated payout tail proportions divided by the estimated 
he payout tail. Thus, the present value of losses 
s obtained by multiplying the total losses and loss 
adjustmen tor. The economic premium is calculated 
separately for each insurer and for each year of the sample period. The present value 
dividends to policyholders and underwritin
t of premiums that reimburse the insurer for bearing risks (Cummins et al., 2005). 
The cost of acquiring and underwriting both new and renewal insurance business is a 
substantial element of expenses for most property-liability insurers and also varies 
significantly across lines of business. The underwriting expense includes commissions to 
agents that are generally the largest portion of underwriting expenses.  
Losses and loss adjustment expenses incurred are discounted based on two 
present value factors: (1) the pattern of loss and loss adjustment
For example, the losses of short-tail lines such as property insurance are fully
y paid in one or two years. Long-tail liability claims such as auto liabi
oped in three to five years, while medical malpractice 
ay develop for ten years or long
ess and for each year of the sample period are e
al statement data using Taylor separati
also estimate U.S. Treasury spot rate (zero rate) curve from the
y treasury data using bootstrap method. The pres
zero curves for the number of periods in t
and loss adjustment expenses incurred i
t expenses by the present value fac
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factor c
 
ias. 
The est
alculated for each line and each year are shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 presents that 
the commercial liability lines are more heavily discounted than the personal property 
lines over the sample period, consistent with the view that commercial lines develop 
longer than short-tail lines.   
8.2. REGRESSION METHODOLOGY
We conduct regressions using a series of pooled, cross-sectional, and time-series 
data to test hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. We also examine several exogenous 
factors that affect the insurers’ price differences across lines of business. One-way and 
two-way fixed effects model regressions are conducted to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity problems. The regressions are based on the unbalanced panel data to 
maximize the number of observations included in the analysis and to avoid survivor b
imated regression model has the following specifications: 
0 1 2 3 4 5ikt kt ikt kt kt ktEPR MA MCA Cost Share IPVα α α α α α= + + ++ +  
6 7kt kt kt k ikttGeoHHI ProdHHI X d fα α γ ε′+ + + + + +               (22) 
where iktEPR = the economic premium ratio charged at time t by insurer k for line i  
ktMA    = indicator variable equal to 1 in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years after M & A  
if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and otherwise is zero.35  
          M iktCA = the marginal capital allocated-to-liability ratio for line i, and insurer k 
 in year t 
kt
kt
Cost = cost efficiency score for insurer k, in year t 
= market share for insurer k, in year t Share
ktIPV   = the insolvency put value-to-liability ratio for insurer k, in year t 
ktGeoHHI =Geographical Herfindahl for insurer k, in year t 
ProdHHI =Product line Herfindahl for insurer k, in year t kt
                                                 
35 t+1 indicates one year after M & A transaction, t+2 is two years after M & A, and t+3 is three years after 
M & A . 
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ktX  = a vector of firm characteristics for insurer k, in year t  
          td  = a vector of time fixed-effects 
         kf  = a vector of firm fixed-effects 
  iktε   = error term for insurer k, in year t 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the economic premium ratio across 
different lines of business. Similar to Sapienza (2002), we use the indicator 
variable, ktMA  to examine the insurance price change of acquiring firms before and after 
M & A. A positive (negative) value for 1α  indicates that insurance price of acquiring 
insurers increases (decreases) following M & A.  
Following Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006), the marginal capital allocated-to-
liability
 by insurer k, in year t. If the market power hypothesis holds, we predict 
positive
 ratio is included as the explanatory variable in the regression to test the 
hypothesis that the marginal capital allocated across lines are reflected in the line-by-line 
price differences. As the amount of capital allocated to specific lines increase, insurance 
price that reflects increased capital cost will go up. Thus, we expect positive relationship 
between the insurance price and marginal capital allocation across lines of business.  
To examine whether efficiency structure (ES) hypothesis is valid, we incorporate 
cost efficiency measure into the regression model. The negative sign for cost efficiency is 
expected under the ES hypothesis. The variable of market share is included to control for 
the market power hypothesis. Market share is defined as the proportion of total premiums 
accounted for
 coefficient for market share.  
To control for firm insolvency risk, we include the insolvency put value-to-
liability ratio, calculated from Myers-Read (2001) methodology. We predict insurance 
prices are inversely related to the insolvency put values, consistent with Phillips et al. 
(1998), Zanjani (2002), and Cummins et al. (2006). As an alternative measure of insurer 
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financial strength, A. M. Best’s ratings for the firms are included in the regressions. 
Insurers that have higher A. M. Best ratings are expected to charge higher prices.  
Geographical and product line Herfindahl index are included as explanatory 
variables in the regression equation to test the hypothesis that diversified insurers charge 
lower prices due to the risk diversification benefits. Product line Herfindahl index is 
calculated by the sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across 
all lines of business for each insurer. An insurer that focuses on writing only one or a few 
lines o
have lower 
nd are safer than smaller firms, risk-averse policyholders are likely to 
pay hig
o achieve a given level of insolvency risk and thus may demand 
lower p
f business has a higher Herfindahl index, whereas a firm that offers a wider range 
of product lines has a lower Herfindahl index, indicating higher diversification. 
Geographic Herfindahl index is measured based on direct premiums written across 51 
states. If geographic diversification or adding more lines of business that coinsure each 
other tend to reduce the capital requirements of acquiring insurer, more diversified 
insurers will charge lower prices. Thus, we expect that both geographic and product line 
Herfindahl index are positively related to the insurance price. 
Other firm characteristics are also expected to affect the price of property-liability 
insurance. The natural log of firm assets is used as a proxy for firm size. The expected 
sign on this variable is ambiguous a prior. Because large firms tend to 
insolvency risk a
her prices for large insurers. We expect a positive relationship between firm size 
and the price of insurance. On the other hand, a negative relationship between firm size 
and the price of insurance is predicted. Since large firms are likely to be more diversified 
and better accessible to capital markets than smaller firms, large firms should require 
relatively lower capital t
rice.  
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We include the ownership form variable, set equal to one for mutual firms and to 
zero for stock firms. Mutual firms eliminate the owner-policyholder conflict because 
policyholders are both customers and owners. However, benefits from control of owner-
policyholder conflict a ffset by less efficient control of owner-manager conflict re o
(Mayer
e managers of an unaffiliated company are likely to be 
more ri
s and Smith, 2001). The owner-manager conflict is more severe for mutual 
insurers than for stock firms since mutual managers are not well monitored in capital 
markets as compared to mangers of stock insurers. Because cost of controlling 
management in mutual insurer is greater than in stock firms, mutual insurers should be 
more prevalent in lines of insurance where lower managerial discretion is required. In 
other words, mutual insurers have a comparative advantage in writing business lines with 
less underwriting risk, requiring less capitalization. Thus, the expected sign on this 
variable is negative.     
A dummy variable is included, equal to one if the firm is an unaffiliated single 
company and zero otherwise. Th
sk averse because group insurers may be able to diversify underwriting risk across 
member companies in a more efficient manner than unaffiliated single firms. Because an 
unaffiliated company tends to engage in less risky activities to avoid insolvency risk and 
may hold more capital, the expected sign on this variable is positive. A dummy variable 
equal to one if the insurer is licensed in New York and zero otherwise is used to proxy for 
regulatory restrictions. If regulatory restrictions function to depress insurance price, the 
predicted sign on this variable is negative. To control for the insurance industry’s 
underwriting cycle, we use year dummy variables with 1989 as the base year. 
8.3. RESULTS 
The regression results are presented in Table 12, 13, 14, and 15. Four lines of 
business are estimated separately: personal property, personal liability, commercial 
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property, and commercial liability lines of business. Several variants of the model are 
estimated with different variables included and with the time and firm fixed effects 
included and excluded.  
The results generally provide support for the hypothesis that the price of insurance 
for newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As. The coefficients for ktMA  
are negative and statistically significant across all models in personal property line and in 
the year fixed and firm fixed effects model of personal liability line, indicating that 
insurance price changes are negatively correlated with M & A activity in these lines. 
However, indicator variables for ktMA  are not significant in commercial property and 
liability lines. 
The regressions shown in Table 12, 13, 14, and 15 provide the results of testing 
three specific hypotheses (capital allocation, efficient-structure, and market power 
hypothesis). The results provide strong support for the capital allocation theory that 
variations in prices by lines of business are directly related to corresponding variations of 
marginal capital allocation. The coefficients of marginal capital allocation (line capital-
to-liability ratio) are positive and statistically significant in the personal property (models 
1, 3, 4, and 5), personal liability line (model 1), commercial property line (models1, 3, 
and 4), and commercial liability lines (across all models), implying that insurance lines 
that hold more capital charge higher prices. The result is consistent with the findings of 
Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006).  
The price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency in all lines except for 
the commercial liability line. This relationship is significant at the 1 percent level and 
thus strongly supports the efficiency structure hypothesis. The coefficient for market 
share is negative and significant at the 10 percent level only in the OLS models of 
personal property line and is not significant generally across other lines of business. The 
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negative and/ or insignificant signs for the market share variable indicate that market 
power hypothesis is not valid with our sample data. If market power is the driving force 
behind mergers and acquisitions, it is predicted that M & As result in increased market 
power, leading in turn to price changes that are not beneficial to consumers. This 
reasoning is particularly true when the merging firms are direct competitors and their 
combination results in a substantial increase in market concentration within specified 
geographical or product markets (e.g., Shepherd, 1982).  However, the market power 
theory overlooks the possibility of entry. If combined firm increases price to a more 
profitable level, this may attract other insurers to enter the market. The firm will 
eventually lose both its market share to other rivals and ability to control the price. The 
only way the dominant firm could maintain the high price and profits would be by 
colludi
lity line. The positive signs on both Herfindahl index 
strongl
ng with its rivals to form a cartel. The formation of cartels through takeovers can 
not be achieved as a result of U.S. antitrust legislation, which precludes excessive 
increases in market power by regulating M & A activity. Another possible explanation 
for the negative relationship between market share and insurance price is that if insurer’s 
motivation is to gain market share through M & As, consolidated insurers may try to 
attract more customers by decreasing prices.  
The coefficients of geographical and product line Herfindahl index are positive 
and significant across all lines of business with the exception of product line Herfindahl 
index in the commercial liabi
y support the hypothesis that diversified insurers that may have lower overall 
capital costs due to the effect of risk diversification charge lower prices than less 
diversified insurers. The result is also consistent with Myer-Read’ propositions that  
diversification by adding more new lines and geographical areas that have low 
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covariability with the insurer’s current loss portfolio or high covariability of loss portfolio 
with asset portfolio leads to more efficient use of capital, resulting in lower prices. 
The signs of other control variables are generally consistent with the predictions. 
The co
 inversely related to firm insolvency 
risk. Similar to Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006), three indicator variables-set equal to one 
for insurers with Best’s ratings of A or A-, B++ or B+, and B or lower, respectively, and 
set equ therwise-are used as an alternative measure of insurer financial strength. 
Insurers with Best’s ratings of A++ or A+ are omitted as a reference group to avoid 
multicollinearity. The coefficients of the Best’s rating are negative and significant across 
all lines, suggesting that safer firms charge higher prices. The results also show that the 
magnitude of the coefficients of Best’s ratings become monotonically smaller as the 
Best’s ratings move down, implying that progressively lower ratings are related to higher 
firm insolvency risk.  
Firm size is positive and stat t only in personal property line, as 
xpected if larger firms have lower insolvency . Other 
possible explanations for why larger firm
 for firm size variables were 
e negative sign is that large firms require 
relatively lo
efficients of firm insolvency put value are negative and statistically significant 
across all lines, suggesting that lower capitalization is related to higher insolvency risk, 
resulting in lower prices. Our result is consistent with the findings of Cummins and 
Danzon(1997), Phillips, Cummins and Allen(1998), and Cummins, Lin, Phillips (2006). 
The regressions that include A. M. Best’s ratings instead of firm insolvency put value 
also provide evidence that the price of insurance is
al to zero o
istically significan
e  risk and are safer than smaller firm
s demand higher prices may be due to brand 
name recognition by consumers. However, firm size is significant and inversely related to 
insurance price in other lines. Recall that the expected signs
indeterminate. The possible explanation for th
wer capital to achieve a given level of insolvency because large firms tend to 
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be more diversified and to have better access to capital markets than smaller firms and 
thus may demand lower price. 
The coefficient of mutual is negative and significant in personal property and 
commercial property line, as predicted if mutual insurers have a comparative advantage 
in writing business lines where lower managerial discretion is required, requiring less 
capitalization and demanding lower prices. However, the mutual variable is significant 
and positively related to insurance prices in the commercial liability line where greater 
managerial discretion is required, implying that greater owner-manager agency costs 
exceed any benefits associated with the reduction in owner-policyholder agency costs; 
therefore, the higher cost of controlling management leads to higher insurance prices. 
The dummy variable for unaffiliated firm is positive and significant in all lines of 
business, consistent with exp  firms charge higher prices if an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ectation that unaffiliated
unaffiliated company tends to engage in less risky activities to avoid insolvency risk and 
thus may hold more capital than diversified firms. A New York dummy variable is 
significantly inversely related to insurance price, suggesting that strict regulations lead to 
price reduction, which is favorable for consumers.  
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CAHPTER 9 
EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter specifies the empirical model used to test the hypotheses developed 
in the chapter 4 and then define the variables to be used in the estimation. We also 
present efficiency regression results in this chapter. 
9.1 REGRESSION METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our hypothesis that the efficiency of acquiring insurers is likely to 
decrease following M & A, we conduct regr
36
essions using a series of pooled, cross-
sectional, and time-series data. Because the characteristics of firms’ exogenous variables 
may affect the differences in efficiency scores between before and after M & A, we also 
examine several exogenous factors that determine insurer’s efficiency. We analyze the 
relationship between efficiency scores and firm characteristics using unbalanced panel 
data to avoid survivor bias and to maximize the number of observations included in the 
analysis. We control for some types of unobserved heterogeneity problems by employing 
one-way and two-way fixed effects models because  the estimates of coefficients derived 
from OLS regression may be biased if there is some unknown variable or variables that 
cannot be controlled for that affect the dependent variable (Kennedy, 2003 and Greene 
2003).  With panel data, the functional form of two-way fixed effects model is as 
follows: 
0 1it it it t i itY MA X d f vβ β β ′= + + + + +                                (23) 
where i indexes firms and t represents year. The dependent variables of regression, itY , 
are five different efficiency scores (cost, revenue, pure technical, scale, and allocative 
efficiency scores). The indicator variable, itMA , is equal to one in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years 
after M & A if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and zero otherwise is used to examine the  
                                                 
36 The Hausman testing shows that these models fit better to the data. 
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relationship between M & A activity and insurers’ efficiency.37 itX  is a vector of control 
variables described below. 0β  is the estimated intercept terms; 1β  and β ′ are the 
estimated parameters. is a vector of time fixed-effect and td  if  is a vector of firm fixed-
effects. is error term. Similar to Sapienza (2002), we include non-M & A involved it
firms as a control group in the regression to control for economy-wide factors and 
changes in the regulatory framework that influence firm efficiency change. The it
v
MA  
indicator for these firms is always equal to zero. 
Firm characteristics that may be systematically related to efficiency change are 
incorporated as explanatory variables in the regression. The natural logarithm of total 
assets is included to control for firm size. We control for insurer’s business mix by 
including the percent of losses incurred in personal property lines, the percent of losses 
incurred in personal liability lines, the percent of losses incurred in commercial liability 
lines.38 Geographical and product line Herfindahl indices are included as explanatory 
variables in the regression equation to control for the effects of diversification. 
Geographic Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
percentages of premium written by state for each insurer. Geographic Herfindahl index is 
measured based on direct premiums written across 51 states. A firm with a high 
geographic Herfindahl index has a significant portion of its business concentrated in one 
or a few states, whereas firms with lower Herfindahl index are likely to be more 
geographically diversified. Product line diversification is measured using a Herfindahl 
index of direct premiums written across all lines of business. Lower Herfindahl indices 
imply higher diversification. The expected signs of Herfindahl indices are ambiguous a 
prior. Geographical and product line Herfindahl indices are predicted to have a positive 
                                                 
(Berger et al. 1998). 
38 The percent of losses incurred in commercial property lines is omitted as the reference category. 
37 It is argued that the gestation period of restructuring following a merger can be as long as three years 
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sign if diversification benefits are offset by the additional costs associated with agency 
conflicts and administrative problems arising from operating multiple lines and states. On 
the other hand, geographical and product line Herfindahl indices could have a negative 
sign if consolidated firms are more efficient by offering multiple lines of business, either 
due to 
systems have coexisted in insurance markets 
for man
products to consumers. In contrast, according to the product-quality hypothesis, the 
the benefits of risk diversification or revenue scope economies with customers 
who are willing pay higher prices for “one-stop shopping.” 
The ratio of net premium written to policyholders’ surplus is included in the 
regression to control for the effects of underwriting leverage on efficiency change. To 
control for company’s ability to meet its anticipated short- and long-term obligations to 
policyholders and other creditors without having to resort to selling long-term 
investments or affiliated assets, liquidity ratio measured by the proportion of liabilities 
covered by cash and investments that can be quickly converted to cash is included.  
We control for efficiency variation that is induced by different distribution 
systems. The property-liability insurance is distributed by a variety of distribution 
systems: insurance contracts are sold through direct writers, independent agents, brokers 
and mixed systems. Direct writing includes exclusive agents and insurer employees. An 
exclusive agent represents a single insurer, but is not technically insurer’s employee. An 
independent agent represents more than one insurer. A broker represents the customer, 
negotiates with multiple insurers and tends to focus more on the commercial lines of 
business for larger-scale customers. These 
y decades, despite evidence that independent agency-insurers have higher costs 
than direct writers. Previous empirical studies find that independent agency insurers have 
higher expense margins than exclusive dealing insurers (e.g., Barrese and Nelson, 1992; 
Kim, Mayes, and Smith 1996) and thus may be considered less efficient in delivering 
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higher costs of independent-agency insurers are associated with producing higher-quality 
product or service differences. The product-quality hypothesis implies that independent 
agency insurers are compensated by higher revenues, with customers who are willing to 
pay higher prices for greater service intensity and the reduced search costs (Kim, Mayes, 
and Smith 1996; Regan and Tennyson, 1996). Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997) 
the product-quality hypothesis. They estimate both cost 
and p
the issue of the coexistence of multiple distribution systems for 
insuran
ts pay a 
greater
insurer, insurance firms with brokerage distribution systems are even less vertically 
                                                
provide evidence supporting for 
rofit efficiency for independent-agency and direct-writing insurers using 
econometric efficiency methods. Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997) find that 
independent-agency and direct-writing insurers generate almost the same profitability for 
delivering the same mix and quantity of outputs and are approximately equal in revenue 
and profit efficiency. Their empirical results support the view that independent-agency 
insurers are less cost efficient on average than direct-writing insurers.  
We revisit 
ce industry by breaking them into direct writing, independent agency, brokerage, 
and mixed distribution using more recent data.39 Independent agency is omitted in the 
regression as a reference category. We predict that insurers with direct writing 
distribution systems are more efficient than insurers using independent agents because 
direct writing insurers can easily recognize cost savings by advanced technology and 
automated customer database. In addition, insurers using independent sales agen
 proportion of commissions for their role in risk assessment and renewals of 
policies, especially where insurance products are complicated and risks are 
heterogeneous, and thus agent information is a valuable supplement to standardized 
underwriting inputs. Because the broker is the legal agent of the customer and not the 
 
39 Mixed distribution includes using both independent agency and direct writing or using both brokerage 
and direct writing. 
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integrated. Insurers using brokerage are likely to be more efficient than other independent 
agency insurers because brokers are generally larger than independent agencies, offer a 
wider array of services to more sophisticated clients, and have advantages over 
independent agent in more complex lines.  
We include dummy variables equal to one for mutual firms and zero for stock 
insurers to control for organizational form. An indicator variable equal to one for 
unaffiliated insurers and zero for groups is also used. Regulatory restrictions may 
increase insurer costs in the form of conservative reserving standards or minimum levels 
of capital requirements and thus contribute to firm cost and revenue efficiency. The state 
of New York is generally recognized as the state that has the most rigid insurance 
regulations in the United States (Sommer, 1996). A dummy variable equal to one if the 
insurer is licensed in New York and zero otherwise is used to proxy for regulatory 
restrictions.  
9.2 REGRESSION RESULTS 
The regression results using each of the estimation techniques are presented in 
Tables 16 and 17. Model 1 (or year) indicates one-way fixed effects regression, which 
controls for time-specific effects that are not otherwise controlled for by other variables, 
while model 2 (or year+firm) controls for both time and company fixed effects.40 F 
statistic is presented for all regressions to investigate whether there is company and time 
fixed effects. The large F statistic rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the fixed effect 
model (p<.0000).41
We conduct overall regressions for cost and revenue efficiency and analyze the 
decomposition of cost efficiency by also conducting regressions where the dependent 
                                                 
40 g one-way and two-way random effects model. The results of random  We also estimated regressions usin
effect models are consistent with those of the fixed-effect models. 
41 The null hypothesis is that parameters of company and time dummies are 
zero: 0 1 1... 0nH µ µ −= = = =  and 1 1... 0Tτ τ −= = = . 
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variables are pure technical, scale, and allocative efficiency, respectively. Although 
technical and allocative efficiency provide important indicators, the discussion is mainly 
focused on the cost and revenue efficiency regressions because they determine the 
profitability of firms and provide the best measures of overall firm performance.  
The regressions, shown in Table 16, reveal significant differences in cost and 
revenue efficiency of acquiring firms between before and after M & A. The coefficients 
on itMA in both cost and revenue efficiency are negative and significant, supporting the  
hypothesis that acquiring firms experience significantly larger losses in cost and revenue 
efficiency after M & A. This result suggests that expansion of the firm through M & As 
has the potential to create inefficiencies. As firms become larger and more complex, 
diversification benefits are offset by the additional costs. Administrating and operating 
over wider geographical areas and integration of different information systems can lead 
to higher costs. Bonding different organizations have more potential to create managerial 
conflict and agency costs since managerial monitoring becomes more difficult.  
The signs of explanatory variables are generally consistent with theoretical 
predictions. The coefficients estimated on firm size are positive and significant in all 
types of efficiency, with the exception of scale efficiency, indicating that larger firms 
tend to experience more efficiency than smaller firms. This result is consistent with prior 
findings (Cummins and Zi, 1998). However, firm size is negatively related to scale 
efficiency. A possible explanation for this result is that as Cummins and Xie (2005) find 
that the majority of firms above median size are operating with decreasing returns to 
scale, firms with DRS may not attain scale efficiency.  
We document a significant and positive relationship between the percentage of 
loss incurred in both personal property and personal liability lines and cost efficiency. 
Thus, it appears that insurers with a higher proportion of business in personal property 
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and personal liability lines obtain greater cost efficiency than those with more business in 
commercial property lines, suggesting that types of business and their combination has an 
porta
exposed to catastrophic 
propert
                                                
im nt role in improving insurer’s efficiency.42 This result is consistent with Cummins 
and Xie (2005). Surprisingly, the percentage of loss incurred in commercial liability lines 
are inversely related to cost efficiency, indicating that firms with emphasizing 
commercial liability lines are likely to create cost inefficiency. As shown in Table 17, the 
decomposition regression shows that the primary source of cost efficiency gains in 
personal property and personal liability lines is pure technical efficiency, suggesting that 
automated systems are more advantageous in the personal lines. Because long-tail 
commercial liability lines such as medical malpractice and workers compensation are 
more complex and the pattern of loss payment are more uncertain,  allocating resources 
and adopting new technology and marketing systems are relatively difficult in 
commercial liability lines. 
The percentage of loss incurred in personal property lines and personal liability 
lines is significantly negatively related to revenue efficiency. Thus, firms with a higher 
proportion of business in personal lines are less advantageous in output-oriented revenue 
efficiency. The negative relation may be induced by the fact that personal property lines 
that include homeowners and earthquake insurance are highly 
y risks from hurricanes and earthquakes. In addition, because personal liability 
lines such as primary personal auto liability is written as a compulsory insurance along 
with auto physical damage, it may be more difficult to choose optimal output 
combinations to maximize revenue efficiency.  
The coefficient on the geographical Herfindahl index is positive and significant in 
both cost and revenue efficiency, supporting the pro-focus arguments that geographically 
 
regression analysis using the percentage of premiums written in personal property lines, personal liability 
lines, and commercial liability lines and observe similar results. 
42 To investigate whether our results are robust to a different measure of business mix, we repeat our 
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focused insurers are able to achieve greater cost and revenue efficiency than 
geographically diversified insurers. This result implies that potential benefits from risk 
diversification are likely to be offset by the extra costs associated with greater managerial 
discretion, inefficient allocation of resource, and additional administrative and regulatory 
issues t
fficiency, implying that insurers with higher premium-to-surplus ratios employ less 
capital input relative to premium revenues. The liquidity ratio calculated by dividing 
liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) by total liabilities is significantly negatively 
related to all types of efficiency. A high degree of liquidity enables an insurer to meet 
unexpected financial needs without the untimely sale of investments or fixed assets, 
which may result in substantial realized losses due to temporary market conditions or tax 
consequences. The negative sign on this variable suggests that firms with higher liquidity 
hat are required to deal with when operating across different states. The product 
line Herfindahl index is significant and positively related to cost efficiency. However it is 
not significant in revenue efficiency. The product line Herfindahl index is negative and 
significant as related to allocative efficiency, consistent with pro-conglomeration 
arguments that diversified insurers are more advantageous in choosing cost minimizing 
combinations of inputs than focused insurers.  
 The underwriting leverage measured as premium revenues net of reinsurance 
transactions relative to policyholders’ surplus is significant and positively related to cost 
and revenue efficiency. The net premium-to-surplus ratio is inversely related to the 
capacity of an insurer to write additional business because new policies generate 
liabilities, which must be supported by surplus due to regulatory accounting rules. The 
positive relationship between cost efficiency and underwriting leverage ratio is primarily 
attributable to pure technical efficiency, which offsets a negative effect of allocative 
e
 106
ratio to meet financial obligations to pay off reserves by holding cash and quickly 
convertible investments have lower cost and revenue efficiency.  
As predicted, the coefficient on the direct marketing indicator variable is 
significantly positive in both cost and revenue efficiency. This results support the 
hypothesis that direct marketing distributions are more cost and revenue efficient than 
independent agency distributions. This result is contrary to the finding of Berger, 
Cummins, and Weiss (1997) who provide evidence that there is no difference in revenue 
efficiency between direct writing and independent agency. The regression results also 
show that brokers are more cost efficient th but indicator variable 
for mixed distribution is not significant in cost efficiency. The advantage of direct 
marketing and brokerage over independent a ency is mostly attributable to pure technical 
efficiency which also offset the negative eff e efficiency. We also find that 
mixed distribution is more revenue efficient than independent agency distribution. 
Mutual variable has a positive and significant coefficient in cost efficiency, as 
predicted if mutual insurers have a comp rative advantage in writing less complex 
business lines where lower managerial dis retion is required, requiring fewer inputs. 
There is no significant difference in revenue efficiency between mutual firms and stock 
firms. The unaffiliated single firms are significantly positively related to all type of 
efficiency, with the exception of allocative ay be able to 
iversify risks across member companies, whereas unaffiliated single firm may not have 
ification opportunities. Thus, managers of an unaffiliated company are likely to be 
more risk averse and m  maximize revenues 
an those of stock firms. The negative sign on allocative efficiency may indicate that 
less resource allocation is conducted at an unaffiliated company level. The coefficient on 
an independent agents, 
g
ect of allocativ
a
c
 efficiency. Group insurers m
d
divers
ay have mor mize costs ande incentive to mini
th
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firms li
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
censed in New York is significant and negative, suggesting that stricter regulation 
leads to cost and revenue inefficiencies, perhaps due to the imposition of regulatory costs.  
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CAHPTER 10 
FIRM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
In this chapter, we discuss our regression methodology for the analysis of firm 
ation results.  
i
ce,
We control for unobserved heterogeneity using time and company fixed effect model. In 
addition to the fixed effects model, other estimation techniques are also utilized for 
robustness of estimation results. We also investigate several factors that affect insurers’ 
performance by including firm and industry characteristics as explanatory variables.  
variables to measure insurer performance.  ROA and ROE are widely used in 
diversification-performance literature (e.g., Browne et al., 2001; Greene and Segal, 2004). 
ROA is defined as net income after policyholder dividend but before taxes divided by 
total assets and ROE is the ratio of net income after policyholder dividend but before 
A revenue efficiency variable is included as an explanatory variable based on the 
hypothesis that revenue efficient firms tend to have higher returns because they dissipate 
less of their potential revenues due to inefficiency than do inefficient firms. Because 
revenue efficiency variable is expected to be jointly determined with the dependent 
performance and then present estim
10.1 REGRESSION SPECIFICATION 
To further exam ne the relationship between M & A activity and financial 
performance and to explore the differences in performance across lines of insuran  we 
conduct a panel data regression with a series of pooled, cross sectional, time-series data. 
We use return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as dependent 
43
taxes to insurer’s equity capital.44  
                                                 
43 Finance literatures use Tobin’s Q to proxy for firm performance. Tob
value of a firm’s financial claims to the replacement value of its assets. 
in’s Q is the ratio of the market 
We can not estimate Tobin’s Q 
because very few insurers are publicly-traded at the subsidiary level.  
44 We also used ROA and ROE before policyholder dividends and taxes and after dividends and taxes. Both 
support the same conclusions regarding the effects of M & A on firm performance. 
 
 109
variabl
endogeneous variable is: 
e (ROA and ROE), OLS estimation model would result in inconsistent parameter 
estimates. The most common test for endogeneity is the Hausman(1978) method 
(Wooldridge, 2002). If Hauman test rejects the null hypothesis that revenue efficiency 
variable is exogenous, this implies that the feedback effects between insurer performance 
and revenue efficiency are significant. To correct for this endogeneity, we employ two-
stage least squares methods using instrumental variables. Thus, the specific empirical 
model with 
0 1
ˆ
kt kt kt kt ktMA X Iβ β β δ ε′Ψ = + + + +  
                                                        I Z0kt kt ktπ π ν′= + +                                                 (24) 
Where indexes firms and indexes the time periods. The dependent variable k t ktΨ is 
firm k ’s performance measures. ktX is a vector of control variables. ktIˆ  is the predicted 
revenue efficiency values from a first-state regression. ktI is a true revenue efficiency 
value. ktZ is a vector of instrumental variables. 0β and 0π are the estimated intercept 
terms. 1β , β ′ , δ , and π ′ are the estimated parameter vectors. ktε and ktv are error terms. 
To test whether M & As improve firm performance also included in the performance 
regression is an indicator variable ( itMA ) equal to 1 in t+1, t+2, and t+3 years after M & 
A if the insurer is an acquiring firm, and zero otherwise. 
Instrumental variables used in the first-stage regression should satisfy two 
conditions. First, the instrumental variables must be highly correlated with revenue 
efficiency, and second, they must be uncorrelated with firm performance measures. The 
commonly suggested instrumental variables consist of lagged or historically averaged 
measures of firm characteristics, industry growth, and general economic growth (e.g., 
Campa and Keida, 2002). Accordingly, the instrumental variables that are relatively 
uncorrelated with ROA and ROE but correlated with revenue efficiency include average 
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firm size for the prior five years, five-year average percentage of premium written in 
personal property lines, five-year average percentage of premium written in personal 
liability lines and five-year average percentage of premium written in commercial 
property lines, as well as lagged revenue efficiency scores. 
Because insurer’s profitability is influenced by both underwriting results and 
investment returns, we also consider underwriting performance as an alternative 
performance measure. The underwriting performance measured by combined ratio in 
each line is regressed on firm characteristics to examine the effect of M & A on line by 
line performance change. The combined ratio is calculated by the sum of loss ratio 
(incurred loss/premium earned) 45 and expense ratio (underwriting expense/net premium 
written).46  
Firm characteristic variables employed in the preceding efficiency regression are 
also included as control variables in the main regression. We use the natural logarithm of 
assets as a measure for firm size. We expect firm size to be positively related to firm 
performance since larger firms are likely to have lower insolvency risk and greater 
potential to gain revenue scope economies. Revenue scope economies may be realized 
due to firm-specific intangible assets such as brand reputation recognized by customers. 
The ratio of equity capital to total assets is included to control for the effects of 
capitalization on firm performance. The predicted sign on this variable is positive since 
firms will be rewarded from safety benefits of holding the additional capital.  
                                                 
45 Earned premium is determined by insurance pricing and reporting convention that combines revenues 
from policies priced in the current period as well as policies priced in earlier periods. Thus, if policies cover 
one-year periods, earned premium for year t, EPt, will be a weighted average of prices from years t and t-
in year t-1, is the fraction of policies sold in t-1 that were unexpired at the beginning of period t. 
Incurred loss can be written as the sum of three variables: unexpected payments during year t for pr ium
1(Pt  and Pt-1). In particular, EPt =(1-αt) Pt + αt Pt-1,  where αt, the weight for policies priced 
em s 
earned prior to t, revisions to outstanding liabilities for premiums earned prior to year t, and estimated 
liabilities for premiums earned in period t. The first two components reflect differences between expected 
payments and actual payments. 
46 Underwriting expenses include commission and brokerage expenses incurred, licenses and fees incurred, 
administrative expense incurred, and other acquisition, field supervision and collection expenses incurred 
(Insurance expense exhibit Part II of NAIC annual statement). 
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 pendent variable. 
The sta
 and Nini (2002) find 
a positi
idization to poor subsidiaries (Jensen, 
1986). 
The predicted sign on some explanatory variables is ambiguous a prior. To 
capture the effect of M & A on risk-adjusted performance, we include the standard 
deviation of ROA and ROE over the past 5 years as a control variable of risk measure in 
the regression, following previous literature (e.g., Lai and Limpaphayom, 2003; 
Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). The advantage of this approach is that it allows for 
direct interpretation of the magnitude of the effect of M & A on the de
ndard deviation of returns is likely to be inversely related to the firm performance 
if it captures firm insolvency risk, or may be positively related if higher performance may 
simply be the result of higher risk activities.  
There is little consensus in the insurance literature about the benefits of 
diversification in different lines of business versus focusing on one or a few specialized 
area. We investigate this controversy using product line and geographical Herfindahl 
index as explanatory variables in the regression equation. Cummins
ve relationship between ROE and product line Herfindahl index in the property-
liability insurance industry, consistent with the strategic focus hypothesis. Meador, Ryan, 
and Schellhorn (2000) conducted efficiency analysis to investigate the effects of product 
diversification for U.S. life insurers. Their results suggest that diversified life insurers are 
more X-efficient than their more focused counterparts. Pro-focus arguments state that 
firms can maximize value by focusing on core businesses and core competencies where 
the firm has a comparative advantage. It is also argued that conglomeration may 
aggravate agency problems by allowing cross-subs
Thus, we predict that product line Herfindahl index is likely to be positively 
related to firm performance under the strategic focus hypothesis. In contrast, pro-
conglomeration arguments suggest that operating multiple lines of business can add value, 
either because of diversification benefits or because of revenue scope economies in 
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offering “one-stop shopping” to customers who are willing to pay more. Thus, product 
line Herfindahl index will have a negative sign if conglomeration hypothesis holds.47  
Similarly, geographic Herfindahl index will have a positive sign if geographically 
focused insurers are able to achieve efficiencies associated with market specialization in 
core businesses and avoid costly monitoring that is required when operating across 
different states, or geographic Herfindahl index will have a negative sign since 
geographically diversified insurers have less volatile earnings due to coinsurance effects 
and thus are able to charge higher prices as a result of their lower risk.  
Firm performance will be affected by different distribution systems. The predicted 
sign on direct marketing system is positive because the commission structure for an 
independent agency system may impose higher costs than direct writers. We do not have 
strong predictions on brokerage and mixed distributions. However, firms with brokerage 
distribution systems are likely be more performance enhanced than firms using 
independent agency systems because brokers are more technically advanced and have a 
greater advantage over independent agents in more complex lines.  
We include the percent of premium written in personal property lines, the percent 
of premium written in personal liability lines, and the percent of premium written in 
ntrol for possibility that insurer’s performance varies by 
busines
ines because personal property lines are highly exposed to catastrophic 
commercial property lines to co
s mix. The percent of premium written in commercial liability lines is omitted as 
the reference category. We predict that firms with a higher proportion of business in 
personal lines are less advantageous in profitability than insurers emphasizing 
commercial l
property risks such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 
                                                 
47 For further discussion of the strategic focus and conglomeration hypotheses please see Berger, Cummins, 
Weiss, and Zi (2000). 
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We use an indicator variable equal to one for mutual firms and zero for stock 
insurers to control for forms of ownership structure. The relationship between ownership 
structure and performance is ambiguous. It is argued that mutual managers are not well 
monitored in capital markets as compared to mangers of stock insurers and the pressure 
to maximize firm value is far less in a mutual firm since the role of owner and 
policyholder functions are merged (Colquitt, Sommer, and Godwin, 1999). Thus, stock 
insurers are likely to have incentives to yield better performance, other things equal. On 
the other hand, mutual insurers are likely to be better performed because they tend to 
underwrite less risky and complex policies requiring less managerial discretion. A 
dummy variable is included, set equal to one for unaffiliated single companies and zero 
otherwise. An unaffiliated company is likely to be more risk averse than the affiliated 
firm of groups because the unaffiliated insurer may not have diversification opportunities. 
Thus, managers of unaffiliated firms may have more incentive to minimize costs and 
maximize revenues than those of affiliated groups, predicting positive sign on this 
variabl
al to
 regulatory costs. 
10.2 EM
to ROA, ROE, combined ratio, and expense ratio, respectively. We first present ROA and 
e. We also control for performance variation that is induced by insurers operating 
in different regulatory stringency. A dummy variable equal to one if the insurer is 
licensed in New York and equ  zero otherwise is included to test the regulatory costs 
hypothesis. New York is recognized as the state that has most stringent licensing and 
solvency surveillance system (Cummins and Sommer, 1996). We predict a negative sign 
for this variable because stricter regulation leads to revenue inefficiencies due to the 
imposition of
PIRICAL RESULTS 
The regression analysis consists of four equations with dependent variables equal 
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ROE regression results and then turn to a discussion of the underwriting performance 
regressions.  
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) 
The ROA and ROE regressions are designed to provide additional information on 
the relationship between M & A activity and insurers’ overall financial performance. The 
results 
ot be enough to 
elated errors as well as heteroskedastic errors.49  
are shown in Table 18 and 19. The first two equations are estimated using one-
way (year) fixed effects model omitting revenue efficiency variable and the third 
equation is an instrumental variables version (IV) that includes potentially endogenous 
variable, revenue efficiency. The first two equations use different risk measures-standard 
deviation of returns or firm portfolio risk as an explanatory variable. Although fixed 
effects estimation with panel data is useful to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
presence of time-constant omitted variables, panel data methods may n
solve the problem of time-varying omitted variables that are correlated with the 
dependent variable.48 A test for the endogeneity was performed using Hausman (1978) 
method. The test rejects the null hypothesis that revenue efficiency variable is exogenous 
at the 1% level. A rejection of the null suggests that firm performance and revenue 
efficiency are contemporaneously determined and thus two-stage least squares estimation 
is required. The standard errors reported in the IV version are robust to the presence of 
serially corr
We focus most of the discussion on the IV version of the ROA equation, although 
fixed effects and IV models provide the similar results in both ROA and ROE regressions. 
The coefficient estimates on itMA  are negative and significant in fixed effects and IV 
estimation in both ROA and ROE equations, supporting our hypothesis that the 
                                                 
48 More detailed discussions are shown in Wooldridge (2002), pp484-514. 
49 The Durbin-Watson statistics for the regressions ranged from 0.89 to 1.52. Estimation uses the Newey 
and West (1987) procedure with one lag to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
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performance of acquiring insurers decreases following M & As possibly due to scale 
diseconomies and increase frictional costs associated with post-merger managerial 
integration.  
The results with other explanatory variables are mostly consistent with 
expecta
t line Herfindahl indices are significant and positive across all models 
in both ROA and ROE, consistent with the findings of Cummins and Nini (2002). The 
s that more focused insurers are rewarded with higher 
perform
tions. Firm size is positively and significantly related to performance across all 
models, consistent with the view that larger firms tend to have lower insolvency risk and 
greater potential to gain revenue scope economies. The ratio of equity capital to total 
assets is significantly positively related to ROA and ROE, as predicted if better 
capitalized firms are more likely to charge higher prices and higher prices will translate 
into higher performance.  
The types of business that insurers write are found to be relevant to insurer 
performance. Firms with a higher proportion of business in commercial property lines 
exhibit greater ROA and ROE than those with more business in commercial liability lines. 
The coefficient on the percent of premium written in personal property lines in the IV 
version of ROE equation is significant and negative, consistent with the expectation that 
firms emphasizing personal property lines are less advantageous in profitability than 
insurers with a higher proportion of business commercial liability lines.  
 The produc
positive relationship suggest
ance. This result supports the strategic focus hypothesis that the insurer can 
maximize value by focusing on one or a few specialized area where the firm has a 
comparative advantage. However, geographic Herfindahl index is not significant in all 
equations.  
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The sign on direct marketing system is positive and significant, consistent with 
the view that insurers using direct marketing system have higher financial returns than 
insurers with independent agency system because independent agency distributors are 
likely to have higher costs than direct writers. The coefficient on mixed distribution is 
negative and significant only in the fixed effect model of ROE, indicating that firms 
using independent agency distribution tend to have better performance than firms using 
mixed distribution systems. The coefficient on brokerage indicator variable is not 
significant in all regression, indicating that there is no considerable difference in 
performance measure between firms with brokerage distribution and firms using 
indepe
ficient on the standard 
deviati
ndent agency distribution. 
The mutual variable has a significant negative sign across all models, consistent 
with the argument that mutual insurers have less incentive than stock firms to maximize 
firm value perhaps due to merged function of owner and policyholder. An unaffiliated 
single firm indicator is positive and significant in all regressions, which supports the 
argument that an unaffiliated company is likely to be more risk averse and managers of 
unaffiliated firms may have more incentive to minimize costs and maximize revenues 
than those of affiliated insurance groups. A New York dummy variable is significantly 
inversely related to firm performance, indicating that stringent regulatory costs result in a 
negative impact on a insurer’s financial performance. The coef
on of returns is negative and significant, suggesting that higher volatility of 
earnings may imply higher firm insolvency risk. Finally, revenue efficiency variable has 
a significant positive coefficient in the IV version of both the ROA and ROE equations, 
consistent with the hypothesis that revenue efficient firms are likely to earn higher 
financial returns.  
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Underwriting Performance 
The underwriting performance regressions are designed to examine the 
relationship between M & As and the differences in performance across lines of 
insurance. We conduct line by line regressions using both combined ratio and expense 
ratio as dependent variables. The expense ratio regressions provide additional evidence of 
the relationship between M & A activity and line by line performance.  
The results are presented in Tables 20 and 21 and are generally consistent with 
our hypotheses. The coefficient of M & A indicator variable is significant and positive in 
both personal property and commercial liability lines in combined and expense ratio 
regress
x are 
significant and inversely related to combined ratio across all lines only with the exception 
e. Similarly, geographic and 
produc
ions, indicating that loss ratio and underwriting expense ratio of acquiring insurers 
tend to increase after M & As. This result reinforces the conclusion of ROA and ROE 
regressions that the performance of acquiring insurers decreases after M & As. Since 
incurred loss and underwriting expenses are major costs of insurance company, it is 
important to keep in mind that combined ratio and expense ratio are an inverse measure 
of insurer’s pricing and profitability.  
The coefficients of explanatory variables in the combined and expense ratio 
regressions generally strengthen the results presented in the ROA and ROE regressions. 
For example, the coefficients of both geographic and product line Herfindahl inde
of product line Herfindahl index of personal liability lin
t line Herfindahl index is significant and negative in the expense ratio regression 
across all lines except the personal liability line. The negative relationship between 
underwriting performance and Herfindahl index indicates that loss ratio and expense ratio 
tend to be higher in more diversified firms than less diversified insurers, which, as a 
result, leads to lower financial performance for diversified firms. 
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Firm size is negatively and significantly related to combined ratio in the personal 
property and personal liability lines, indicating that larger firms experience lower loss 
and exp
her financial performance than insurers with independent 
agency
e lik
nts for firms licensed in New 
York a
regulations impose higher regulatory costs, leading to lower financial performance. 
 
ense ratio. However, the coefficient on the firm size is positive in the commercial 
liability line, indicating that larger firms undergo higher combined ratios than smaller 
firms. The coefficients of firm size are significant and negative in the expense ratio 
regressions across all lines. The dummy variables for direct marketing are significant and 
negative across all lines in both the expense ratio and the combined ratio regressions 
except the personal liability line, implying that direct writers tend to use less costs than 
independent agency distributors, and, this supports the results that insurers using direct 
marketing system have hig
 system. The coefficient on brokerage is negative and significant only in the 
commercial property line of expense ratio regression, indicating that firm with brokerage 
distribution systems are likely to use less expenses than insurers with independent agency 
systems in the commercial property line. Mixed distribution is also inversely and 
significantly related to expense ratio across all lines except the personal liability line.  
The indicator variable for unaffiliated single firms is significantly negatively 
related to both combined ratio and expense ratio across all lines. The negative 
relationship is consistent with the view that unaffiliated insurers ar ely to be more risk 
averse and thus have more incentive to reduce costs because they do not have 
opportunities to obtain diversification benefits. The coefficie
re significantly positively related to the combined ratio across all lines except 
commercial liability line and also have significant and positive relationship with expense 
ratio in the personal property and commercial liability lines, suggesting that stricter 
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10.3 ROBUSTNESS OF PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
We estimate several variants of the model to investigate the robustness of the 
results. First, to examine whether our results are robust to a different performance 
measure, we repeat our regression analysis with alternative performance measures by 
replacing ROA with ROE. As shown in Table 19, indicator variable for itMA is 
significantly inversely related to performance across all models, consistent with the 
results of ROA regression. The results for other explanatory variables are also unaffected 
by an alternative performance measure. 
Financia theory argues that higher risk activities earn higher returns. Thus, it is 
important to consider the effect of M & A on risk-adjusted performance. As in the 
preceding section, the first approach utilized to capture risk-return relationship is to 
include a risk m ariable in the regressions. In addition, we examined 
the robustness of our results to different risk measures by replacing standard deviation of 
returns with firm portfolio risk. Firm portfolio risk is calculated based on the option 
pricing model.5 olio risk is also significantly inversely related to ROA and 
ROE as in Table 18 and 19. 
An alternative approach suggested in the literature is to use risk-adjusted 
performance as a dependent variable in the regression. The risk-adjusted performance is 
calculated by dividing the relevant performance measure by its volatility over a given 
time period (Brown et al, 2001; L mer, 2005). We calculated risk-
adjusted ROA and RO  ROE by its standard 
deviatio
l 
easure as a control v
0 Firm portf
iebenberg and Som
E again by dividing an insurer’s ROA and
n of returns over the past 5 years following Liebenberg and Sommer (2005). We 
repeat regressions using this measurement as dependent variables. Results are shown in 
Table 22. Consistent with the first approach, the coefficient on itMA  is significant and 
                                                 
50 Details of the calculation on the firm portfolio risk measure are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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negative in both ROA and ROE regressions. The results for other explanatory variables 
are generally similar to those presented in Table 18 and 19.  
Although the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
estimat
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ed by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by 
the consistent fixed effects estimator, we repeated regressions using one-way and two-
way random effects models with the assumption that the unobserved effect is the random 
variable to estimate. The key results are unaffected.   
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CAHPTER 11 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation provides some of the first evidence on the relationship between 
M & As activity and the changes in the price of insurance across lines of business and the 
line-by line performance change in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. 
Because U.S. antitrust policy is primarily concerned with the potential for collusive 
behavior due to M & As and one principal objective of antitrust regulation is to prevent 
M & As that would lead to a substantial increase in market power, our findings have 
important policy implications.  
Using the sample of U.S. property-liability insurers that engaged in M & A 
activity over the period 1990-2003, we conduct one-way and two-way fixed effects 
model regressions where dependent variable is the insurance price for each line and 
where explanatory variables include the marginal capital allocation for each line, firm 
insolvency put value, cost efficiency, market share, and geographical and product line 
Herfindahl index. We incorporate cost efficiency and market share variable into the 
regression model to exam
rsified insurers charge lower prices than less diversified 
firms. Our result is cons
engaging in the M&A transaction and therefore gain a competitive advantage in pricing.   
ine whether efficient structure and market power hypotheses are 
valid. We include geographical and product line Herfindahl index as explanatory 
variables to provide further evidence on the related hypothesis that diversified insurers 
charge lower prices. 
The results of regression analysis provide evidence that the price of insurance for 
newly formed insurers decreases following the M & As, which are favorable to 
consumers. We also find that dive
istent with several possible explanations. One possibility is that 
acquiring insurers reduce overall underwriting risks and more efficiently manage the 
frictional costs of capital through geographical and/or product line diversification by 
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Alternatively, the result is also consistent with acquiring firms, on average, purchasing 
target firms that are underperforming in terms of price and therefore the newly combined 
firms charge a lower average price. Finally, the result is also consistent with acquiring 
firms purchasing targets which tend to underwrite less risky clients and therefore the 
target, prior to the merger, is charging fair premiums but to a different segment of the 
market than which the acquiring firm operates.  
Our analysis also reveals a number of other interesting results. The regression 
analysis provides support for the capital allocation theory that variations in prices by lines 
of business are directly related to corresponding variations of marginal capital allocation. 
We find that insurance price is positively related to marginal capital allocation across all 
lines, consistent with the findings of Cummins, Lin, and Phillips (2006). Consistent with 
prior st
ing price determinants in insurance industry. 
Howev
udies on the relation between insurance price and firm insolvency risk, we find 
that insurance price is inversely related to firm insolvency put value. This result implies 
that market discipline is present in insurance markets. For example, an insurer that 
pursues market share aggressively and thus takes on high levels of portfolio risk may 
suffer lower capitalization, charges lower prices, and thus loses firm profits. This firm 
will be restricted to risk-taking, even without regulation. Furthermore, these results show 
the importance of incorporating insolvency risk and marginal capital costs in pricing lines 
of insurance business. 
We also find that the price of insurance is inversely related to cost efficiency, 
consistent with the efficiency structure hypothesis. The results indicate that it is important 
to control for cost efficiency in examin
er, the negative and/ or insignificant signs for the market share variable indicate 
that market power hypothesis is not valid with our sample data. Thus, the implication of 
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the result suggests that market power that can arise from M & A activity may not be a big 
concern for insurance regulators. 
Next, the dissertation explores the relationship between M & A activity and 
insurer
 addition to the studies on the M & A-performance relationship, we also 
investigate the performance effects of geographic and product-line diversification within 
the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. We test two alternative hypotheses-
strategic focus hypothesis and conglomeration hypothesis-regarding diversification’s 
 performance. The results provide support for the strategic focus hypothesis 
re consistent 
with sification-performance relation (e.g., 
esults 
are r  worth 
’s efficiency and firm performance changes using more recent data. The regression 
results reveal the negative relationship, indicating that acquirers’ overall cost and revenue 
efficiency and financial performances such as ROA and ROE decrease following M & As. 
One possible explanation is that expansion of the firm through M & As has the potential 
to create inefficiencies, even though acquisition targets are financially healthy firms. As 
firms become larger and more complex, diversification benefits tend to be offset by the 
additional costs. Administrating and operating over wider geographical areas and 
integration of different information systems can lead to higher costs. Bonding different 
organizations has more potential to create managerial conflict and agency costs since 
managerial monitoring becomes more difficult. An alternative explanation for this result 
is that the target firms may be considerably badly performing and thereby acquiring firms 
appears to perform poorly after the transaction because it takes time to improve the 
performance of the target.  
In
effect on firm
that more focused insurers outperform the diversified insurers. Our results a
 the findings of recent studies of the diver
Cummins and Nini, 2002; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). We also find that the r
obust to alternative performance measure, risk-adjusted ROA and ROE. It is
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notin
literature did not incorporate risk factor.   
regre  expense ratio as dependent variables. The 
profi nd ROE regressions that 
, 
futur A activity utilize the capital of 
erall 
ined 
acqu ate the 
efficiency and financial performance of the targets relative to the industry prior to the M 
& A financial performance for newly 
t 
insu
Cam trol 
for  to gain more insights, additional exploration using 
“trea
g that we measure performance using risk-adjusted returns while most prior 
To provide evidence on line-by-line performance differences, we conduct 
ssions using both combined ratio and
results indicate that loss ratio and underwriting expense ratio tend to increase after M & 
A. Because loss ratio and expense ratio are an inverse measure of insurer’s pricing and 
tability, the result reinforces the conclusion of ROA a
acquirers’ performance decreases after M & As.  
In order to explain price declines for newly formed insurers following the M & As
e work can analyze whether firms that engage in M & 
the firm more efficiently and thus reflect lower overall capital costs by comparing ov
capital requirement relative to the liability for both newly formed insurers and comb
iring and target firms before and after M & As. We could also investig
 to figure out whether the decrease of efficiency and 
formed insurers following the M & As is attributable to the firm characteristics of targe
rers. Furthermore, there is potential for sample selection bias if one argues firms that 
engage in M & A transactions are more or less likely to be good (or bad) performers (e.g. 
pa and keida, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; Liebenberg and Sommer, 2005). To con
potential self-selection and
tment effects” may be necessary. 
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Table1. Economic Value of Assets for the U.S. Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 1989-2004 (Unit: $Millions) 
Table shows the economic value of assets for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry over the sample period 1995-2004. Assets are adjusted to market values based o
NAIC statutory accounting standards. Stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds are reported at market values. However, other assets are described at NAIC annual 
statement book values. The economic value of assets is defined as the book value of total assets minus the book value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds plus 
the market value of stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds.  
n 
 
Year 
Number of 
Company Stocks % 
G t 
% 
Eco
  1  0  0. 0 1 0.1
overnmen
Bonds % 
Corporate 
Bonds % Real Estate % Mortgages % 
Cash+  
Invested % 
Other 
Assets
nomic  
Assets 
1989 2596 15,609 .188 255,473 0.415 76,786 0.125 6,171 010 6,499 0.011 39,449 .064 1 5,446 88 615,434 
1990  1  0  0. 0 1 0.1
  1  0  0. 0 2 0.1
  1  0  0. 0 3 0.1
  1  0 0. 0 2 0.1
  1  0 0. 0 2 0.1
  1  0 0. 0 3 0.1
  2  0 0. 0 3 0.1
  2  0 0. 0 4 0.1 1
  2  0 0. 0 5 0.1 1
  2  0 0. 0 6 0.1 1
  2  0 0. 0 7 0.1 1
  2  0 0. 0 2 0.2 1
  2  0 0. 0 4 0.2 1
  2  0 0. 0 6 0.2 1
  3  0 0. 0 8 0.1 1
 2  0  0. 0 6 0.1
2649 12,924 .174 277,062 0.426 81,878 0.126 6,996 011 6,916 0.011 44,986 .069 1 9,929 84 650,690 
1991 2668 31,780 .185 305,942 0.429 96,567 0.135 7,710 011 6,537 0.009 39,541 .055 1 5,522 76 713,600 
1992 2669 34,383 .179 321,752 0.429 96,340 0.128 8,476 011 5,710 0.008 48,393 .064 1 5,307 80 750,361 
1993 2655 45,354 .182 359,540 0.451 102,449 0.129 9,086 011 4,525 0.006 48,097 .060 1 8,037 61 797,088 
1994 2681 54,534 .195 347,949 0.440 100,352 0.127 9,441 012 3,813 0.005 46,135 .058 1 8,694 63 790,920 
1995 2688 86,129 .209 379,726 0.427 121,060 0.136 9,273 010 2,857 0.003 56,209 .063 1 4,403 51 889,661 
1996 2708 01,990 .217 386,251 0.416 135,770 0.146 9,623 010 2,544 0.003 56,683 .061 1 6,613 47 929,469 
1997 2721 57,936 .251 403,769 0.392 154,531 0.150 9,472 009 2,315 0.002 59,788 .058 1 1,695 38 ,029,506 
1998 2757 82,565 .262 393,125 0.365 166,333 0.154 9,188 009 2,045 0.002 69,853 .065 1 4,241 43 ,077,355 
1999 2708 93,569 .277 349,494 0.330 169,096 0.160 9,532 009 2,197 0.002 66,569 .063 1 8,031 59 ,058,491 
2000 2679 67,784 .254 343,561 0.326 177,461 0.168 9,646 009 1,645 0.002 81,568 .077 1 1,725 63 ,053,393 
2001 2699 49,362 .226 344,673 0.312 191,549 0.173 9,329 008 2,554 0.002 83,502 .076 2 4,514 03 ,105,485 
2002 2680 29,278 .193 389,675 0.328 196,025 0.165 9,532 008 2,588 0.002 112,345 .095 2 8,327 09 ,187,773 
2003 2699 73,158 .205 436,372 0.328 216,052 0.162 9,280 007 2,715 0.002 127,536 .096 2 7,290 01 ,332,406 
2004 2727 01,135 .207 497,056 0.342 228,786 0.158 9,329 006 3,108 0.002 130,726 .090 2 1,947 94 ,452,089 
Average 2687 08,593 .213 361,964 0.385 144,440 0.146 8,880 010 3,661 0.004 69,461 .070 1 7,608 72 964,608 
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Table2. Economic Value of Liabilities and Capital for the U.S. P
Table shows the economic value of liabilities and equity for the U.S. property-liab
roperty-Liability Insurance Industry, 1989-2004 (Unit: $Millions) 
ility insurance industry over the sample period 1995-2004. The reserves for each line of 
business are adjusted to the present values by discounting the expected future loss cash flows with the estimated U.S. Treasury spot-rate curve. The expected future loss cash 
flows are based on the pattern of loss and loss adjustment expense payment. Other liabilities are defined as total liabilities of the industry minus all reserves of commercial 
liability, commercial property, personal liability, and personal property after discounting. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Company
Personal 
Property % 
Personal 
Liability % 
Commercial 
Property % 
Commercial 
Liability % 
Other 
Liabilities % 
Economic 
Liabilities % 
Economic 
Equity % 
Economic  
Liab+Equity
1989 2596  12,404 0.020  66,159 0.107 31,039 0.050 139,988 0.227  187,217 0.304 436,807 0
 
.710 178,627 0.290      615,434  
1990 2649  12,278 0.019  70,208 0.108 32,916 0.051 151,833 0.233  192,877 0.296 460,112 0.707 190,578 0.293      650,690  
8  12,484 0.017  74,1 0 8 5 .2 208, 0. 49 0 21 0     0  
0.018  77,54 03 ,30 .23 2, .29 8, 0.7 21, 0.      
0.015  81,03 02 38,925 ,47 .23 4,9 .28 4, 0.6 52, 0.    7   
12,911 0.016  77,95 99 38,939 0.049 ,8 .2 6,6 .3 9,3 0.7 31, 0.    7   
.014  64,16 72 43,462 0.04 201,82 .22 8,9 .29 1,2 0.6 08, 0.    8   
13,025 0.014  63,52 68 44,397 0.04 20 276 0.22 4, .2 0, 0.6 29, 0.      
12,424 0.012  63,24 61 45,194 0.04 20 047 197  285,5 .2 9,4 0.5 20, 0. 1,0   
3  64,19 60 49,222 0.04 20 093 193  293,866 0.27 9, 0.5 48, 0. 1,   
41 0.013  61,96 59 49,153 0.04 18 292 178  322,932 305 636,5 0.6 21, 0. 1,0   
0.015  64,48 61 49,519 0.04 18 409 177  330,511 314 6 6,355 0.6 07, 0. 1,   
17,361 0.016  68,20 62 57,726 0.05 19 159 178  381,402 345 7 1,852 .653 383, 0. 1,   
19,494 0.016  73,91 62 60,768 0.05 22 915 186  416,455 351 7 1,547 .666 6,225 0. 1,   
 0.016  76,63 58 62,907 0.04 24 39 81  46 ,060 48 8 ,247 649 4 7,158 .351   1,3   
2004 2727  21,893 0.015  77,215 0.053 67,856 0.047 259,577 0.179  497,633 0.343 924,176 0.636 527,912 0.364   1,452,089  
Average 2687  14,845 0.016  70,286 0.077 46,498 0.048 194,740 0.207  300,482 0.308 626,852 0.656 337,755 0.344      964,608  
1991 266 31 0.104 34,23  0.04 16 ,012 0 31  347 292 4,204 .693 9,396 .307  713,60
1992 2669  13,759 3 0.1 37,715 0.050 177 3 0 6  22 183 0 6 52 503 04 2 858 296   750,361
1993 2655  12,244 5 0.1 0.049 187 9 0 5  22 26 0 2 54 609 83 2 479 317   97,088
1994 2681  2 0.0  182 93 0 31  24 68 0 12 55 63 07 2 557 293   90,920
1995 2688  12,766 0 8 0.0  9 0 0 7  25 86 0 1 58 04 53 3 456 347   89,661
1996 2708  9 0.0  8 5, 1  27 150 0 95 60 378 46 3 090 354   929,469
1997 2721  2 0.0  4 3, 0. 05 0 77 60 14 92 4 091 408   29,506
1998 2757  13,893 0.01 9 0.0  6 8, 0. 3 62 276 84 4 078 416   077,355
1999 2708  14,2 8 0.0  6 8, 0. 0. 88 01 4 902 399   58,491
2000 2679  15,433 0 0.0  7 6, 0. 0. 4 14 4 038 386   053,393
2001 2699  2 0.0  2 7, 0. 0. 2 0 632 347   105,485
2002 2680  3 0.0  1 0, 0. 0. 9 0 39 334   187,773
2003 2699  20,908 1 0.0  7 0,7 0.1 4 0.3 65 0. 6 0 32,406
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Table3. Liability Volatility and Correlation Matrix, 1991-2004 
Table3, 4, and 5 provide industry-wide volatilities and correlation matrix that are determined by the quarterly time series of returns of seven asset classes and of the 
underwriting re rns of four aggre sura es o pe -20 e qua stim th urn irst ori obta m 
dard rate of return series (Sto & P dex; men Lehm ther ed  total ; cor ond ’s c e bon
AREIT total retu tga rill L ortg ked n; c d othe sted- U.S. ry b . The 
ts are calculated nat arithm e gr terly tage  in t l ma ue nce y net 
e first six asset cate  Th rly u ting serie ed alit  the nsus s X dur fined
ithm of the present value rre s and l ust pens ed b rned um fo quart
ty   A M     M WC L   
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b
ges-Mer ynch m age bac  securities total retur ash an rs inve 30-day Treasu ill rate) return 
series for other as
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ural log
e quarte
 of th
nderwri
oss quar
 return 
 percen
s adjust
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he tota
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rket val
U.S. Ce
of asset of th
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e insura
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natural logar  of incu d losse oss adj ment ex es divid y the ea  premi r each 
 
Liability Class Volatili    HO     APD L      C P   SP   FS    AH M     O   SL  ML 
Homeowners/Farmowners(HO 0 -0.1 0.56 62 0 -0. 0.05 136 4  ) 0.302 1.00 -0.312 92 9 0.5 -0.13 0.491 282 4 0. 0.54 -0.036
Auto Physical Damage(APD) 0.124  1.
Auto Liability(AL) 0.125   
000 0.235 0.208 0.136 0.396 0.128 -0.166 0.006 0.275 0.360 0.278 
1.000 -0.047 -0.764 0.236 -0.090 0.856 0.245 -0.345 -0.685 0.141 
ommercial Multiple Peril(CMP) 0.189    1.000 0.643 0.188 0.011 0.019 -0.045 0.190 0.261 0.001 
Special Property(SP) 81   00 0.0 0 .053 4 
ty(FS) 430  1.000 -0.091 0.277 38 -0.085 0.177 
nt, Health, Fin. Guaranty(AH) .088  1.00 3 0. .238 0 .127 
(MM) .164  0 0 .283 -0 .002 
sation(WC) .207 1 .527 -0 .097 
L) .221  .000 0 .046 
ility(SL) .207 1 .078 
us Liability(ML) .053           .000 
C
0.4
0.
  1.0 -0.180 - 14 -0.087 .123 0 0.276 -0.12
Fidelity/Sure     -0.133 0.4
Accide 0       0 -0.14 027 0 .343 -0
Medical Malpractice 0
0
       1.00 .188 -0 .795 0
Workers' Compen
Other Liability(O
  
  
  
  
     
     
.000 -0
1
.066 -0
.369 -00
Special Liab 0            .000 -0
Miscellaneo 0             1
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Table4. Asset and Liability Correlation Matrix, 1991-2004 
 
       HO APD      AL       CMP     SP    FS     AH       MM      WC    OL   SL     M
Stocks -0.175 -0.018 -0.009 -0.248 -0.150 -0.072 -0.151 -0.180 -0.125 -0.065 -0.025 -0.028 
Government Bonds -0.092 -0.079 0.173 -0.153 -0.313 -0.106 0.199 0.161 -0.141 0.026 -0.149 0.006 
Corporate Bon 0.012 -0.059 0.031 -0.3 0.064 -0.213 -0.038 0.106 
l E 0.113 0.014  
Mortg 0.038 -0.112 0 
 Othe d 0 3 1 0  
Asset .  
ds 46 -0.248 -0.230 0.239 -0.066
0.084 -0.044 -0.072 0.173 -0.041Rea state 
ages 
0.2
-0.1
07 0.054 0.005
89 -0.059 0.003
- -0.194
-0.296 -0.395 -0.087 0.181 0.075 -0.097
-0.185
0.02
Cash & r te
s 
s Inves -0.403 -0.1
0.09
5 0.0
-0.15
7 -
0.200
0.227 -0.24
-0.01
0 0.2
6 0.1
- 7
74 
 -0
0.139
.336 -0.0
-0.0
72 -
86 -0
.190
.185
-
0.312
0.311 -0.18
0.19
9 0.198
0 -0.076Other 0 018 5 5
 
Table5. A tility rsset Vola and Co relation Matrix, 1991-2004 
 
 
Asset Class 
e a
  
 
Volatility Stocks 
Governm
Bonds 
nt Corpora
Bonds 
te  Real Est te Mortgage C Ot
ash & 
hers Inv. Other Assets 
Stocks 0.1581 1.0000  -0.2833  0.5570  0.2946  -0.0907  0.1952  -0.1972  
Government   
ate B  
state    
ages   
 Oth d   
Asset  
 Bonds 0.0373 -0.2833  1.0000 -0.0146  0.0493  0.9250  0.1966  -0.0141  
Corpor onds 0.0682 0.5570  -0.0146  1.0000  0.2662  0.1354  0.1013  0.0767  
Real E 0.1211 0.2946  0.0493 0.2662 1.0000  0.1247  0.0684  -0.1591  
Mortg 0.0065 -0.0907  0.9250 0.1354  0.1247  1.0000  0.2809  0.0051  
Cash & ers Investe 0.0061 0.1952  0.1966 0.1013  0.0684  0.2809  1.0000  0.0307  
Other s 0.0704 1.0000  0.0307  0.0051  -0.1591  0.0767   -0.0141-0.1972  
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e U.S. Prop ions) 
The table displays insolvency put value for the U.S. property-liability insurance industry a d on 
Myers and Read (2001) methodology. CL represents commercial liability, CP commercial ities.  
The column of default-to-liability ratio is calculated to obtain insolvency put value. The co or eac
line in response to the marginal increase in the present value of losses for the line.   
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es o
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pita
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f bu
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l re
it:
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 oth
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ess 
er li
eme
ill
base
abil
nt f h 
 Insolvency/Liability  Insolvency Capital-To-Liability Ratio The Amount of Capit llo nd % of  Capital 
cono
Capital A cated By Line a  Industry
E mic  
al 
Year Ratio Put Value CL CP PL PP OL CL % C  % % % %   P PL PP OL 
1989 6.20E-05 27.08  0.84 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.12   117,153 0.656    10   0.058   23,7 0.133      4,67  0.026    22,69   0.127      178,6,372 24 9 7 27  
1990 6.18E-05 28.43  0.85 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.11   128,929 0.677    10,776  0.057   24,769 0.130      4,499  0.024    21,603   0.113      190,5
1991 3.70E-05 18.26  0.91 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.12   150,014 0.684    11,787  0.054   27,488 0.125      4,831  0.022    25,275   0.115  219,3
1992 5.68E-05 30.03  0.86 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.11   152,932 0.689       2         2      221,8
1993 3.45E-05 18.76  0.95 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.12   177,807 0.704        ,4
1994 3.65E-05 20.43  0.86 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.12   156,548 0.676       2         3      231,5
1995 6.41E-05 37.26  1.10 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.15   222,639 0.722    18,133  0.05 2,839 0.0  5,720  0.019 9,12   0.127  308,4
1996 5.29E-05 31.76  1.14 0.44 0.37 0.47 0.17   234,414 0.712    19,508  0.059   2      6,158  0.019    4     ,0
1997 5.18E-05 31.57  1.44 0.57 0.47 0.61 0.23   291,561 0.694       2         6     ,0
1998 3.73E-05 23.46  1.48 0.61 0.49 0.64 0.24   307,076 0.685               7      448,0
1999 4.77E-05 30.35  1.37 0.63 0.51 0.67 0.29   257,211 0.610    31,082  0.074   3      9,520  0.023    9     ,9
2000 5.53E-05 35.76  1.30 0.61 0.50 0.65 0.28   243,010 0.597       3    1    9     ,0
2001 6.62E-05 47.82  1.10 0.55 0.43 0.58 0.25   217,284 0.566          1    9     ,6
2002 4.09E-05 32.36  1.05 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.22   233,024 0.588    30,468  0.077   2    10,484  0.026    9      ,2
2003 1.98E-05 17.12  1.14 0.53 0.41 0.58 0.25   274,538 0.588    33,608  0.072   3    12,184  0.026  11     ,1
2004 1.14E-05 10.57  1.21 0.56 0.42 0.61 0.26   314,274 0.595       3    1  12     ,9
Avg. 4.60E-05 27.56  1.10 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.19   217,401 0.653       2         6 9     ,7
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Table6. Insolvency Put Value and Capital Allocations for th
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N Mean v.
Table7. Inputs and Expenses-Groups and Unaffiliated Companies, 1989-2004 
 
  Median Std. De Min Max 
Input Quantities (000s)             
Administrative Labor  1  1 31 1
 1 3 5
rvices  1 15 20
  1 3 4 5
abor   0,643 6.928 7 76 0. 3 5.9  7.932 
 10,643 5.27 140 45 5 
ss Services  10,643 4.37 .186 0 5 
  10,643 0.11 114 9 0 
    
abor  10,64 20,150     04 5     2,01
  ,643    5,184     1,830      172, 0 0.4      3,929,143 
ss Services  1  67 0 0
ital 3
ses 
1 .9 1
 1 2 .5 % 1
3 40.4% 3 4% 17  0.0  99.8%
ital  10,64 23.9% .1% % 1 
    0,643       2,871        31        14,1  0.01  262,171
Agent Labor     0,643        6,619        48        31,8 1 0.096 679,788
Materials and Business Se     0,643      ,279        783        92,8  20 2,554,499
Financial Equity Capital     0,643    3 2,830   12,611   2,124,9 7 70  55,868,199
Input Prices       
Administrative L    1 .0 66 58
Agent Labor      7 5. 0.3 4.92 6.039 
Materials and Busine      2 4 0.40 3.96 5.075 
Financial Equity Capital      1 0. 0.02 0.06 0.166 
Expenses (000s)   
Administrative L     3              912   101,1 0.06 1,635 
Agent Labor    10   3 19 86
Materials and Busine     0,643     ,233     3,385      411,9 1 8    10,655,961 
Financial Equity Cap      10,643      4,956     1,350      220,750 51     6,715,357 
Percent of Total Expen       
Administrative Labor      10,643 2.1% 11 % 8.8% 0.00  83.8%
Agent Labor     0,643 3.6% 23 % 17.2  0.00  97.9%
Materials and Business Services     10,64 9. .2% 19
Financial Equity Cap    3 18 18.3 0.00 100.0%
 
Ta
 
ble8. Outputs, Prices, and Reve es-Groups and Unaffiliated Companies, 1989-2004 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
nu
Output Quantities (000s)             
Personal Short-Tail        7,259      172,007       20,625        839,914        344     14,741,160 
  164,879       14,081        732,146        187     11,535,170 
mercial Short-Tail        7,786        91,398         9,484        258,510            4       3,262,982 
  149,098         8,841        503,577            6     10,793,424 
iation     10,643 2,277,673     209,573     7,321,154   11,057     94,700,304 
t Prices       
0.241 0.204 0.112 0.002 4.966 
onal Long-Tail        5,176 0.273 0.221 0.134 0.001 4.753 
hort-Tail 0.713 0.622 0.498 0.003 4.991 
Commercial Long-Tail        7,314 0.474 0.352 0.223 0.001 4.981 
0.079 0.074 0.061 0.001 2.176 
Revenues (000s)       
    88,654        9,457         318,045          30       8,961,194 
Personal Long-Tail        5,176         73,499         8,244         314,838        134       7,266,213 
    74,306          9,540        211,724            3       2,753,662 
mercial Long-Tail        7,314         85,582         8,313        308,014            1       7,971,607 
  169,573       15,798        600,242     1,210       9,735,310 
enues: Percentage of Insurance Revenues    
t-Tail 23.1% 21.6% 15.1% 0.01% 81.1%
al Long-Tail        5,176 16.6% 14.5% 13.0% 0.03% 80.8%
mmercial Short-Tail        7,786 18.2% 15.6% 13.9% 0.01% 90.6%
ng-Tail 17.6% 13.2% 16.2% 0.01% 87.9%
Intermediation      10,643 24.4% 23.1% 10.7% 0.50% 98.1%
Per
Com
sonal Long-Tail        5,176    
Com
Inte
me
rmed
rcial Long-Tail        7,314    
  
Ou
Per
tpu
sonal Short-Tail        7,259 
Pers
Commercial S        7,786 
Intermediation     10,643 
Personal Short-Tail        7,259   
Com
Com
mercial Short-Tail        7,786     
Inte
Rev
rmediation      10,643    
Per
Per
sona
son
l Shor        7,259 
Co
Commercial Lo        7,314 
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and Sample Selection Criteria, 1990-2003 
ple Selection Criteria/Y 2ear 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 003  Total 
M & As initially identified 53 in Best's Reports 26 36 35 44 38 44 49 44 33 40 36 38 34 41 8 
Less   Merge with shell tar
           Reinsurer M & A 
           In liquidation after  
           Remerge within 2 y  
           Merge with life insu nsurer 2    
           Merge into inactive i  2    
           Involve in multip 1 1 2  4 
           Not identified on N tabase 9 4 5 4 7 1 1 2 
           Negative premium/l plus 3 6 3 4 4 6 1 5 
           Negative input/outp ices 4 4 7 8 2 7 10 7 3 6 5 6 6 7 8
Sample used in the regress lysis  7 15 9 16 16 19 13 10 11 17 12 17 12 16 19
44 
24 
11 
11 
7 
10 
42 
66 
51 
2 
0 
get 
M & A 
ears 
rer, rei
nsurer
le M & A  
AIC da
oss/sur
ut or pr
ion ana
4
1
1
1
1
1
3
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Table9. Number of M & A Transactions 
 
Sam
Data source: Best's Ins e Reports and NAIC databaseuranc
Table10. Summary Statistics for All Groups and Unaffiliated Companies: 1989-2004 
Ob e S
 
Variables s. M an Median td. Dev. Min Max 
Economic Premium Ratio       
Personal Property(PP) Line  72 106 1.057
51 .051 1.029
ne  77 38 1.27
7314 .24 1.1 0  
 
106 .0 0.
106 .0 0. 1
eturn On Asset 106 .0 0.
106 .9 0.
ce 72 .9 0.
ce 51 .9 0.
erformance 77 .8 0.
 Performance 73 .9 0.
atio 72 2 0.
tio 51 0.
tio 77 3 0.
73 3 0.
 
1064 .8 0.
1064 .6 0.
1064 .8 0.
1064 .8 0.
1064 .2 1.
1064 .0 1.
ation 106 .0 1.
 106 .3 1.
 
 106 .5 0.
106 .8 0.
106 .6 0.
106 .3 0.
106 .4 0.
59 1.   0.440 0.012 4.000 
Personal Liability(PL) Line  76 1  0.408 0.010 3.982 
Commercial Property(CP) Li 86 1. 3 1 0.617 0.014 3.995 
Commercial Liability(CL) Line  1 3 45 .589 0.011 3.999 
Firm Performance      
Return On Asset 43 0 34 037 0.098 -1.357 4.145 
Return On Equity 43 0 66 085 0.300 -5.937 0.594 
Risk-Adjusted R 43 1 45 910 1.483 -5.581 9.719 
Risk-Adjusted Return On Equity 43 0 83 842 1.434 -8.838 9.006 
PP Line Underwriting Performan 59 0 04 905 0.300 0.012 4.211 
PL Line Underwriting Performan 76 0 47 930 0.318 0.028 4.129 
CP Line Underwriting P 86 0 73 862 0.294 0.020 4.502 
CL Line Underwriting 14 0 42 908 0.382 0.010 4.642 
PP line Expense to Premium R 59 0. 81 287 0.155 0.001 0.996 
PL line Expense to Premium Ra
um Ra
76 0.254 264 0.140 0.001 0.995 
CP line Expense to Premi 86 0.
1
60 339 0.181 0.001 0.998 
CL line Expense to Premium Ratio 4 0. 72 347 0.188 0.002 0.999 
Capital Allocation      
PP Line Capital Allocation 3 0 62 605 0.805 0.011 3.990 
PL Line Capital Allocation 3 0 76 538 0.637 0.014 3.982 
CP Line Capital Allocation 3 0 35 590 0.780 0.013 3.987 
CL Line Capital Allocation 3 0 84 699 0.719 0.011 3.999 
Relative PP Line Capital Allocation 3 1 56 157 0.791 0.012 3.988 
Relative PL Line Capital Allocation 3 1 02 007 0.724 0.010 3.800 
Relative CP Line Capital Alloc 43 1 93 018 0.671 0.013 3.988 
Relative CL Line Capital Allocation 43 1 10 408 0.677 0.010 3.985 
Efficiency Scores      
Pure Technical Efficiency 43 0 89 546 0.274 0.006 1.000 
Scale Efficiency 43 0 43 923 0.192 0.002 1.000 
Allocative Efficiency 43 0 96 722 0.198 0.005 1.000 
Cost Efficiency 43 0 35 302 0.199 0.001 1.000 
Revenue Efficiency 43 0 08 400 0.192 0.001 1.000 
Note: We exclude observations when economic premiu is ha ess t 1 so 
ital allocation ter or  0.0
m ratio greater t n 4 or l han 0.0 . We al
exclude observations when either line cap  is grea  than 4 less than 1.
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Table10. Continued 
 
ariables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max V
Firm Characteristics       
Total Assets ($ million) 106 6  4       3,343 2.003 4,405 
3 9     0   4
3 3     0   5
3 2  0
3 9  0
  0.
ability   0.
lus 3 5  
3 9  
nses 3 7  
3 8  
3 7  0
3 7  0
3 2  0
3 7  0
3 8  0 5
3 3  0
3 6  0 3
ne 9   0
ine 6 2 0
 Written in CP Line 7786 0.2  0.16  0.327 0.001 1.000 
 in CL Line 4 6  0
 PP Line 9 6  0
 PL Line 6 2  0
 CP Line 6 7  0
e 4 5  0
3 7  0
3 5  0
3 2  0
riting 106 0.1  0.00  0.384 0.000 1.000 
43 9 0.
ion 43 8 0.
ork Domicile 3 8  0
++ or A+ Rating 3 2  0
th A or A- Rating 3 7  0
 B++ or B+ Rating 3 7  0
43 32 0    8
Total Premiums ($ million) 1064 32 19   1,832 .101 7,762 
Equity Capital ($million) 1064 33 13   2,135 .001 7,977 
Firm Insolvency Put Value 1064 0.00 0.000 0.015 .000 0.833 
Firm Portfolio Risk(Sigma) 
ssets 
1064
106
0.12
0.4
0.128
0.42
0.034 
0.193
.003 
012 
0.741 
0.998 Firm Capital/Total A
Firm Capital/Firm Li
43
43
65
42
1
9
 
 106
1064
0.8
1.27
0.59
1.164
0.709
0.776 
013 
0.006 
3.997 
3.992 Net Premium/Surp
Liquidity Ratio 1064 0.30 0.154 0.438 0.002 4.792 
Advertising Expenses/Total Expe 1064 0.00 0.002 0.017 0.001 0.581 
Standard Deviation of ROA  1064 0.05 0.045 0.051 0.002 1.507 
Standard Deviation of ROE  1064 0.12 0.097 0.121 .001 1.653 
Industry Concentration 1064 0.05 0.053 0.045 .003 0.832 
Market Share 1064 0.00 0.000 0.008 .000 0.187 
Geographic Herfindahl Index 1064 0.63 0.766 0.379 .001 1.000 
Number of States Operated 1064 12.41 2.000 17.828 .000 1.000 
Product Line Herfindahl Index 1064 0.50 0.394 0.321 .003 1.000 
Number of Product Line 1064 8.01 6.000 7.425 .000 1.000 
Percent of Premiums Written in PP Li
Percent of Premiums Written in PL L
7259
517
0.24
0.15
0.178
0.102
0.259
0.221 
.001 
.001 
1.000 
1.000 
Percent of Premiums 86 8  
Percent of Premiums Written 731 0.31 0.113 0.380 .003 1.000 
Percent of Losses Incurred in 725 0.25 0.171 0.272 .001 1.000 
Percent of Losses Incurred in 517 0.16 0.001 0.234 .002 1.000 
Percent of Losses Incurred in 778 0.26 0.139 0.325 .001 1.000 
Percent of Losses Incurred in CL Lin 731 0.31 0.101 0.382 .001 1.000 
Percent of Mutual Companies 1064 0.38 0.000 0.487 .000 1.000 
Percent of Unaffiliated Companies 1064 0.57 1.000 0.494 .000 1.000 
Percent of Independent Agent 1064 0.61 1.000 0.487 .000 1.000 
Percent of Direct W 43 80 0  
Percent of Brokerage 
Distribut
106 0.05 0.000 0.233 000 1.000 
Percent of Mixed 
Percent of New Y
106
1064
0.05
0.08
0.000 
0.000
0.234 
0.283 
000 
.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Percent Insurers with A 1064 0.13 0.000 0.338 .000 1.000 
Percent Insurers wi 1064 0.37 0.000 0.485 .000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with 1064 0.15 0.000 0.364 .000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with B or Below B 10643 0.077 0.000 0.266 0.000 1.000 
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Table11. Summary Statistics for Acquiring Groups and Unaffiliated Companies:  
1989-2004 
bs.  Dev. Min Max
 
Variables O Mean Median Std.
Economic Premium Ratio       
Personal Property(PP) Line  149 1.0 1.
e  1.
ine  1
ine  1  
   
0  
y 0  
0  
ity 0  
ce 0  
rformance 0  
ce 0  
ance  
tio 
um Ratio 
0
0
   
0
0
0
0
1
 0
ation 0
llocation 1
   
0
0
0
0
0
79 034 0.349 0.251 2.678 
Personal Liability(PL) Lin 113 1.053 045 0.340 0.010 3.977 
Commercial Property(CP) L 156 .333 1.262 0.512 0.060 3.488 
Commercial Liability(CL) L 168 .244 1.141 0.503 0.013 3.938
Firm Performance    
Return On Asset 190 .045 0.038 0.079 -0.279 3.656 
Return On Equit 190 .054 0.060 0.170 -1.105 4.983 
Risk-Adjusted Return On Asset 190 .940 0.691 1.408 -3.229 6.951 
Risk-Adjusted Return On Equ 190 .645 0.659 1.303 -3.676 6.024 
PP Line Underwriting Performan 149 .943 0.932 0.260 0.109 2.426 
PL Line Underwriting Pe 113 .974 0.947 0.239 0.370 2.359 
CP Line Underwriting Performan
CL Line Underwriting Perform
156 .870 0.845 0.274 0.038 3.293 
168 0
0
.985 0.963 0.372 0.001 3.857 
PP line Expense to Premium Ra 149 .290 0.286 0.137 0.001 0.947 
PL line Expense to Premi 113 0.282 0.288 0.127 0.001 0.728 
CP line Expense to Premium Ratio 156 .322 0.305 0.145 0.013 0.939 
CL line Expense to Premium Ratio 168 .381 0.348 0.166 0.001 0.981 
Capital Allocation    
PP Line Capital Allocation 149 .836 0.595 0.758 0.018 3.649 
PL Line Capital Allocation 113 .673 0.525 0.636 0.011 3.270 
CP Line Capital Allocation 156 .725 0.567 0.650 0.038 3.904 
CL Line Capital Allocation 168 .936 0.824 0.602 0.040 3.873 
Relative PP Line Capital Allocation 149 .106 1.091 0.638 0.012 3.156 
Relative PL Line Capital Allocation 113 .878 0.783 0.603 0.012 2.152 
Relative CP Line Capital Alloc 156 .927 0.925 0.431 0.106 2.059 
Relative CL Line Capital A 168 .440 1.608 0.594 0.012 3.306 
Efficiency Scores    
Pure Technical Efficiency 190 .621 0.594 0.242 0.107 1.000 
Scale Efficiency 190 .809 0.855 0.183 0.244 1.000 
Allocative Efficiency 190 .746 0.777 0.157 0.210 1.000 
Cost Efficiency 190 .358 0.352 0.157 0.015 0.975 
Revenue Efficiency 190 .406 0.407 0.160 0.083 1.000 
N
ex
ote: We exclude observations when economic premium o i r th  less 0 lso 
clude observations when either line capital allocation is greater than 4 or less than 0.01. The statistics refer to 
the calendar year prior to the M & As 
 rati s greate an 4 or  than 0. 1. We a
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Table11. Continued 
 
O . Dev. Min Max Variables bs. Mean Median Std
Firm Characteristics       
Total Assets ($ million) 19    1 2 7  4,10 2.00      23,95
otal Premiums ($ million) 1    2,11     14,905
Equity Capital ($million) 26     2,1 2     11,16
lvency Put Value 1 1 0.0  0.037
Firm Portfolio Risk(Sigma) 42 0.0 5 0.26
ssets 67 0.19 0.99
pital/Firm Liability 715 0.4 8 3.14
ium/Surplus 8 0.6 3.90
ty Ratio 277 0.2 1 3.40
ising Expenses/Total Expenses 006 0.0 0 0.10
 ROA  9 0.11 1.27
 ROE  38 0.1 0 0.96
 1  0.04 0.436 
Market Share 04 0.0 0 0.05
erfindahl Index 1  0.35 1.000 
Number of States Operated 50 20.4 0 51.00
Product Line Herfindahl Index 1  0.2 1.000
Number of Product Line 62 8.5 0 32.00
ms Written in PP Line 1  0.19 0.750
Percent of Premiums Written in PL Line 72 0.1 2 0.67
 CP Line 1  0.2 1.000
Percent of Premiums Written in CL Lin 02 0.2 2 1.00
ncurred in PP Line 1 4 0.175 0.224 0. 2 0.942 
Percent of Losses Incurred in PL Line 78 0.104 0.170 0. 1 0.798 
rred in CP Line  0.215 0.224 0. 1 1.000 
urred in CL Line 306 0.237 0.320 0. 1 1.000 
mpanies 6 0.000 0.493 0. 0 1.000 
ted Companies 26 0.4  1.00
dent Agent 190 0 690 0.4 0 1.00
riting 190 3 0. 0.329  1.000 
cent of Brokerage 190 0 5 0. 0.246  1.000 
rcent of New York Domicile 190 0.058 0.000 0.235 0.000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with A++ or A+ Rating 190 0.221 0.000 0.416 0.000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with A or A- Rating 190 0.468 0.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with B++ or B+ Rating 190 0.143 0.000 0.351 0.000 1.000 
Percent Insurers with B or Below B 190 0.045 0.000 0.209 0.000 1.000 
0 ,82 18       5 0 6 
T 90 929 103      4 0.611  
190    1,0 139    64 0.82 3 
Firm Inso 90 0.00 0.000 03 0.000  
190 0.1 0.137 29 0.05 1 
Firm Capital/Total A 1
190 0.
90 0.4 0.425 4 0.128 7 
7 Firm Ca
Net Prem
0.575 70 0.10
1
190 0.
90 1.22 1.120 49 0.170 4
4 
 
Liquidi
Advert
0.138 96 0.01
190 0.
1
0.003 11 0.00 1 
2 Standard Deviation of
Standard Deviation of
90 0.06 0.052 9 0.012 
190 0.1 0.105 31 0.01 9 
Industry Concentration 90 0.059 0.054 1 0.016 
190 0.0 0.000 08 0.00 7 
Geographic H 90 0.400 0.236 6 0.005 
190 24.3 21.000 11 1.00 0 
90 0.326 0.230 67 0.074  
190 14.6 15.000 69 1.00 0 
Percent of Premiu 49 0.258 0.196 9 0.001  
 113 0.1 0.115 47 0.00 4 
Percent of Premiums Written in  56 0.292 0.227 34 0.008  
e 168 0.3 0.226 90 0.00 0 
Percent of Losses I 49 0.25 00
113 0.1 00
Percent of Losses Incu 1
168 0.
56 0.284 00
Percent of Losses Inc
Percent of Mutual Co
00
190 0.
190 0
40 00
Percent of Unaffilia
Percent of Indepen
.2 0.000 19 0.000 0 
. 1.000 64 0.00 0 
Percent of Direct W 0.12 000 0.000
Per 0. 6 000 0.000
Percent of Mixed Distribution 190 0.084 0.000 0.278 0.000 1.000 
Pe
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Table12. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Personal Property Line, 1989-2004 
 
Dependent Variable:  Economic Premium Ratio   
Fixed Effects X     Year X  Year   Year+Firm   
Variable/Model Number 1     2  3   4   5   
    Intercept 0.8147 *** *0.8847 ** 0.6978 *** 0.7453 *** 1.0542 ***
 (0.0895)   
** ** ** * 
  
**  ** 
  
*** * ***
  
*  * 
  
  
  
* *
  
*** * ***
  
*** *** *** ** 
  
*** ***
  
*** * *** ** 
  
 ** 
  
  
*
  
  
  
  
(0.0910) (0.0838)  (0.0854)  (0.3129)  
    Indicator for MA -0.0463 -0.0567 -0.0476 -0.0563 * -0.0683 * 
 (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0229)  (0.0229)  (0.0433)  
    Marginal Capital Allocation 0.0189 0.0109 0.0193 0.0145 * 0.0323 ** 
 (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0076)  (0.0076)  (0.0132)  
    Cost Efficiency -0.1079 -0.1346 ** -0.1214 -0.1413 *** -0.5656 ***
 (0.0312) (0.0335) (0.0311)  (0.0334)  (0.0509)  
    Market Share -1.0906 -0.8666 -1.1881 -0.9901  1.5958  
 (0.6134) (0.6089) (0.6069)  (0.6031)  (1.6419)  
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0416 ** 0.0380 ** 0.0421 ** 0.0391 ** 0.0522 * 
 (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0176)  (0.0176)  (0.0329)  
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.1279 ** 0.1267 ** 0.1360 *** 0.1362 *** 0.1542 ** 
 (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.0328)  (0.0326)  (0.0591)  
    Natural log of Assets 0.0182 0.0134 ** 0.0238 0.0201 * 0.0360 * 
 (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0155)  
    Mutual -0.1264 -0.1258 -0.1269 -0.1265 * -0.0202  
 (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116)  (0.0116)  (0.0382)  
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0533 0.0453 0.0564 *** 0.0489 *** 0.0205 ***
 (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142)  (0.0141)  (0.0043)  
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0689 -0.0716 ** -0.0625 -0.0667 * 0.0192  
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0172)  (0.0171)  (0.0534)  
    A.M. Best Rating A or A- -0.0193 -0.0262     
 (0.0122) (0.0122)     
    A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+ -0.0322 * -0.0437 ***     
 (0.0166) (0.0166)     
    A.M. Best Rating B or lower -0.0668 ** -0.0798 ***     
 (0.0214) (0.0215)     
    Firm Insolvency Put Value -8.8723 *** -7.0252 ** -16.0084 ** 
 (2.8913)  (2.8878)  (3.3975)  
Adjusted R-square 0.03  0.05  0.03   0.05   0.44   
Observations 7259    7259  7259   7259   7259   
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.
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Table13. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Personal Liability Line, 1989-2004 
 
Dependent Variable:  Economic Premium Ratio   
Fixed Effects X      Year X Year  Year+Firm  
Variable/Model Number 1      2  3  4   5  
    Intercept 1.0583 *** 1.0660 *** 0.8542 *** 0.1814 *** 1.5988 ***
 (0.0952)  (0.0949)  (0.0875)  (0.0877)  (0.3282)  
    Indicator for MA 0.0269  -
(0.0187)  (0.0384)  
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.1589 *** 0.1549 *** 0.1648 *** 0.1684 *** 0.2923 ***
 (0.0409)  (0.0401)  (0.0406)  (0.0398)  (0.0720)  
    Natural log of Assets -0.0047  -0.0077 * 0.0066  0.0057  -0.0085  
 (0.0046)  (0.0045)  (0.0043)  (0.0043)  (0.0165)  
    Mutual 0.0006  0.0057  -0.0022  0.0040  -0.0078  
 (0.0121)  (0.0118)  (0.0120)  (0.0118)  (0.0472)  
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0247 * 0.0236  0.0307 ** 0.0307 ** 0.0118 ** 
 (0.0149)  (0.0146)  (0.0148)  (0.0146)  (0.0047)  
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0316  -0.0375 * -0.0118  -0.0218  -0.0784  
 (0.0207)  (0.0202)  (0.0208)  (0.0204)  (0.0606)  
    A.M. Best Rating A or A- 0.0011  -0.0148      
 (0.0132)  (0.0130)      
    A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+ -0.0465 ** -0.0698 ***     
 (0.0188)  (0.0185)      
    A.M. Best Rating B or lower -0.1015 *** -0.1289 ***     
 (0.0227)  (0.0223)      
    Firm Insolvency Put Value   -22.9823 *** -19.1810 *** -12.4967 * 
   (3.0394)  (3.0199)  (3.6946)  
Adjusted R-square 0.02   0.06   0.02   0.07   0.38   
0.0099  0.0236  -0.0092  -0.0189 * 
 (0.0236)  (0.0232)  (0.0235)  (0.0232)  (0.0347)  
    Marginal Capital Allocation 0.0178 * 0.0133  0.0078  0.0103  -0.0110  
 (0.0100)  (0.0097)  (0.0100)  (0.0098)  (0.0161)  
    Cost Efficiency 0.0145  -0.0999 *** -0.0044  -0.1077 *** -0.3097 ***
 (0.0355)  (0.0383)  (0.0351)  (0.0381)  (0.0571)  
    Market Share 0.4112  0.7951  0.0089  0.3382  1.5158  
 (0.5942)  (0.5810)  (0.5862)  (0.5752)  (2.0201)  
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0603 *** 0.0662 *** 0.0652 *** 0.0703 *** -0.0283  
 (0.0191)  (0.0187)  (0.0190)  
Observations 5176   5176   5176   5176   5176   
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table14. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Commercial Property Line, 1989-2004 
 
Dependent Variable:  Economic Premium Ratio  
Fixed Effects X Year X Year  Year+Firm  
Variable/Model Number 1  2  3  4   5  
    Intercept 1.9049 *** 2.0597 *** 1.5545 *** 1.6829 *** 1.1364 ***
 (0.1151)  (0.1168)  (0.1084)  (0.1101)  (0.4092)  
    Indicator for MA 0.0198  0.0027  0.0160  0.0032  0.0186  
 (0.0300)  (0.0299)  (0.0300)  (0.0299)  (0.0299)  
    Marginal Capital Allocation 0.0169 * 0.0120  0.0183 * 0.0176 * 0.0036  
 (0.0120)  (0.0103)  (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0168)  
    Cost Efficiency -0.1475  -0.1454 *** -0.1887 *** -0.1723 *** -0.4041 ***
 (0.0427)  (0.0456)  (0.0430)  (0.0458)  (0.0704)  
    Market Share 0.0718  0.3877  -0.6662  -0.4183  1.3656  
 (0.8295)  (0.8236)  (0.8226)  (0.8179)  (2.7520)  
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0976 *** 0.0911 *** 0.1001 *** 0.0953 *** 0.1014 ** 
 (0.0223)  (0.0222)  (0.0223)  (0.0222)  (0.0410)  
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.0827 *** 0.0852 *** 0.1001 *** 0.1072 *** 0.0175  
 (0.0318)  (0.0316)  (0.0317)  (0.0316)  (0.0614)  
    Natural log of Assets -0.0283 *** -0.0344 *** -0.0095 * -0.0138 ** 0.0132  
 (0.0056)  (0.0057)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0198)  
    Mutual -0.0468 *** -0.0507 *** -0.0459 *** -0.0499 *** 0.0453  
 (0.0153)  (0.0152)  (0.0153)  (0.0152)  (0.0511)  
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0192  0.0060  0.0324 * 0.0206  0.0047  
 (0.0178)  (0.0177)  (0.0178)  (0.0177)  (0.0039)  
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0804 *** -0.0752 *** -0.0709 *** -0.0667 *** -0.0626  
 (0.0220)  (0.0218)  (0.0221)  (0.0220)  (0.0664)  
    A.M. Best Rating A or A- 0.0038  -0.0056      
 (0.0156)  (0.0157)      
    A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+ -0.0654 *** -0.0822 ***     
 (0.0215)  (0.0217)      
    A.M. Best Rating B or lower -0.2277 *** -0.2378 ***     
 (0.0320)  (0.0320)      
    Firm Insolvency Put Value   -28.9689 *** -27.5552 *** -24.2742 ***
   (3.9977)  (3.9857)  (4.7061)  
Adjusted R-square 0.04   0.06   0.04   0.05   0.45   
Observations 7786   7786   7786   7786   7786   
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table15. Economic Premium Ratio Regression for Commercial Liability Line, 1989-2004 
 
Dependent Variable:  Economic Premium Ratio   
Fixed Effects X  Year  X  Year   Year+Firm   
Variable/Model Number 1   2   3   4   5   
    Intercept 2.0288 *** 2.1671 *** 1.7325 *** 1.8355 *** 1.1499 ***
 (0.1009)  (0.1029)  (0.0974)  (0.0997)  (0.3776)  
    Indicator for MA 0.0425  0.0157  0.0385  0.0145  -0.0043  
 (0.0290)  (0.0289)  (0.0289)  (0.0289)  (0.0306)  
    Marginal Capital Allocation 0.0491 *** 0.0338 *** 0.0419 *** 0.0337 *** 0.0557 ***
 (0.0095)  (0.0098)  (0.0096)  (0.0098)  (0.0161)  
    Cost Efficiency 0.2103  0.1480  0.1856  0.1419 * 0.0642  
 (0.0406)  (0.0441)  (0.0405)  (0.0441)  (0.0673)  
    Market Share 0.6247  0.9785  -0.1534  0.2668  0.5246  
 (0.8061)  (0.8004)  (0.7992)  (0.7958)  (3.0781)  
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.1239 *** 0.1172 *** 0.1256 *** 0.1187 *** 0.0581  
 (0.0205)  (0.0204)  (0.0205)  (0.0204)  (0.0428)  
    Product Line Herfindahl Index -0.1259  -0.1660 * -0.0867  -0.1171 * -0.0693  
 (0.0233)  (0.0237)  (0.0235)  (0.0239)  (0.0555)  
    Natural log of Assets -0.0496 *** -0.0558 *** -0.0339 *** -0.0387 *** -0.0012  
 (0.0050)  (0.0050)  (0.0049)  (0.0046)  (0.0194)  
    Mutual 0.0270 ** 0.0283 ** 0.0282 ** 0.0301 ** -0.0144  
 (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0443)  
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0367 ** 0.0256  0.0522 *** 0.0423 ** 0.0267 ***
 (0.0164)  (0.0163)  (0.0164)  (0.0164)  (0.0036)  
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.1570 *** -0.1540 *** -0.1480 *** -0.1466 *** -0.0591  
 (0.0209)  (0.0208)  (0.0210)  (0.0208)  (0.0659)  
    A.M. Best Rating A or A- 0.0128  -0.0081      
 (0.0145)  (0.0146)      
    A.M. Best Rating B++ or B+ -0.0682 *** -0.1016 ***     
 (0.0196)  (0.0198)      
    A.M. Best Rating B or lower -0.1488 *** -0.1777 ***     
 (0.0286)  (0.0286)      
    Firm Insolvency Put Value   -13.5920 *** -12.4990 *** -16.5255 ***
   (1.6802)  (1.6833)  (2.2637)  
Adjusted R-square 0.06   0.08   0.07   0.08   0.41   
Observations 7314   7314   7314   7314   7314   
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table16. Cost and Revenue Efficiency Regression 
-One Way and Two Way Fixed Effect Model 
 
Dependent Variable 
 (Type of Efficiency):  Cost Revenue 
Variable/Model(Fixed Effects) Year  Year+Firm Year  Year+Firm  
    Intercept -0.3749*** 0.0229 -0.0863*** 0.0761 
 (0.0195) (0.0625) (0.0206) (0.0700) 
    Indicator for MA -0.0201*** -0.0023 -0.0227*** -0.0134** 
 (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0063) 
Size     
    Natural log of assets 0.027*** 0.0191*** 0.0133*** 0.0256***
 (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0031) 
Business Mix     
    % of Losses Incurred in PP Line 0.2848*** 0.2727*** -0.0275*** -0.0956***
 (0.0061) (0.0148) 0.0069 (0.0166) 
    % of Losses Incurred in PL Line 0.2543*** 0.1886*** -0.0505*** -0.0533***
 (0.0073) (0.0138) (0.0075) (0.0155) 
    % of Losses Incurred in CL Line -0.0037 -0.0420*** 0.0037 -0.0177 
 (0.0047) (0.0110) (0.0050) (0.0123) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0442*** 0.0140** 0.0280*** 0.0287***
 (0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0043) (0.0070) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.0204*** 0.0003 0.0070 -0.0311 
 (0.0053) (0.0079) (0.0056) (0.0089) 
Capitalization     
    Net Premium Written/Surplus 0.0235*** 0.0338*** 0.0769*** 0.0632***
 (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0026) 
    (Cash+Invested Assets)/Liability -0.0334*** -0.0295*** -0.0037 -0.0205***
 (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0040) 
Distributions Systems     
    Direct Marketing  0.0686*** 0.0034 0.0074** 0.0167** 
 (0.0035) (0.0065) (0.0037) (0.0073) 
    Brokerage 0.0142** 0.0094 0.0216 0.0004 
 (0.0058) (0.0135) (0.0061) (0.0151) 
    Mixed Distribution 0.0075 -0.0134 -0.0296 0.0247***
 (0.0057) (0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0093) 
Organization Form     
    Mutual 0.0107*** 0.0035 0.0125 0.0015 
 (0.0031) (0.0075) (0.0033) (0.0084) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0166*** 0.0178*** 0.0074** 0.0148** 
 (0.0033) (0.0069) (0.0035) (0.0072) 
Regulation     
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0138** -0.0220* -0.0125** 0.0170 
 (0.0046) (0.0122) (0.0049) (0.0137) 
Adjusted R-square 0.51  0.80  0.38  0.72  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 148.61 11.78 226.06 13.17 
Observations 10643  10643  10643  10643  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table17. Decomposition of Cost Efficiency Regression 
-One Way and Two Way Fixed Effect Model 
 
Dependent Variable:   Pure Technical Scale  Allocative 
Variable/Model Model1   Model2   Model1   Model2   Model1   Model2   
    Intercept -0.8897*** -0.3161*** 1.4170*** 1.5201*** 0.0444*** 0.4076***
 (0.0305) (0.0944) (0.0212) (0.0749) (0.0224) (0.0809) 
    Indicator for MA -0.0213** -0.0080 -0.0114* 0.0048 0.0072 0.0036 
 (0.0106) (0.0085) (0.0074) (0.0068) (0.0078) (0.0073) 
Size       
    Natural log of assets 0.0639*** 0.0515*** -0.0320** -0.0319* 0.0141*** 0.0201***
 (0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0036) 
Business Mix       
    % of Losses Incurred in PP Line 0.2629*** 0.2311*** 0.0759*** 0.0516*** 0.1911*** 0.1875***
 (0.0103) (0.0224) (0.0071) (0.0177) (0.0075) (0.0192) 
    % of Losses Incurred in PL Line 0.1900*** 0.1916*** 0.0536*** 0.0244 0.1891*** 0.1275***
 (0.0111) (0.0208) (0.0077) (0.0165) (0.0081) (0.0179) 
    % of Losses Incurred in CL Line 0.0176** -0.0207 -0.0332*** -0.0698*** 0.0431*** 0.0227 
 (0.0073) (0.0166) (0.0051) (0.0132) (0.0054) (0.0142) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0278*** 0.0178* 0.0195*** 0.0263*** 0.0417*** 0.0280***
 (0.0064) (0.0095) (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.0047) (0.0081) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.0383*** 0.0325*** 0.0051 0.0217 -0.0545* -0.0423 
 (0.0082) (0.0120) (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0060) (0.0103) 
Capitalization       
    Net Premium Written/Surplus 0.0534*** 0.0846*** 0.0064** 0.0144** -0.0236** -0.0287* 
 (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0030) 
    (Cash+Invested Assets)/Liability 0.0111 -0.0260*** -0.0469*** -0.0255*** -0.0438*** -0.0192***
 (0.0051) (0.0055) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0047) 
Distributions Systems       
    Direct Marketing  0.0995*** 0.0085 0.0095** 0.0159** -0.0109** -0.0053 
 (0.0055) (0.0099) (0.0038) (0.0078) (0.0040) (0.0084) 
    Brokerage 0.0285*** 0.0236 0.0157** 0.0257 -0.0430 -0.0286 
 (0.0090) (0.0204) (0.0063) (0.0162) (0.0066) (0.0175) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.0100 -0.0373*** 0.0226*** 0.0271*** -0.0084 -0.0273**
 (0.0090) (0.0126) (0.0062) (0.0099) (0.0066) (0.0108) 
Organization Form       
    Mutual 0.0496*** 0.0082 0.0086** -0.0120 0.0621*** 0.0053 
 (0.0048) (0.0114) (0.0034) (0.0090) (0.0035) (0.0097) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0351*** 0.0311*** 0.0146*** 0.0148** -0.0175*** -0.0124* 
 (0.0052) (0.0110) (0.0036) (0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0070) 
Regulation       
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0120* -0.0122 -0.0011 0.0009 0.0047 -0.0218 
 (0.0072) (0.0185) (0.0050) (0.0147) (0.0053) (0.0158) 
Adjusted R-square 0.38  0.76  0.24  0.62  0.33  0.66  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 70.85 11.26 114.44 6.48 183.45 6.43 
Observations 10643  10643  10643  10643  10643  10643  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. Model1 indicates one-way (year) fixed effect and model2 represents two-way 
(year and firm) fixed effects.  
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Table18. Performance (ROA) Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model 
 
Dependent Variable:   Return On Assets 
Variable/Model Year Fixed  Year Fixed  IV   
    Intercept -0.0884*** -0.0848*** -0.0936***
 (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0117) 
    Indicator for MA -0.0153*** -0.0152*** -0.0120***
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
    Natural log of Assets 0.0059*** 0.0050*** 0.0049***
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
    Equity Capital/Total Assets 0.0857*** 0.0827*** 0.1049***
 (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0035) 
    % of Premium Written in PP Line -0.0084* -0.0037 -0.0052 
 (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0039) 
    % of Premium Written in PL Line -0.0061 -0.0088* -0.0067 
 (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
    % of Premium Written in CP Line 0.0166*** 0.0198*** 0.0146***
 (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0018 0.0010 -0.0031 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.0177*** 0.0150*** 0.0159***
 (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
    Direct Marketing  0.0105*** 0.0081*** 0.0085***
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
    Brokerage -0.0043 -0.0051 0.0016 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.0025 -0.0035 0.0034 
 (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0034) 
    Mutual -0.0127*** -0.0141*** -0.0130***
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0059*** 0.0052** 0.0089***
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0094*** -0.0100*** -0.0061** 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
    Revenue efficiency   0.1713***
   (0.0051) 
    Standard Deviation of Returns over past 5 years  -0.0211** -0.0248** 
  (0.0101) (0.0096) 
    Firm Portfolio Risk -0.1077***   
 (0.0288)   
Adjusted R-square 0.10  0.11  0.19  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 41.64 45.01 82.13 
Observations 10643  10643  10643  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table19. Performance (ROE) Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model 
 
Dependent Variable:  Return On Equity 
Variable/Model Year Fixed  Year Fixed   IV   
    Intercept -0.1587*** -0.1023*** -0.1184*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0311) (0.0298) 
    Indicator for MA -0.0363*** -0.0349*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0101) 
    Natural log of Assets 0.0155*** 0.0121*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
    Equity Capital/Total Assets 0.0193 -0.0049 0.0456*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0090) 
    % of Premium Written in PP Line -0.0197* -0.0132 -0.0173* 
 (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0098) 
    % of Premium Written in PL Line -0.0116 -0.0177 -0.0128 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0108) 
    % of Premium Written in CP Line 0.0281*** 0.0308*** 0.0178** 
 (0.0081) (0.0075) (0.0071) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.0056 0.0066 -0.0030 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0061) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.0582*** 0.0536*** 0.0557*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0078) 
    Direct Marketing  0.0245*** 0.0182*** 0.0187*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0052) 
    Brokerage -0.0017 -0.0048 0.0114 
 (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0085) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.0162* -0.0159* 0.0009 
 (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0085) 
    Mutual -0.0168*** -0.0239*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0045) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0206*** 0.0195*** 0.0286*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0051) 
    Indicator for Firm Licensed in New York  -0.0233*** -0.0249*** -0.0155** 
 (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0069) 
    Revenue efficiency   0.4083*** 
   (0.0129) 
    Standard Deviation of Returns over past 5 years  -0.1337*** -0.1489*** 
  (0.0131) (0.0126) 
    Firm Portfolio Risk -0.2932***   
 (0.0719)   
Adjusted R-square 0.05  0.06  0.14  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 18.42 23.26 55.67 
Observations 10643  10643  10643  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table20. Combined Ratio Regression-One Way Fixed Effect Model 
 
Dependent Variable:  Combined Ratio  
Variable/Lines of Business PP   PL   CP   CL   
    Intercept 1.1706*** 1.2226*** 1.0152*** 0.8240***
 (0.0480) (0.0601) (0.0457) (0.0587) 
    Indicator for MA 0.0492*** 0.0093 -0.0021 0.0362* 
 (0.0148) (0.0184) (0.0150) (0.0195) 
    Natural log of Assets -0.0167*** -0.0114*** -0.0012 0.0128***
 (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0027) 
    Equity Capital/Total Assets 0.0093* -0.0844*** -0.0560*** -0.0467** 
 (0.0138) (0.0180) (0.0131) (0.0185) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index -0.0274*** -0.0657*** -0.0693*** -0.0376***
 (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0099) (0.0129) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index -0.0827*** -0.0397 -0.0348*** -0.1641***
 (0.0174) (0.0256) (0.0129) (0.0150) 
    Direct Marketing  -0.0205** 0.02314* -0.0172* -0.0303***
 (0.0095) (0.0118) (0.0088) (0.0111) 
    Brokerage 0.0138 0.0105 -0.0093 -0.0052 
 (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0137) (0.0170) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.0660*** 0.0111 0.0010 0.0145 
 (0.0166) (0.0231) (0.0148) (0.0168) 
    Mutual 0.1003*** 0.0232** 0.0060 -0.0036 
 (0.0069) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0090) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms -0.0357*** -0.0555*** -0.0463*** -0.0515***
 (0.0087) (0.0111) (0.0083) (0.0110) 
    Firm Licensed in New York  0.0181* 0.0573*** -0.0105 0.0911***
 (0.0103) (0.0148) (0.0104) (0.0149) 
Adjusted R-square 0.08  0.05  0.05  0.08  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 25.24 9.62 13.72 25.28 
Observations 7259  5176  7786  7314  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. PP represents personal property line, PL personal liability line, CP commercial 
property line, and CL commercial liability line. 
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Table21. Expense Ratio Regression-One Way Fixed Effect Model 
 
Dependent Variable:  Expense Ratio 
Variable/Lines of Business PP   PL   CP   CL   
    Intercept 0.6121*** 0.5561*** 0.9522*** 0.7736*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0242) (0.0275) (0.0281) 
    Indicator for MA 0.0274*** 0.0085 -0.0110 0.0166* 
 (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0093) 
    Natural log of Assets -0.0196*** -0.0175*** -0.0271*** -0.0190*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
    Equity Capital/Total Assets 0.0528*** -0.0330*** 0.0207*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0089) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index -0.0278*** -0.0078 -0.0605*** -0.0315*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index -0.0511*** -0.0228** 0.0172* -0.1575*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0077) (0.0071) 
    Direct Marketing  -0.0419*** -0.0219*** -0.0642*** -0.0607*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
    Brokerage -0.0082 0.0089 -0.0624*** -0.0079 
 (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0081) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.0687*** -0.0150 -0.0188** -0.0182** 
 (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0080) 
    Mutual 0.0515*** 0.0012 -0.0301*** 0.0376*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms -0.0254*** -0.0300*** -0.0308*** -0.0170*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0052) 
    Firm Licensed in New York  0.0198*** 0.0019 -0.0382*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0071) 
Adjusted R-square 0.15  0.23  0.13  0.18  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 49.78 59.80 44.80 60.02 
Observations 7259  5176  7786  7314  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. PP represents personal property line, PL personal liability line, CP commercial 
property line, and CL commercial liability line. 
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Table22. Risk-Adjusted Performance Regression-One Way Fixed Effect and IV Model 
 
Dependent Variable:  Risk-Adjusted ROA Risk-Adjusted ROE 
Variable/Model Fixed Effect   IV   Fixed Effect    IV   
    Intercept -2.7869*** -2.9044*** -1.7294 * -1.8406**
 (0.3393) (0.3364) (0.8862)  (0.8857) 
    Indicator for MA -0.4430*** -0.4071*** -0.4559 * -0.4218* 
 (0.1171) (0.1161) (0.3058)  (0.3056) 
    Natural log of Assets 0.1962*** 0.1951*** 0.1877 *** 0.1866***
 (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0401)  (0.0400) 
    Equity Capital/Total Assets 0.9913*** 1.2646*** 0.5820 ** 0.8415***
 (0.1015) (0.1025) (0.2651)  (0.2698) 
    % of Premium Written in PP Line 0.2341** 0.2184* 0.2020  0.1870 
 (0.1133) (0.1123) (0.2960)  (0.2957) 
    % of Premium Written in PL Line 0.0484 0.0867 0.8926 *** 0.9289***
 (0.1250) (0.1239) (0.3265)  (0.3262) 
    % of Premium Written in CP Line 0.5875*** 0.5311*** 0.8107 *** 0.7571***
 (0.0826) (0.0820) (0.2158)  (0.2159) 
    Geographic Herfindahl Index 0.2825*** 0.3350*** 0.5284 *** 0.5782***
 (0.0709) (0.0704) (0.1852)  (0.1853) 
    Product Line Herfindahl Index 0.7735*** 0.7960*** 1.1055 *** 1.1270***
 (0.0903) (0.0895) (0.2359)  (0.2356) 
    Direct Marketing  0.0604 0.0762 -0.0593  -0.0442 
 (0.0606) (0.0601) (0.1584)  (0.1583) 
    Brokerage 0.1144 0.1966** -0.0413  0.0367 
 (0.0990) (0.0983) (0.2587)  (0.2589) 
    Mixed Distribution -0.3367*** -0.2493** -0.4389 * -0.3559 
 (0.0988) (0.0981) (0.2581)  (0.2584) 
    Mutual -0.0564 -0.0409 0.0874  0.1021 
 (0.0529) (0.0524) (0.1382)  (0.1381) 
    Unaffiliated Single Firms 0.0339*** 0.3835*** 0.1896  0.2316 
 (0.0598) (0.0593) (0.1562)  (0.1562) 
    Firm Licensed in New York  -0.1259 -0.0803 -0.1827  -0.1394 
 (0.0800) (0.0793) (0.2089)  (0.2089) 
    Revenue efficiency  2.0749***   1.9698***
  (0.1481)   (0.3900) 
Adjusted R-square 0.06  0.07  0.02   0.03  
F-Statistic for fixed effect 21.94 28.13 5.60  6.28 
Observations 10643  10643  10643   10643  
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
